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ABSTRACT 
In my thesis, Evolution Science and the Imago Dei: A Richer and more Robust 
Treatment of Theological Anthropology, the first chapter demonstrates, from the 
historical analysis of the content attributed to the concept imago Dei over the centuries, 
that different ages in the Church have interpreted the content of that expression in different 
ways. From this historical analysis that the imago Dei assumes different meanings at 
different points in history, I justify my expectation that the term is open to ever new 
meanings.  
With the second chapter, by exploring the evolutionary contribution to the 
emergence of modern human, I establish the similarity and divergence between humans 
and nonhumans, genetically and phenotypically. In the third chapter, I criticize the 
exclusive reference of the imago Dei to only humans. Even though humans continue to be 
special and distinct from other species, human species has a lot in common with nonhuman 
species. Evolutionary science helps demonstrate that what our ancestors in faith thought 
was unique to humans is not so.  
My claim is that every living species is imago Dei in different ways. Every time 
that there is similarity between species, there is imago Dei, and every time that there is 
divergence, there is imago Dei in a different way. The divergence is not a difference 
between members of the same species, or else there would be in the same species so 
many imago Dei in different ways. Rather, the divergence is the speciation, that is, the 
difference between species. Because we are all imago Dei, we have a purpose which is not 
only individual, self-centered, or universal but which is divine; therefore, the meaning of 
our life does not end in this life but is opened to eschatology. Because we are imago Dei, we 
ii 
are called to be in solidarity and to live in sincerity with each other. Solidarity, rather than 
having anything to do with pity or charity, affirms that as imago Dei, we all have value in 
the eyes of our God.  
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While the Bible and the Christian tradition use the language of 
image of God specifically of the human, they also see the whole 
of creation, and the diversity of life on Earth, as the self-
expression of God and, in this sense, as imaging God.1 
 
General Introduction  
Anthropological science, as the scientific study of human biological and 
physiological characteristics (physical anthropology) and human societies and cultures and 
their development (social anthropology), is often readjusted in light of new discoveries in 
science. When discoveries or new scientific theories are conceived, it impacts in one way 
or another the past and present comprehension of the human being. When Christians think 
about the human being, they approach it with a theological anthropology perspective where 
they explain man considering their faith, in light of Revelation and the Christ 
event. Christian anthropology has developed variations on the understanding of the human 
being as imago Dei. Might contemporary evolutionary science contribute to further 
development?  Understanding Homo sapiens as a product of a long history of evolution 
governed by natural selection rather than divine intervention re-frames much of the 
theological discussion. If the modern human is understood as a being which descends from 
a common ancestor with other species, what can be the implications in the Christian 
theological anthropology? What will it mean then to be imago Dei? Is it exclusively being 
a human person? Does something or any feature belong uniquely or exclusively to human 
beings? And how can we understand the strict reference of imago Dei to the non-physical, 
the soul or spirit, reason or conscience, during history? This thesis will demonstrate that 
the human person is so thoroughly embedded in natural physical processes that the concept 
 
1 Denis Edwards, Ecology at the Heart of Faith: The Change of Heart that leads to a New Way of Living on 
Earth (New York: Orbis Books, 2006), 14. 
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of the imago Dei must incorporate our evolutionary history, biology, and future. In other 
words, this thesis will demonstrate that the traditional way of referring the notion of imago 
Dei exclusively to humans needs some readjustment. In this thesis, then, considering the 
contribution of Biological, Cultural, and Epistemic evolution and the similarities and 
divergences between humans and nonhuman species, we will propose the extension of the 
notion of imago Dei to every living species in different ways. The claim that we will 
demonstrate is that every living species is imago Dei in different ways. 
The first chapter will trace the metaphor of the imago Dei through different phases 
of its history. We will present different approaches to the imago Dei. We will emphasize 
the meaning of imago Dei from the biblical perspective before focusing on the patristic and 
medieval Eastern and Western contributions on imago Dei, where the structural view of 
the imago Dei will be developed. From there, we will analyze the functionality, or 
stewardship, and the communal, or relational, views of imago Dei. The second chapter will 
focus mainly on Contemporary Evolutionary theories, but we will begin by paying 
attention to Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism, which are the foundation for Contemporary 
evolutionary theories, like Social Darwinism, Sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and 
cultural evolution. In that context of the contemporary evolutionary theories, we will 
analyze the emergence of the modern humans, where the similarities and divergences 
between modern humans and chimpanzees will be emphasized. The third chapter will 
demonstrate how the evolutionary perspective sheds light on Christian anthropology. We 
will demonstrate that when we speak of the human being as the product of contemporary 
understanding of the Evolutionary theories, that requests an openness or an extension of 
imago Dei to other species, but in different ways. From there, we will argue that having 
3 
evolved along evolutionary pathways does not mean that we do not have purpose or value. 
In the end, we will develop the notion of solidarity and sincerity between human beings as 
imago Dei, and between human beings and the rest of creation as created also, in a different 
way, in the image of God.  
4 
CHAPTER I: VARIOUS UNDERSTANDING OF IMAGO DEI 
As the witness of Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium 
makes clear, the truth that human beings are created in the 
image of God is at the heart of Christian revelation. This truth 
was recognized, and its broad implications expounded by the 
Fathers of the Church and by the great scholastic theologians. 
Although, as we shall note below, this truth was challenged by 
some influential modern thinkers, today biblical scholars and 
theologians join with the Magisterium in reclaiming and 
reaffirming the doctrine of the imago Dei.2 
 
Introduction 
Among the three major monotheistic religious traditions, Judaism3, Islam4 and 
Christianity, there is an agreement that, while everything is created by God, human beings 
are the only thing created as imago Dei, meaning in the image of God, to whom God has 
entrusted the rest of creation. During their history, each of these major religious traditions 
has supported and explained in her own way the exclusive reference of imago Dei to human 
beings. From the Christian perspective, especially from the Old Testament perspective, the 
imago Dei referred to the whole of the human being, in the sense that the different 
composite parts of the human person were not perceived as divided, like body or soul, flesh 
 
2 International Theological Commission, Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the 
Image of God, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040723_co
mmunion-stewardship_en.html. (accessed November 26, 2019), 6. 
3 The idea of imago Dei in Judaism is first of all found in the Torah and it can be found also in different 
works, such as Yechiel Barilan, “From Imago Dei in the Jewish-Christian Traditions to Human Dignity in 
Contemporary Jewish Law,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal 19, no. 3 (Sep 2009): 231-59; and 
Dominique Scallisi, “5 Things Muslims and Christians Can Agree On,” Intellectual TakeOut (July 23, 2018), 
https://www.intellectualtakeout.org/article/5-things-muslims-and-christians-can-agree/ (accessed April 22, 
2020); and Martin Gosman, Holy Scriptures in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: Hermeneutics, Values and 
Society (Amsterdam & Atlanta GA: Rodopi, 1997). 
4 In Islam, the idea of imago Dei is also based in the Holy Scriptures, the Quran, and it can be found also in 
some works like Admin, “Islam, End Times, and the Imago Dei,” Crosspolitic Studios, (2018), 
https://crosspolitic.com/islam-end-times-and-the-imago-dei/ (accessed April 22, 2020); and Samuela Pagani, 
“Imago Dei e l’Interdizione di Uccidere Nell’Islam. Il Capitolo su Giona Dei Fusus Al-Hikam Di Ibn’Arabi,’’ 
in In The Image of God: Foundations and Objections within the Discourse on Human Dignity, ed. Alberto 
Melloni, and Riccardo Saccenti (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010), 227-261. 
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or spirit. It also referred to the capacity of the creatures to be in relation to the Creator and 
to other creatures who look like them. And, in the New Testament, the imago Dei referred 
principally to Jesus, the First-born, the true image of God.  
However, in the course of history, the Church fathers from Eastern and Western 
Christian traditions, emphasizing in their own way the meaning of the imago Dei, 
dissociated themselves from the reference of the imago Dei to the whole of human person, 
i.e., the undivided person. From the distinction of being in the likeness or being in the 
image, they considered that the whole of the human person cannot be at the same time the 
likeness and the image of God. The medieval thinkers emphasized their own meaning of 
the imago Dei by referring the image of God in the human person to some cognitive faculty 
that the human being has, such as reason. That approach was already developed by 
Augustine of Hippo during the Latin father period. Referring the image of God in the 
human person to reason or self-consciousness is qualified as the structural view of imago 
Dei. Alongside the structural view, there are the relational or communal view and the 
functional or stewardship view of the imago Dei.  
In the context of this first chapter of our thesis, we will begin by clarifying the 
meaning of imago Dei from the biblical perspective where the imago Dei is understood as 
undivided and relational, before presenting the perception of the imago Dei from the 
patristic, medieval, and contemporary periods in the Eastern and Western Christian 
traditions. From there, we will emphasize the two other views: the functionality or 
stewardship and the communal or relational dimensions of the imago Dei.  
6 
1.1. The imago Dei from the official teaching of the Catholic  
 The Catechism of the Catholic Church reaffirms that when God created men and 
women, He created them to occupy a unique place in creation, to be the image of God, to 
unite the spiritual and material worlds; male and female God creates them and established 
his friendship with them.5 Among all visible creatures, The Catechism states that “only 
man is able to know and love his creator.”6 Man is also confirmed as the “only creature on 
earth that God has willed for its own sake, and he alone is called to share, by knowledge 
and love, in God’s own life.”7 The Catechism makes it clear that “being in the image of 
God the human individual possesses the dignity of a person, who is not just something, but 
someone. He is capable of self-knowledge, of self-possession and freely giving himself 
and entering into communion with other persons.”8 According to The Catechism, “God 
created everything for man, but man in turn was created to serve and love God and to offer 
all creation back to him.”9 The human person as created in the image of God is “a being at 
once corporal and spiritual. […] Man, whole and entire, is therefore willed by God.”10 The 
emphasis was more on the whole person rather than on individual qualities or capacities of 
the structural imago Dei.  
 Men and women as willed by God are on one hand “in perfect equality as human 
persons; on the other, in their respective beings as man and woman.”11  Being made in the 
image of God, men and women “possess an inalienable dignity which comes to them 
 
5 The Catechism of the Catholic Church, Revised edition. (Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa, 1995), 355. 
6 Gaudium et Spes, 12. 
7 Ibid., 24. 
8 The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 357. 
9 Ibid., 358. 
10 Ibid., 362. 
11 Ibid., 369. 
7 
immediately from God their Creator. Man and woman are both with one and the same 
dignity in the image of God.”12 Man and woman are created to complement each other, to 
be in communion with one another, with the world and with God. In that communion, 
according to The Catechism “man and woman have the vocation of ‘subduing’ the earth as 
stewards of God. This sovereignty is not to be an arbitrary and destructive domination.”13 
It continues by stating that “God calls man and woman, made in the image of the Creator, 
[…] to share in his providence towards other creatures, hence responsibility for the world 
God has entrusted to them.”14 With the help of the encyclical letter Laudato Si’ and the 
Ecology at the Heart of Faith of Denis Edwards, we will come back in the third chapter to 
this model of stewardship.15  
 The Catechism has also clarified that God is not in man’s image. It states “in no way 
is God in man’s image. He is neither man nor woman. God is pure spirit in which there is 
no place for the difference between the sexes.”16 However in their respective perfection, 
man and woman reflect something of the infinite perfection of God: those of a mother and 
 
12 The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 373. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 We will then insist on the invitation of Pope Francis to humans for the importance of ethics in our 
relationship to the environment. This is an approach to ecology which respects our unique place as human 
beings in this world and our relationship to our surroundings. And after presenting briefly the 5 models 
(kinship with creation; domination of nature; ecological egalitarianism; kinship within a community; and 
cultivating and caring for creation) of relationship between human beings and the rest of the creation of 
Edwards, we will emphasize the fifth model ‘the cultivating and caring for creation’. According to Edwards, 
the cultivating and caring model is where human beings can see themselves as interrelated in a community 
of life with other creatures, who are also the self-expression of God, and in this sense, the image of God like 
human beings. Cf. Denis Edwards, Ecology at the Heart of Faith: The Change of Heart that leads to a New 
Way of Living on Earth (New York: Orbis Books, 2006), 14-26. 
16 The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 370. 
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wife and those of a father and husband. These are briefly what we can learn from the official 
teaching of Catholicism from The Catechism of the Catholic Church.17  
1.2. The imago Dei from the Scriptures: Old and New Testament 
The concept of imago Dei is traditionally referred to human beings. And the idea 
of human beings as created in the image of God is at the real heart of the Christian 
revelation. Before getting to the traditional reference of the theme of imago Dei in Genesis, 
it can be noted that the theme imago Dei “emerges from a common royal ideology where 
individual Mesopotamian, Hittite, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Egyptian priests-kings are 
referred to as the image and likeness of particular gods.”18 The imago Dei (selem elohîm) 
in Hebrew, which is the term used in Genesis, is “the exact counterpart of the Akkadian 
expression (salam [God’s name]) ‘image of Enlil [Marduk, etc.]’), an expression which 
often appears as an epithet of Mesopotamian priest-kings.”19 “Reference to the king as the 
image (salmu) of God abound in the Neo-Assyrian royal correspondence.”20 In the ancient 
Near Eastern conception, the king (understood as a priest-king) was seen as “the god’s 
authorized deputy or viceroy on earth.”21 In fact, “description of Near Eastern Kings as the 
image of a god . . . provides the most plausible set of parallels for interpreting the imago 
Dei in Genesis.”22 From the book of Genesis, God said: 
 
17 In addition to this teaching, we have a text, Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons created in the 
Image of God, developed by an International Theological Commission held at Rome during the period 
2000-2002. This document was submitted to Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, the President of the Commission, 
who has given his permission for its publication in 2004. 
18 Joshua Moritz, “One Imago Dei and the Incarnation of the Eschatological Adam,” in Astrotheology: 
Science and Theology Meet Extraterrestrial Life, chap. 19, Kindle. 
19 Phyllis A. Bird, “Theological Anthropology in the Hebrew Bible,” in The Blackwell Companion to the 
Hebrew Bible, ed. Leo Perdue (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 260–261. 
20 Simo Parpola, “The Assyrian Tree of Life: Tracing the Origins of Jewish Monotheism and Greek 
Philosophy,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 52, no. 3 (1993): 168.  
21 Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids Michigan: Brazos 
Press, 2005), 119. 
22 Ibid., 121. 
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Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, 
and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps 
upon the earth. So, God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he 
created them; male and female he created them.23  
This is the written account of Adam's family line. When God created mankind, he 
made them in the likeness of God. He created them male and female and blessed 
them. And he named them "Mankind" when they were created. When Adam had 
lived 130 years, he had a son in his own likeness, in his own image; and he named 
him Seth.24 
Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall their blood be shed; for in the image 
of God has God made mankind.25 
 These passages from Genesis are in the context of the narrative of creation. In this 
narration, the fact that the human beings are made in the likeness and image of God leads 
Gerhard von Rad to identify human beings as “God’s representative in the world.”26 
Theologians like Jack Mahoney, SJ, said the “passage was given a special anthropological 
interpretation based on what was considered uniquely characteristic of humanity above all 
other creatures.”27 Traditionally, imago Dei is referred to men and women because when 
“God created man in his image; in the image of God he created him; male and female, he 
created them.”28  
 From the biblical interpretation, God has created male and female29 in his image. The 
theme imago Dei is “seen as the key to the biblical understanding of human nature and to 
all the affirmations of biblical anthropology in both the Old and New Testaments.”30 The 
 
23 Gen.1: 26-27. 
24 Gen. 5: 1-3. 
25 Gen. 9: 6. 
26 Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, 2nd rev. ed. (London: SCM, 1963), 55. 
27 Jack Mahoney, “Evolution, Altruism, and the Image of God” Theological Studies 71, no.3 (Sep 2010): 
678. 
28 Gen. 1:27; cf. Gen. 5:1-2. 
29 In Familiaris Consortio, Pope John Paul II clarifies how male and female all share equal dignity and 
responsibility and how they are equally created in God’s image. Men and women have equal dignity and 
responsibility because they are all created in the image of God. Unfortunately, the history left us a kind of 
discrimination and dominance of male over female, which is not really what all created in the image of God 
should be. 
30 International Theological Commission, 7. 
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imago Dei at this point is the definition of humanity. And the mystery of imago Dei seems 
strongly connected to the mystery of God. The biblical interpretation understood the imago 
Dei as the whole of the human being, as The Catechism has reaffirmed. Whenever we read 
how God creates Mankind in His image, the text never divides mankind as if God creates 
the intellect or reason or the domination of humankind.  
Biblical anthropology excludes mind-body dualism. It speaks of man as a whole. 
Among the basic Hebrew terms for man used in the Old Testament, nèfèš means 
the life of a concrete person who is alive (Gen 9:4; Lev. 24:17-18, Proverbs 8:35). 
But man does not have a nèfèš; he is a nèfèš (Gen 2:7; Lev 17:10). Basar refers to 
the flesh of animals and of men, and sometimes the body as a whole (Lev 4:11; 
26:29). Again, one does not have a basar, but is a basar. The New Testament term 
sarx (flesh) can denote the material corporality of man (2 Cor 12:7), but on the 
other hand also the whole person (Rom. 8:6). Another Greek term, soma (body) 
refers to the whole man with emphasis on his outward manifestation. Here too man 
does not have his body but is his body. Biblical anthropology clearly presupposes 
the unity of man and understands bodyliness to be essential to personal identity.31 
Created in the image of God, every part of the human being participates in the being 
and becoming of the imago Dei. The biblical interpretation of imago Dei as united man is 
shaped by two themes: “the whole of man is seen as created in the image of God. […] (and) 
the creation accounts in Genesis make it clear that man is not created as an isolated 
individual.”32 The human body or the human spirit or mind or reason are all part of the 
imago Dei without insistence on one part. Even when the Gospel insists on the fact that 
“the word became flesh” (sarx), the Evangelist surely makes it clear that Jesus has a real 
physical body which is not a phantom body (as this could favor Docetism), a real body 
which is part of  the being of Jesus as the perfection of imago Dei. It is clear with the 
biblical interpretation that imago Dei is a unified reality and that human bodyliness is part 
of the image of God. Not only has God created mankind not divided but He has created 
 
31 International Theological Commission, 28. 
32 Ibid., 9-10. 
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mankind as a relational person. The first human beings were placed in relation with other 
persons, with the world, with God and with themselves. So, the created image from the Old 
Testament is that mankind is neither a divided person nor an isolated person.  
From the New Testament, the perfect and true imago Dei is in the imago Christi. 
The theme of imago Dei as Mahoney emphasizes, “was transposed from the Hebrew 
Bible's treatment of it as an anthropological statement about the creation of humanity to 
the center of Christian theology with Paul's identification of Christ as the image of the 
invisible God, the firstborn of all creation.”33 He continues by mentioning that “through 
his human existence and actions Jesus has presented us with a unique eikon, or created 
representation, of his heavenly Father, and we in turn are being called to be associated with 
Christ as his brothers and sisters.”34  
Jesus Christ is seen as the true and perfect image of God or, “in the original Greek, 
as the icon of God.”35 In the letter to the Corinthians, Paul speaks of Christ as the image of 
God. He says: “the god of this age has blinded the minds of unbelievers, so that they cannot 
see the light of the gospel that displays the glory of Christ, who is the image of God.”36 It 
is in His grace that others are conformed to His image. In the letter to the Hebrews, the 
author states, “the Son is the radiance of God's glory and the exact representation of his 
being, sustaining all things by his powerful word. After he had provided purification for 
sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty in heaven.”37 And it is confirmed that 
others are conformed to this image by grace in the letter to Romans, “for those God 
 
33 Mahoney, 679. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Edwards, 15. 
36 2 Cor 4: 4. 
37 Heb 1: 3. 
12 
foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the 
firstborn among many brothers and sisters.”38 The hymn to Christ in the Letter to the 
Colossians sings of Christ as the “image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation.”39 
Jesus is the true and perfect image of God, “the one in whom all things are created and the 
one in whom all are reconciled.”40 The imago Christi as the perfect imago Dei determines 
the becoming of others as imago Dei, so that “to become the image of God requires an 
active participation on man’s part in his transformation according to the pattern of the 
image of the Son […] who manifests his identity by the historical movement from his 
incarnation to his glory.”41  
The transformation to the imago Christi, so that to become an imago Dei is a 
journey of conversion from sin to salvation and consummation which is accomplished 
through the sacraments. Created as imago Dei and perfected as imago Christi by the power 
of the Holy Spirit in the sacraments, we are embraced in love by the Father. The imago 
Christi is the full or complete revelation of what it means to be created in imago Dei.  “In 
him (imago Christi), we find the total receptivity to the Father which should characterize 
our own existence, the openness to the other in an attitude of service which should 
characterize our relations with our brothers and sisters in Christ, and the mercy and love 
for others which Christ, as the image of the Father, displays for us.”42 This transformation 
to the imago Christi is a form of the biblical tradition.  
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The theology of imago Dei as perfected in imago Christi finds some clarifications 
from Gaudium et Spes, where it states that  
It is only in the mystery of the Word made flesh that the mystery of man truly 
becomes clear. For Adam, the first man, was a type of him who was to come, Christ 
the Lord. Christ the new Adam, in the very revelation of the mystery of the Father 
and of his love, fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high 
calling. No wonder, then, that all the truths mentioned so far should find in him 
their source and their most perfect embodiment.43  
Here, Jesus is the one who reveals to men and women the fullness of their being because 
of having been created “through him and in him.”44 Becoming imago Dei is no longer in 
the past but it is in the future. Ted Peters in “The Imago Dei as the End of Evolution”45 has 
developed an idea about the human race becoming imago Dei at the end (terminus as 
conclusion and telos as goal) in imago Christi who despite having been after Adam, 
“provides the definition of what is truly Adam”46, in the sense that the sin which is 
conceived to come after the being imago Dei, now precedes it. Peters develops a 
complementary approach between evolutionary science and the eschatology. “For 
creatures within the lengthy story of evolution, the imago Dei is the divine call forward, a 
call we hear and respond to now but that draws us towards transformation into a future 
reality.”47 He continues by affirming that “the full flourishing of the image of God in 
humans is a promise to hope for.”48 It is in the eschatology that we hope to see the fullness 
of the imago Dei. And with the proleptic model, “we begin with Jesus Christ, not Adam 
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and Eve. Accordingly, we begin with the resurrected Christ and then, retroactively 
incorporate Christ’s imago into ourselves through faith, hope and love.”49  
The proleptic model as the promise to rise in the new creation with Christ who rose 
on Easter, synthetizes creation and redemption, and includes ontological (“it is the being 
of God’s future that determines the being of all that has happened in past nature and 
history”50) and ethical components (“ethics as human action aimed at making tomorrow 
better than yesterday. The Christian ethicist begins with a vision of God’s future and then 
seeks to work creatively to transform present reality in light of this vision.”51) With his 
contribution, Peters clarifies from evolutionary and eschatological perspectives how the 
fullness of the imago Dei derives “not from Adam and Eve in the past but from the 
eschatological Christ in the future. (and) […] when we and the cosmos are redeemed, we 
will be fully created. Then God can finally say, “Behold, it is very good.”52 
1.3. The imago Dei from the Patristic and Medieval views in Eastern and 
Western traditions 
1.3.1. From Eastern Christianity 
In general, the biblical anthropology of imago Dei as non-divided and non-isolated 
has occupied a prominent “place in Christian anthropology in the Fathers of the Church 
and in later theology, right up to the beginning of modern times.”53 An indication of the 
centrality of the biblical vision of the image of God can be found in the endeavor of early 
Christians “to interpret the biblical prohibition against artistic representations of God (cf. 
Ex 20:2f; Dt 27:15) in the light of the incarnation. For the mystery of the incarnation 
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demonstrated the possibility of representing the God-made-man in his human and historical 
reality.”54 We can recall the defense of artistic representation of the Incarnate Word and of 
the events of salvation during the iconoclastic controversies of the seventh and eighth 
centuries which “rested on a profound understanding of the hypostatic union which refused 
to separate the divine and the human in the image.”55 
In their development of the notion of imago Dei, the Eastern and Western Christian 
traditions developed differently. The Eastern tradition, with the Greek fathers, focused not 
only on the notion of image, but also expanded on the notion of person which refers to 
Christ as one person with two natures.56 In “The Human Person as Image of God: Eastern 
Christianity,” Lars Thunberg explained that the human as a person in Christian spirituality 
is not an individualistic human being, but “the human person is always seen as in a social 
context. […] (it is) also always understood as being created in the image of God.”57 The 
human being as a social person and not as an antisocial individual and God as the 
“copersonal counterpart are seen as the decisive factors in this spirituality.”58 Image and 
person are two concepts crucial to the way that the human being as person is always 
understood as being created in the image of God, because “Divine life is understood as 
personal. (And) God is divinity in three persons-and thus the human being, as bearing the 
image of God, is necessarily a person.”59  
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God as one substance manifesting in three persons – the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit – led to the insight that the person is the individualization within the same 
nature or species. Therefore, the ancient church considers “Christ as divine/human person 
(Greek hypostasis, Latin persona) which means that the category of person transcends the 
limits of what is naturally given. Christ consists of two natures but is nevertheless one 
person, as the Council of Chalcedon in 451 stated.”60  In this logic, the early Christian 
Church despite considering humans as composite beings – body and soul – considered the 
human being as “unity charged by God with a purpose in the world that is linked to their 
being in the image of God.”61 The human being as imago Dei was still considered by the 
early Christians as a unity, meaning as a whole human despite the composite being that is 
the human person, and the evaluation of human beings was not possible without 
considering “their relationship to God – one in three persons – or to Christ, the 
divine/human Savior, who is one person in two natures.”62 
The early church that emerged within the Hellenistic cultural context, where it was 
bound to deal with both Greek philosophy and the Old Testament in its Greek version, the 
Septuagint, produced a significant development of the biblical account which makes a 
distinction between the image and the likeness. However, at a certain point, the patristic 
and medieval theology diverged from the biblical vision which identified the imago Dei 
with the whole man, meaning the undivided or totality of man. Therefore, the rendering of 
Gen 1:26 “seems more explicitly distinctive: the human is created not only ‘in the image 
of God’ (kat’ eikona) but also ‘into his likeness’ (kat’ homoiosin), and this seems to imply 
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a distance between what is given at the outset and what could be realized within the 
category of time.”63 And combined with the concept of humanity’s fall and sinfulness, “it 
might lead to an understanding of humans as in tension between their ‘ontological’ image 
character and their ‘moral’ similitude.”64 And, adopting the view of the New Testament 
which defines the true image of God in Christ, because Christ is identical with the creative 
Word/Logos and incarnate in humanity, the early Church reaffirmed, like all the Christian 
tradition, that human beings are according to the image of Christ, which means, human 
beings are the image of the image of God. The Logos is seen as the prototype, which “God 
used in creating humans in his image, and Christ is seen as the archetype of what is to be 
human. But Christ is, in his duality, also a person. And thus, human beings, in reflecting 
the archetype successively, may develop their likeness to God as personal fulfillment.”65 
In their distinction between image and likeness, first references by Christian authors 
go back to the debate on the composite beings of humans, as body and soul, or as flesh and 
spirit which has impacted considerably the notion of the non-divided imago Dei. Origen of 
Alexandria or Origen Adamantius (185-254), who basing himself on Genesis 1:26 (where 
God is said to have created man in his image and likeness), and Genesis 2:7 (where we 
learned that God created the human out of the dust and breathed his own spirit into the 
human’s nostrils), “constructed a theory of a double creation66: the first being one of pure 
spirits gathered around God, but finally falling into corruption; the second being 
effectuated by God in the act of rescuing fallen creation, giving humans bodies to gather 
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up their falling and frozen souls (psychai).”67 This theory of double creation which 
supposed that there was no initial coexistence of body and soul, was condemned as heresy. 
It was condemned because it was in conflict with the traditional view of creation as good.  
The second reference is Irenaeus of Lyons (120/140-200/203) who is considered as 
the first to have elaborated the human duality and “who regarded Adam as not yet mature 
but endowed with a divine task to develop his capacities to their fullness.”68 But because 
of the fall, this development was interrupted. It was only in the restoration of humanity in 
Christ that humans could regain their freedom.  
Gregory Nazianzen (329-389), one of the three Cappadocian fathers, wrestled 
considerably with the problem of the composite makeup of human beings, which are the 
mixture of body/soul, and flesh/spirit. According to Gregory, as body and soul, human 
person is fully initiated into the visible creation but only partially into the intellectual. 
However, being partially initiated into the intellectual creation is “not only the expression 
of the fallenness of human beings (as in Origen), but also a sign of their being preserved—
by God in creating them both body and soul—from the most disastrous destiny 
(exemplified by the fallen angel Lucifer) of a creation that revolts against its Creator.”69 
The human composite being of body and soul is understood as the special prerogative of 
human persons, which puts humans “into a unique position within the created order without 
letting them either usurp the exclusive position of God or be absorbed by material creation. 
They are in a position in between, which implies struggle, and it is precisely this position 
that renders humans both weak and pretentious.”70  
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Gregory of Nyssa (332-395), another Cappadocian father, did not agree with 
Origen’s approach of two creations, which makes the coexistence of the soul and body as 
something which happened in the second creation. For Gregory of Nyssa, in De hominis 
opificio (On the Creation of Man), “the Origenist position was intimately connected with 
an idea of metempsychosis and he argued that a fall into the material world would not imply 
a purification but rather successive falls—or a superiority of sensual life over against 
spiritual life.”71  
Like the others Church fathers, Maximus the Confessor (580-662) rejects the theory 
of Origen and affirmed that body and soul are linked to each other by necessity. For 
Maximus, it is part of God’s plan that human beings should consist of body and soul, and 
“body and soul not only form a composite nature, with its own principle of being, but also 
a complete species. Thus, the human as a composite being is unique, and it is this 
uniqueness that is according to the image.”72   
Cyril of Alexandria (378-444), making used of the analogy between humanity’s 
composite and the unity between divine and human nature in Christ, explained that “since 
Christ is the true image of God, this analogy seems to convey to the whole of humanity a 
secondary image character, which is fundamental and basic, even if it remains a fact that 
the early church located the image of God in humans in the soul, particularly in the higher 
part of the soul, the mind (nous).”73 
With this understanding of human composite being, the early church established 
the distinction between image and likeness in the biblical story of creation. It seems that in 
 
71 Gregory of Nyssa, Doctrine of Man 28; cf. De anima et resurrectione (PG 46, col. 108B). 
72 Thunberg, 295. 
73 Ibid. 
20 
Hebrew, the “terms selem (image) and dĕmût (likeness) do not convey any such distinction 
but are simply synonyms. But in the Greek Old Testament, the terms eikon (image) and 
homoiōsis (likeness) seem to be more open to a distinction between two meanings.”74 
Origen as a Greek father linked this distinction with his theory of double creation. He 
believes that, in Genesis 1:26, because both image and likeness are mentioned, God’s final 
intention is sketched out, and because in Genesis 1:27, only the image is mentioned, this 
indicated “that human being received in the first creation the dignity of image but the 
perfection of the likeness was reserved for the end of history on account of God’s 
pedagogical efforts as well as humanity’s positive imitation of God.”75 At the end, for 
Origen, “likeness was acquired by human beings through imitation of God.”76  
According to Irenaeus of Lyons, who has been the first church father to use the 
distinction of image and likeness77 in the sense that “image’ denotes an ontological 
participation (methexis) and ‘likeness’ (mimesis) a moral transformation,”78 the human 
character of image is not a sign of perfection, but it indicates “a task, the culmination of 
which is supposed to be likeness to God.”79 For Irenaeus, the image is used to refer to 
humanity created by God and likeness is used for what occurs when human beings are 
conformed to Christ through grace.80 In other words, “the mind which alone carries the 
divine image, is bound down through its relationship to the body and has to free itself 
through ascetic efforts in order to gain the divine likeness.”81  
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While Irenaeus makes his distinction between the ontological participation and the 
moral transformation, Tertullian (155-222), one of the Latin fathers, notes that “God 
created man in his image and gave him the breath of life as his likeness. (And) while the 
image can never be destroyed, the likeness can be lost by sin.”82 
For Maximus the Confessor, likeness seems to be above the image, but the use of 
the distinction between image and likeness did not seem to cause any difficulty. For him, 
“human beings are created in the image of God, in order that they may become like God. 
And this likeness is both their own maturity as human beings and their fulfillment as a 
microcosmic and mediating task within the created universe.”83  
1.3.2. From Western Christianity 
The question of the imago Dei in the course of the history of the early Church was 
not only the preoccupation of Eastern Christianity,84 it was also the preoccupation of 
Western Christianity. With Origen, Irenaeus of Lyons, Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of 
Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and Maximus the Confessor, we emphasize their divergence 
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from the biblical perspective of imago Dei, but also their approach of the composite beings 
of the human persons which are the bases on which most of them build their divergence. 
In the Western tradition, “the ways in which Latin authors understood how 
humanity was made in and reformed to God’s image were much influenced by their 
inheritance from both Jewish and Greek sources.”85 The Western Christian authors not only 
used the Old Testament which contains the Hebrew view of the human person as called by 
God to acts of loving obedience, but they also used the anthropology of Greek 
philosophers, like Plato and his followers, with its notion of the soul as bearing an image 
of divinity.86 There were some important differences between Jewish and Greek 
anthropologies. While the Greek anthropology makes a distinction between the body and 
soul “which led to an emphasis on the latter as the true person and an insistence that the 
soul’s immortality was the true human destiny,”87 the “traditional Jewish anthropology 
knew nothing of the distinction between body and soul, and in its apocalyptic phase had 
created the notion of the resurrection of the body in order to vindicate divine justice in a 
time of persecution.”88 Even if Christian authors made use of Greek philosophical language 
in explaining their anthropology, their use of it is radically new, because of the trinitarian 
and Christological character of medieval understanding of the imago Dei,  
Divinization, a concept taken over from the Greeks, was given a new content in 
Christian belief and practice, not only through the new religion’s insistence on the 
necessity of grace to restore the image but also because Christian understanding of 
the image itself was based not upon a fluid Greek notion of divinity but rather on 
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the mystery of the one God who had revealed himself as Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit.89 
In Western Christianity during the patristic and medieval period, three possible 
traditions of imago Dei were established: “that which finds the image of God primarily in 
the person considered as an intellectual subject; that which concentrates on the freedom of 
the subject as the true location of the image; and that which emphasizes the interpersonal 
character of the image.”90 To understand what it means to be created in the image and 
likeness of God, Augustin and Marius Victorinus made use of Neoplatonic thought. 
Victorinus makes a distinction between the Logos, who is the true imago Dei, and the 
human soul, which is created ad imaginem—that is, after the pattern of the Logos.91  For 
Victorinus, the original human person whose creation is described in Gen 1:26 bears the 
divine image – the soul possesses ‘to be,’ ‘to live,’ and to ‘understand’ in conformity with 
the three divine persons, whereas the body’s division into two sexes as recounted in the 
story of the creation of terrestrial humanity in Gen 2:7 mirrors the double nature of the 
Logos as both male and female.92  
For St. Augustine, instead of a distinction between image and likeness, he presents 
a more personalistic, psychological and existential account of the imago Dei. Using his life 
story in the Confessions, Augustine broke93 with Neoplatonic anthropology,94 “human 
destiny is no longer seen as the absorption of the individual back into the All, but as the 
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recovery of the true self through divine reordering of the will.”95 To become a true human 
person, there is a need for confession, a need for a direct interpersonal address to God 
which is simultaneously confession of our own sinfulness and praise of God’s loving-
kindness.96 Augustine developed the notion of imago as a particular kind of likeness 
(similitudo) in the way that the image is expressive of its source because of proximity and 
because its nature is formed through conversion, that is, a dynamic turning back toward the 
source in the very moment of its creation.97  
“Like Victorinus, Augustine admitted that some images can have a relation of 
equality with their source, […] (but) unlike Victorinus, Augustine insisted with Paul (1Cor 
11:7) that the human person can be said not only to be made ad imaginem but also to be in 
itself a true imago Dei.”98 Augustine rejected99 also the idea according to which the sexual 
division of humanity could be the result of the fall.100 In The Trinity, exploring how the 
whole of created reality mirrored the triune God101 and how the inner person had been 
created as a special image of the one God, Augustine insisted that “the external world and 
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even the outer person (homo exterior) bear only the vestiges of the Trinity (vestigia 
Trinitatis) and that only the inner person can be seen as a real imago Trinitatis.”102 For 
Augustine, the image of the triune God resides only in the mens, or the higher dimension 
of the soul. According to Augustine, it is in that part of human nature wherein the human 
being surpasses the brute and beasts, which of course, is reason, mind or intelligence, and 
that human beings are made in the image of God. It is in that part of his nature that man is 
made in the image of God.103  
“Augustine developed understanding of the human person as trinitarian image 
based both upon love and knowledge.”104 Augustine makes it clear that “the image of God 
in man orients him to God in invocation, knowledge and love.”105 In his understanding of 
the mind as the imago Trinitatis, Augustine concludes that “the image of God in man has 
a Trinitarian structure, reflecting either the tripartite structure of the human soul (spirit, 
self-consciousness, and love) or the threefold aspects of the psyche (memory, intelligence, 
and will).”106 And “it is only because the human person retains the image of the Trinity 
even after sin that it is possible for God’s grace to restore that image through act of 
knowing, remembering, and loving him.”107 Augustine108 placed clearly the imago 
character of the human subject in its intellectual nature.109  
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As McGinn notes, it is good to remember that “Augustine’s view of the human 
subject as the imago Trinitatis always needs to be considered in the light of his thoughts 
on the mystery of grace and freedom.”110 Augustine was resolutely opposed to any 
conception of freedom as the unhindered autonomy or self-determination of the individual 
subject. For him, “freedom was always in need of a modifier – it was freedom ‘to’ or 
freedom ‘from.’ Adam’s freedom had a degree of versatility not open to his 
descendants.”111 But, after the fall, “humanity was freely bound to sin and enjoyed a 
perverse freedom from justice; Christ restored true freedom (libertas) to our power of free 
choice (liberum arbitrium) by granting freedom from bondage to sin and the freedom to 
cooperate with grace in living according to caritas.”112 This Augustinian anthropology 
about the human person as imago Dei was challenged by other Western Christians church 
fathers and medieval thinkers, but it was preserved during the Middle Ages by Benedictine 
monasticism.  
Pope Gregory the Great (540-604), one of the Latin fathers, who was Pope from 
590 till his death, has contributed considerably to the Western Christian anthropology. He 
is known as someone who did more to form the monastic culture and mentality, especially 
in areas dealing with the situation of the human person. He based his anthropology largely 
on that of Augustine, with a genuine capacity to emphasize his own view. “Gregory’s acute 
sense of human misery as a result of sin […] was joined to an intense realization of how 
compunction for our sinful state gives rise to the desire for the experience of God as a 
foretaste of the perfect life to be enjoyed in heaven”113 At the same moment that Gregory 
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the Great insisted that in contemplation of God, a person recognizes his own worthlessness, 
he was also convinced that in that contemplation the taste of interior quiet is already 
experienced.114   
John the Scot (800-877) also made use of the intellectual heritage of Augustine, but 
more often he used the approaches of the Greek fathers. His Periphyseon contains a 
profound theological anthropology of a pronounced Neoplatonic character. In that book, 
after adopting the traditional understanding of human person as created ad imaginem 
(because the Logos is the true imago Dei), and the understanding according to which the 
image resides in the human person’s higher intellectual nature and bears a trinitarian 
structure, John the Scot went further “by insisting that the idea of humanity (homo) is the 
first of the primordial causes in which God created all things.”115 For him, man was made 
among the primordial causes in the image of God, so that in man, every creature, both 
intelligible and sensible, should become an inseparable unity, and that the man should be 
the mediating term and unification of all creatures.116 In that same logic, he explained that 
the first creation was a spiritual one in which all things “were united in the primordial idea 
of the First Man, Adam. His fall through pride produced the differentiated material universe 
in which we now live, but this world of division is being led back to its pristine unity 
through the saving work of the New Man, Christ the incarnate Word.”117 The human person 
at this point, for John the Scot, is “a particular intellectual idea eternally created in the mind 
of God (Periphyseon 4.7) – and the real similarity between the image and its divine 
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Exemplar paradoxically resides more in ignorance than in knowledge.”118 Therefore, as 
human beings, according to John the Scot, we are most truly the image of God in our 
inability to grasp or define our true nature, which precisely as imago Dei remains forever 
mysterious.  
Other important figures in the Western tradition are Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-
1153), who saw human freedom as the site of the image, and Richard of St. Victor ( died 
in 1173), whose thought contains profound reflections on how the interpersonal human 
subject is an image of the three-personed God.119 As a likely a master of the Cistercian 
school and the only rival of Augustine among medieval Latin authors, Bernard insisted on 
self-knowledge, which consists of three things: that a person know what he has done, what 
he deserves, and what he has lost.120 Self-knowledge and self-love are the path to the loving 
union with God. Like Augustine’s view of freedom, Bernard was “fundamentally 
theocentric in the sense that God’s unfailing goodness as the free and spontaneous 
expression of the divine being is the basic source of all liberty.”  
Even if Bernard did not emphasize individual autonomy, Etienne Gilson claims that 
Bernard finds the image of God par excellence in human free will. For the human person 
who exercises self-knowledge and self-love, the image of God is in the free will.121 And 
the freedom seems to have three states according to Bernard: freedom from necessity 
(external coercion) which human beings possess, both before and after the fall, which 
 
118 McGinn, 322. 
119 Ibid., 324. 
120 Ibid. 
121 The understanding of human freedom as the true location of the imago Dei, by Bernard was conditioned 
by the role that love played in the life and thought of this most passionate of monks. When he talks of love, 
he talks of the paradox which comes with it, yet love is free, completely voluntary but it is absorbing and 
obsessive at the same time. Among all the motions, senses, and affections of the soul, it is love alone in which 
the creature is able, even if not on an equal basis, to repay its Creator for what it has received, to weigh back 
something from the same measure. Cf. McGinn, 325. 
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assures that the sins are voluntary expression of human wills; freedom from sin (free 
counsel) which humanity lost in the fall, and which is restored by Christ; and freedom from 
sorrow (free from pleasure) which is the unfailing enjoyment of the goodness of God in 
heaven. And as he said, “we must learn from our freedom of counsel not to abuse free 
choice, in order that one day we may be able fully to enjoy freedom of pleasure. Thus we 
are repairing the image of God in us, the way is being paved, by grace, for the retrieving 
of that former honor which we forfeited by sin.”122 Evoking the distinction between image 
and likeness, which helps to describe how humanity retained its basic relation with God 
even after the fall, Bernard in Grace and Free Choice identified image with free choice123 
and likeness with free counsel and free pleasure.124   
Richard of St. Victor, from the Western Christian tradition, emphasizes 
considerably the affective and intellectual powers of the soul in addressing the question of 
the human person, and this affected his understanding of the Trinity. For Richard, as for all 
his contemporaries, “the soul has two fundamental powers, love and knowledge, the two 
feet by which we journey to God.”125 The love which Richard is talking about is the love 
that is itself a form of knowing, a love which is not anti-intellectual, a love which allows 
the transformation or divinization of the person, a love which is a true caritas, which is 
opposed to the false self-love of cupiditas. And Richard, following Augustine, developed 
an understanding of how the three persons can be one God through an analysis of the nature 
of caritas. “God, who is by definition perfect charity or outpouring generous love, requires 
 
122 Bernard of Clairvaux, Grace and Free Choice 8.27. Cf. McGinn, 326. 
123 In the Sermons on the Song of Songs 80-82, the image consists in the greatness (magnitudo) and 
uprightness (rectitudo) of the soul, and the likeness is found in the permanent simplicity, immortality, and 
free choice of the soul. 
124 Bernard of Clairvaux, Grace and Free Choice 9.28-10.35. Cf. McGinn, 326. 
125 McGinn, 327. 
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someone equal to himself toward whom to direct this love.”126 Like the shared love 
between the persons of the Trinity, “in those who are mutually loved, the perfection of 
each, in order to be completed, requires with equal reason a sharer of the love (condilectus) 
that has been shown to them.”127 From this understanding of the Trinity as the supreme 
shared love of three equal persons, Richard claims that “the human person, then, like the 
divine person, is called to share love: this is what makes it what it is truly meant to be. 
Being made in the image and likeness of God means being made to share in the shared love 
of the Trinity, and like the Trinity to communicate that love to others.”128 So, being imago 
Dei is being this new creature who lives a life of loving service to others. Therefore, the 
true meaning of imago Dei, according to Richard, is to become an imago Christi in this 
life.  
While Bonaventure (1218-1274) understood that the image of God in the human 
person is realized through the will in the religious act of man,129 Thomas Aquinas (1225-
1274) believed that the image of God in the human is realized through reason, knowledge 
and love. And holding that the human person is not only the soul, but a composition of the 
body and soul, Thomas did not believe in an absolute separation of body and soul, but their 
correlation or interdependence in man. By emphasizing the human body, Thomas did not 
mean that the image of God is in man’s body, but “that the human body as a trace exhibits 
the image of God, which is located in the soul.”130 While he claimed that all creatures 
 
126 Bernard McGinn, 327. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Bonaventure, Sent. II d.16 a. 2 q.3. Cf. International Theological Commission, 16. 
130 Dominic Olariu, “Thomas Aquinas’ definition of the imago Dei and the development of lifelike 
portraiture,” BUCEMA (Feb 17, 2013), https://journals.openedition.org/cem/13251 (accessed Mar 9, 2020). 
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possess some likeness to God, which he called a trace, he believed that only human being 
is made in the image of God.131  
For Thomas, “the imago Dei possesses an historical character, since it passes 
through three stages: the imago creationis (naturae), the imago recreationis (gratiae), and 
the similitudinis (gloriae).”132 For him, the human person is made in the image of God in 
these three different ways. According to the stage of imago creationis (naturae), the human 
person is the imago Dei because of his or her ability to know and to love. According to the 
stage of imago recreationis (gratiae), the human person is the imago Dei when he or she 
knows and loves God. And, according to the stage of similitudinis (gloriae), the human 
person is the imago Dei when he or she knows and loves God in heaven as God knows and 
loves Himself. At the heart of “St. Thomas’s account of the human person as the imago 
Dei is his claim that the human person is made in the image of God because of his or her 
rational nature, i.e., his or her ability to know and to love.”133 According to Thomas, being 
imago Dei is to live, to think and to love. And being the imago Dei134 refers to the mind, 
 
131 In Question 93 of the first part of the Summa Theologiae, when Thomas confronts the idea of Augustine 
of the image of God in the intellectual soul, he (Thomas) answers affirmatively by saying that the image of 
God is in man as regards the mind only. For him, all creatures possess some likeness to God, which he calls 
a trace, for all things come from God, but only the human being is said to represent God by way of image. 
Therefore, it must be that what makes us in the image of God is what we have that the other animals do not 
have – a mind. In the mind we have a likeness of the Trinity, as there is a procession of the word as we 
understand and a procession of love as we will. However, as there is only likeness to God as a trace in the 
other animals, there is only likeness as a trace in our animal nature, that is, everything about us except the 
intellectual soul. So, we find in man a likeness to God by way of image in his mind, but in the other parts of 
his being by way of trace. Cf. Montague Brown, “Imago Dei in Thomas Aquinas,” The Saint Anselm Journal 
10.1 (Fall 2014),  
https://www.anselm.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Institute%20of%20SA%20Studies/Brown.pdf 
(accessed Mar 9, 2020).   
132 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I. q. 93.6. 
133 Nicanor P. G. Austriaco, “On the Evolution of the Imago Dei: Insights from St. Thomas Aquinas,” 
Biologos (Feb 15, 2015), https://biologos.org/articles/on-the-evolution-of-the-imago-dei-insights-from-st-
thomas-aquinas (accessed Mar 9, 2020). 
134 For Thomas, because the intellectual nature of the angels is more perfect than the one of human beings, 
the angels are then more in the image of God than human beings. And it is clear for him that the image of 
God exists most perfectly in the acts of the soul, because the soul is that which is most perfect in us and so 
best image of God.  
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reason, or rational soul which includes the intellect and will, the abilities of knowledge and 
love, that human beings have but animals do not have. And to become the more perfect 
image of God, human beings have to know and to love God, who is the most perfect object 
of the acts of intellect and will.135 And this is “a profoundly Trinitarian insight because the 
acts of knowing and loving are the acts that constitute the very persons of the Triune 
God.136  
It is clear in that case that only intellectual creatures are the image of God. The 
imago Dei is the basis for participation in the divine life, and it is realized principally in an 
act of contemplation in the intellect. While it is true, according to Thomas, that likeness is 
common to all things, in the sense that the other creatures have the likeness without being 
the image of God, it is true also that, for him, likeness relates to image as its perfection, in 
the way that every time that the acts of knowledge and love, by seeking God as their object, 
“are more like God than just their potential existence in the capacity of the rational 
soul,…thus through these activities our image becomes more like God.”137 In reference to 
the difference between potentiality and actuality, Thomas insists that we are more in the 
image of God in our acts than in our powers. And because everything is created in Christ, 
who is fully human— body, mind and spirit—He is the perfect image of God. 
“Reformation controversies demonstrated that the theology of the imago Dei 
remained important for both Protestant and Catholic theologians.”138 The Catholics are 
 
135 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I. q. 93.7. 
136 Ibid., I. q. 93.6. 
137 Montague Brown, “Imago Dei in Thomas Aquinas,” (accessed Mar 9, 2020).  
138 International Theological Commission, 17. 
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accused by the Reformers139 of reducing the imago Dei to an “imago naturae” which 
offered a static conception of human nature and encouraged the sinner to constitute himself 
before God. On their side, the Catholics accused the Reformers of denying the ontological 
reality of the image of God and reducing it to a pure relation. In addition, the Reformers 
insisted that the image of God was corrupted by sin, whereas Catholic theologians viewed 
sin as a wounding of the image of God in man.140 
1.4. The imago Dei during the contemporary period 
Generally during history, the imago Dei retained its central position in theological 
anthropology. But during the nineteenth and twentieth century, the notion of imago Dei 
lost its centrality. It became unfavorable at some point. It was undermined because it was 
regarded as an expression of human arrogance by which man compares himself to God and 
by which man considers himself as more important than anything else. The view of the 
universe has displaced the traditional comprehension of a cosmos as something made in 
the divine image, and this has affected the theology of imago Dei. It is affected in the way 
that the empiricists consider imago Dei as “ill-adapted to experience”141 while the 
rationalists consider the idea of man as imago Dei ambiguous.  
Some important intellectuals of the twentieth century, intellectuals like Ludwig 
Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud, undermine the theology of the imago Dei. For 
them, it is not a man who is made in the image of God, but it is God who is made in the 
image of man. Here, God is nothing except an image projected by man. However, the 
 
139 The idea of imago Dei from the reformers’ views can be found in Allen G. Jorgensen, “Beyond Luther’s 
Imago Dei: Imagining a Modest Humanity,” Canadian Theological Review 3 (2014): 66-81; and Jason Van 
Vet, Children of God: the Imago Dei in John Calvin and his Context (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2009). 
140 International Theological Commission, 17. 
141 Ibid., 19. 
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interest in the theology of imago Dei grew again in the mid-twentieth century because of 
the impact of Vatican II. “The council gave new impetus to the theology of the imago Dei, 
most especially in the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes. 
Invoking the theme of the image of God, the Council affirmed in Gaudium et Spes the 
dignity of man.”142  
When the Conciliar fathers asked, “What is man?” in Gaudium et Spes, they 
answered, “About himself he has expressed, and continues to express many divergent and 
even contradictory opinions. In these he often exalts himself as the absolute measure of all 
things or debases himself to the point of despair.”143 But they reaffirmed, “for the Sacred 
Scripture teaches that man was created ‘to the image of God,’ is capable of knowing and 
loving his Creator, and was appointed by Him as master of all earthly creatures […] that 
he might subdue them and use them to God’s glory.”144 The Conciliar fathers insisted on 
the fact that a man is not a solitary, but called to be in community, which is the “primary 
form of interpersonal communion.”145 The imago Dei of Vatican II consists “in man’s 
orientation to God, which is the basis of the human dignity and of inalienable rights of the 
human person.”146 It is because the human as person is imago Dei that no man could be 
made subservient to any kind of system in the world.  
The theology of imago Dei illumines somehow the relation between anthropology 
and Christology. While opening to the unique grace which comes to human beings through 
incarnation, theologians recognize the essential value of human beings created in the image 
 
142 International Theological Commission, 21. 
143 Gaudium et Spes, 12. 
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146 International Theological Commission, 22. 
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of God. “The possibilities that Christ opens up for man do not involve the suppression of 
the human reality in its creatureliness but its transformation and realization according to 
the perfect image of the Son.”147 The theology of imago Dei is linked to Christology, but 
it is linked also to moral theology by the fact that it shows man’s participation in divine 
law, participation in the good in the action of men. Vatican II has helped to make it clear 
that the imago Dei has also a “teleological and eschatological dimension which defines 
man as homo viator, oriented to the parousia and to the consummation of the divine plan 
for the universe.”148  
In the contemporary period, Olli-Pekka Vainio149 and Aku Visala150 have defended 
the structural approach of imago Dei. Vainio makes his argument by concentrating on the 
question of rationality, first, through theologies of Thomas Aquinas and Robert Jenson. 
Vainio argues that there is a significant overlap between contemporary scientific 
interpretations of rationality and both a traditional Thomistic view and a contemporary 
ecumenical interpretation of imago Dei. In his argumentation, he believes that it is possible 
to give an account of imago Dei which takes structural features as central and which is in 
accord with contemporary science, without falling prey to the dangers that the critics of 
structuralism point out.  
Visala begins his argumentation by analyzing the three major critiques against the 
Structural view propose a modified structural imago Dei where he gives responses to the 
critiques and identifies the imago Dei with the distinctiveness and a higher mental capacity 
 
147 International Theological Commission, 24. 
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of humans than other species. The first argument is that the structural view entails 
mind/body dualism and dualism is no longer viable given neuroscience and contemporary 
philosophy. Against that critique, Visala presents the contemporary forms of dualism 
which circumvent those worries. Contrary to those who criticize the structural view 
because it disvalues the human body, Visala argues that neither a structural nor dualism 
approach disvalue the human body. The third issue consists of various evolutionary worries 
that have to do with the lack of a clear-cut boundary between human capacities and the 
capacities of non-human animals. Counter to this third critique of the structural view, 
Visala defends an idea of human beings as distinctive and having certain mental capacities 
to a higher degree than other species. As he states, “if other species were to develop similar 
capacities to us, they would, at least to some extent, be images of God as well.”151 
Alongside, the structural view of the imago Dei, there are the relational or communal, and 
the functional or stewardship views of the imago Dei.  
1.5. The imago Dei as a person of relation or communion 
Created in the image of God from the narration of the first book of the Bible, Man 
is understood as a person of communion or relation and a person of responsibility or 
stewardship. Being created in the image of God, as non-divided and non-isolated, human 
beings in their physical and spiritual beings are made for sharing a world with one another. 
Created in the image of God, human beings are called to love, communion and relationship 
between themselves and toward God, the Creator. “It is of the essence of the imago Dei in 
them that these personal beings are relational and social beings, embraced in a human 
 
151 Visala, 118. 
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family whose unity is at once realized and prefigured in the Church.”152 The relational 
dimension of the imago Dei is often explained by the radical relationship between the 
divine persons of the Trinity153, which was emphasized abundantly in the course of history. 
 
152 International Theological Commission, 40. 
153 The word Trinity was not used until the late second century, even if the earlier religious experience of the 
first Christian communities is already trinitarian. Jesus as the Son of God was from beginning filled with the 
Spirt. Jesus and the Spirit were taken from the beginning of Christian community as sent by the One who is 
the Source of All. During the Arian controversies of the fourth century over the eternity and divinity of the 
Word and Spirit, the Christian community articulated its conviction of the full divinity of the Word at the 
Council of Nicea (325) and of the Spirit at the Council of Constantinople (381). Athanasius, Pope of 
Alexandria, is a vigorous defender of the divinity of Word and Spirit in unity of being of the one God. 
According to Athanasius, human beings can only be deified in Christ, if Christ is truly God, and since the 
Holy Spirit partakes us in divine life, the Holy Spirt who deifies us in Christ, cannot be a creature but must 
be divine. Of the three Cappadocians (Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus), Basil 
defends the idea that the Son and the Holy Spirit are with the Father, which means the Word and the Spirit 
and the Father are in the unity of a communion (koinonia) of radical equality and mutuality. For the 
Cappadocians, the radical communion does not diminish or obscure what is distinctive and proper to the three 
Persons which their call the three hypostasis (underlying reality).  
Augustine in De Trinitate, the supreme image for the Trinity is the inner self-remembering God, 
understanding God, and loving God. Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of God is radically relational. The 
relations are identical with the divine nature. Aquinas calls them ‘subsistent’ relations because they belong 
to God’s substance. Bonaventure, the great Franciscan connects the theology of Trinity to the dynamic 
fruitfulness of divine goodness of the East. In the life the Trinity, everything flows from the fecundity. When 
God freely chooses to create, the fruitfulness of trinitarian life finds wonderful expression in the diversity of 
creatures. Each different kind of creature is a reflection and image of the eternal God.  
Through the work of John Damascene, the word perichoresis was mediated to both Eastern and Western 
theology. Perichoresis suggests a being present to one another in radical intimacy; a mutual presence of love. 
It points out to unity in diversity, so as not to fall into an undifferentiated unity (modalism) or in three separate 
individuals, as three gods (tritheism). The unity in diversity in this case are not opposed but enable each other 
to exist. It expresses the intimate presence of one divine Person to the others, the being-in-one-another in 
supreme distinctiveness. At the heart of perichoresis, there is the idea of the ecstatic: the going-out-from-the 
self. The perichoretic relations of the Trinity suggests that to be a person is not to be simply self-contained 
but to be able to go out from the self in love to other. The theology of Trinity leads to a view of God as 
essentially relational.  
In the contemporary period, the Trinitarian theology affirms not only communion but also difference. It 
locates unity in difference at the heart of God. A Trinitarian theology supports a relational view of reality, 
but it is a specific kind of relationality, one in which distinction and difference are enabled to flourish. Walter 
Kasper in The God of Jesus Christ, 280 understands the unity of divine nature as a unity in love, in the sense 
that being-from-another is also being-for-another. Catherine LaCugna in God for Us: The Trinity and 
Christian Life, 250 also understands the Trinity as relationship at the heart of both, divine and creaturely. She 
said God’s to-Be is to-Be-in relationship, and God’s being-in-relationship-to us is what God is. Elizabeth 
Johnson in She Who is, 22 for example claims that the Trinity as pure relationality, epitomizes the 
connectedness of all that exists in the universe. Orobator Agbonkhianmeghe, in Theology brewed in an 
African Pot: Trinity offers the image of Obirin meta, a Yoruba woman who combines strength, character, 
personality and beauty to think of a God: Trinity as an open-ended, One of many realities, many relationships 
and many qualities at the same time. Jurgen Moltmann sees Trinity in The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, 
109 as making space within the divine relational life for a creaturely world to emerge. For him, “the trinitarian 
relationship between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is so wide that the whole creation can find space, 
time and freedom in it.” Colin Gunton in The One, the Three and the Many, 230 writes that “of both God and 
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We will come back to the Trinitarian relationship when we will present human beings as 
part of a wider pattern of relationships in nature which is understood as grounded in the 
trinitarian relations of mutual love, according to Edwards. A person made in God’s image 
with his or her inalienable right of dignity, is not alone in the universe but is called to be in 
community with others in society. “The human being is truly human to the extent that he 
actualizes the essentially social element in his constitution as a person within familial, 
religious, civil, professional, and other groups that together form the surrounding society 
to which he belongs.”154 Being imago Dei, it is not proper to some human beings but it 
concerns every human being in the society. Being imago Dei is also being in relationship 
with another imago Dei’s but also with God.  
Unfortunately, that relationship with God and others is often ruptured. 
Theologically, the rupture is caused by sin which came from the abuse by the imago Dei 
of his freedom. One thing which is generally admitted by every theologian is that the imago 
Dei is not totally destroyed or corrupted by sin. For Catholic tradition, sin disfigures the 
imago Dei, but it does not destroy it and the relational dimension of the imago Dei with 
God is not lost because of sin.155 The relational dimension of the imago Dei toward God is 
oriented towards its Christological realization. Against “the notion of the total corruption 
 
the world it must be said that they have their being in relation.” Graham Buxton in The Trinity, Creation and 
Pastoral Ministry, 195 writes that “relationality is a critical-event essential-dimension of the divine imprint 
on creation.” He sees perichoresis as not only a way of articulating the divine life, or communion of 
Christians, but also a principle of cosmological unity. Ted Peters in God as Trinity, 8 addresses the 
relationship of God's eternity to the world's temporality and claims that thinking of God as Trinity affirms 
that the word "God" applies to both eternity and temporality. As the incarnate one, as Emmanuel, as God 
with us, God is temporal. The eternal one enters time, and time thereby enters the divine life. And it stays 
there, even unto eternity. The incorporation of time into eternity takes place through the eschatological 
incorporation of the temporal creation into the eternal perichoresis of the three persons that characterizes the 
trinitarian life. The eternity-time paradox is resolved eschatologically. (Most of our ideas are from the 
different classes that we had and the book of Ecology at the Heart of Faith of Edwards.) 
154 International Theological Commission, 42. 
155 Ibid., 46. 
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of the imago Dei, the Catholic tradition has insisted that grace and salvation would be 
illusory if they did not in fact transform the existing, albeit sinful, reality of human 
nature.”156 The man affected by sin does not stop desiring God. The sinful state even makes 
the man in the need of salvation. Because sin cannot destroy that desire for God, man can 
be saved by God’s grace. The necessity of salvation comes with the indestructible desire 
or orientation of man toward God. With salvation, the imago Dei is freed from sin, from 
law which is not inspired by the Holy-Spirit, from suffering, and from death to be 
reconciled with God. Freed from all these, the imago Dei is free for God in Christ and the 
Holy Spirit. This “freedom for” God in Christ and the Holy-Spirit “is made possible by 
Jesus Christ, the perfect icon of the Father, who restores the image of God in man” and the 
communal dimension of the imago Dei. 
1.6. The imago Dei as a person of stewardship or responsibility 
Created in the image of God, men and women are not only called to a life of 
communion with one another and with God, there are also called as imago Dei to share the 
governance or stewardship of visible creation, governance in the sense of care. This 
privilege is granted to the imago Dei from the narration of creation where it is said, “God 
blessed them (mankind): Be fertile and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it. Have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and all the living things that crawl on 
the earth.”157 God allows the human to name all the animals158 and in His wisdom has 
established humankind to rule the creatures produced by Him.159 With this privilege, men 
and women made in the image of God are called to participate in God’s work, his project 
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of love and salvation and his own lordship over the universe. Paragraph 34 of Gaudium et 
Spes states clearly that “Man was created in God's image and was commanded to conquer 
the earth and to rule the world in justice and holiness: he was to acknowledge God as maker 
of all things and relate himself and the totality of creation to him, so that through the 
dominion of all things by man the name of God would be majestic in all the earth.”160  
This sovereignty or stewardship holds an ascendancy over the whole of visible 
creation as a king but also a descendancy image as the kenosis of Jesus Christ. In the 
exercise of this sovereignty, men are supposed to respect the natural order, in other words, 
the natural law which derives from the divine law. The Bible warns against the sin of 
usurpation. Like in the case of the parable of talents (Mt 25: 14-31), the Lord entrusts the 
imago Dei to act in his place as stewards who have freedom to develop the gifts which have 
been entrusted to them. As stewards, every imago Dei must be aware that there will be time 
when they must render an account of their care of creation. “Human stewardship of the 
created world is precisely a stewardship exercised by way of participation in the divine rule 
and is always subject to it. Human beings exercise this stewardship by gaining scientific 
understanding of the universe, by caring responsibly for the natural world (including 
animals and the environment), and by guarding their own biological integrity.”161 During 
the nineteenth and twentieth century, the imago Dei has achieved a lot in his understanding 
of the universe. And this scientific progress has considerable impact in the way that the 
universe is perceived. 
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By admitting the Big Bang theory162, the stardust163 and the emerging evolutionary 
history of life164, we recognize that every stage during the evolutionary process, something 
new occurs, like the Big Bang, hydrogen nuclei, stars, DNA molecule, single-cell like 
eukaryotes, multi-cells like ediacara fauna, mammals, animals, vertebrates, marine life, 
Dinosaurs, chimpanzees like apes, Autralopithecines, Homo rudolphensis, Homo Erectus 
until Home sapiens. And at each one of these stages, the new species depend on what goes 
before, even if each represents something new. With that recognition, everyone can clearly 
see that “human beings share a common history of life with all the other creatures of Earth. 
We carry within us a story of life that goes back to our pre-human ancestors in Africa, back 
to the trilobites of the Cambrian seas, and ultimately back to the first bacterial forms of life 
3.5 billion years ago,”165 which is one billion years after Earth and the other planets began 
to form around the sun.  
 
162 The emergence of the universe from the first fraction of a second after it came into existence, which is 
estimated to have happened 15 billion years ago. And since then, the universe is cooling. With the emergence 
of the necessary conditions, there was the formation of atoms, condensations of galaxies, stars. And around 
10 billion years ago, the formation of planets happened. Our solar system is strongly estimated to 4.5 billion 
years ago. 
163 The fact is that it takes more than hydrogen to make a human being. We are a carbon-based life. The 
molecules of our bodies are composed of atoms of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen with small 
amounts of other elements. Collections of atoms make up molecules, which makes up the chromosomes 
which carry the genetic code. While the hydrogen atoms come from the early universe, the carbon, oxygen, 
and nitrogen all come from the stars. And while some organisms are single-celled, a human being is made 
up of about 50 trillion cells specialized to perform an enormous variety of tasks. In Edwards, 10 &79. 
164 The history of Earth and other planets which emerged from 4.5 billion years ago. And the emergence of 
life on Earth in form of bacterial cells within a billion years after. The emergence of bacterial life and of the 
self-replicating DNA molecule is an enormous step in our history. The evolution of life is explained from the 
emergence of the eukaryotes (single-cell) to the ediacara fauna (multi-cellular), to animals, the vertebrates, 
the marine life, the Dinosaurs, to chimpanzees like apes, to Autralopithecines, to Homo rudolphensis, to 
Homo Erectus till Home sapiens. At every stage in the process, something new occurs. And each of these 
depends on what goes before, but each represents something new. In Edwards, 12-13. 
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This explanation of the life by the Evolutionary perspective came with new 
challenges:166 challenges about the doctrine of creation ex-nihilo167 and challenges about 
men and women made in the image of God. The traditional explanation from biblical 
literalism can no longer stand. The imago Dei is not created in his actual form, but it is the 
product of the evolution of life. And the work of James Watson and Francis Crick on DNA 
made the challenge more serious. As all living things are genetically related, why should 
the qualification of the imago Dei be attributed only to men and women? Can it be 
explained by the increasing brain size, culminating in that of homo sapiens? “With the 
development of the human brain, the nature and rate of evolution were permanently altered: 
with the introduction of the uniquely human factors of consciousness, intentionality, 
freedom and creativity, biological evolution was recast as social and cultural evolution.”168 
Continuing to see the difference at the biological level between human beings and 
nonhumans, like humans and Apes, seems difficult nowadays.  
According to the International Theological Commission, the Big Bang theory does 
not contradict the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo because the Big Bang theory does not 
“exclude the possibility of an antecedent stage of matter, it can be noted that the theory 
appears to provide merely indirect support for the doctrine of creation ex nihilo which can 
 
166 About the two major challenges: Creation ex-nihilo and the imago Dei, theologians have the responsibility 
to locate modern scientific understanding within a Christian vision of the created universe. As imago Dei, 
men and women are called to reshape the evolution of the universe itself, by stewarding it.  
167 Creation ex nihilo is the action of a transcendent personal agent, acting freely and intentionally, with a 
view toward the all-encompassing purposes of personal engagement. In Catholic tradition, the doctrine of the 
origin of human beings articulates the revealed truth of this fundamentally relational or personalist 
understanding of God and of human nature. […] The doctrines of the imago Dei and the creatio ex nihilo 
teach us that the existing universe is the setting for a radically personal drama, in which the triune Creator 
calls out of nothingness those to whom He then calls out in love. Cf. International Theological Commission, 
65. 
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only be known by faith.”169 Divine causality can be active in the situation of Big Bang. 
Nothing should reduce the Big Bang effect to the atheistic materialist of Neo-Darwinism 
which tries to reject the place of the divine providential causality. The evolutionary 
mechanism, which is contingent, can also be contingent because God made it contingent. 
It states,  
With respect to evolution of conditions favorable to the emergence of life, Catholic 
tradition affirms that, as universal transcendent cause, God is the cause not only of 
existence but also the cause of causes. God’s action does not displace or supplant 
the activity of creaturely causes, but enables them to act according to their natures, 
and nonetheless, to bring about the ends he intends.170  
As it is said, “in the Catholic perspective, neo-Darwinians who adduce random genetic 
variation and natural selection as evidence that the process of evolution is absolutely 
unguided are straying beyond what can be demonstrated by science.”171 For the 
commission, an evolutionary mechanism is possible only if God has made it. It states,  
while science can study these causal chains, it falls to theology to locate this account 
of the special creation of the human soul within the overarching plan of the triune 
God to share the communion of trinitarian life with human persons who are created 
out of nothing in the image and likeness of God, and who, in his name and according 
to his plan, exercise a creative stewardship and sovereignty over the physical 
universe.172  
The imago Dei, as a person of relation and a steward, is called at the ecological 
level to care for the world, our common home. In fact, the exploitation and sometimes 
destruction of the common home has damaged the universal home in the way that the imago 
Dei is at risk in his life. The stewardship or sovereignty of the imago Dei has been criticized 
as a cause of the Ecological crisis because Christianity has maximized the place of human 
 
169 International Theological Commission, 67. 
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beings in the Creation and has placed human beings as the ruler of the rest of creation. “The 
Genesis account which grants man ‘dominion’ over the earth (Gen 1: 28), has encouraged 
the unbridled exploitation of nature by painting him as domineering and destructive by 
nature.”173 Even if this is not a correct interpretation of the Bible as understood by the 
Church, “it is true that we Christians have at times incorrectly interpreted the Scriptures, 
nowadays we must forcefully reject the notion that our being created in God’s image and 
given dominion over the earth justifies absolute dominion over other creatures.”174 The 
sovereignty or stewardship has been taken as the mark of superiority. The teaching of 
Christian beliefs was not to disregard or violate or damage the common home. It was to 
care for the rest of creation. This view of care is strongly developed by the current Pope of 
the Catholic Church with his encyclical Laudato Si’, which will be evoked in the third 
chapter. 
Before Pope Francis, John Paul II says during the discourse he gave on January 17, 
2001, that “Man’s lordship is not absolute, but ministerial… not the mission of an absolute 
and unquestionable master, but of a steward of God’s kingdom.”175 In the same way, he 
states in Centesimus Annus “ 
At the root of senseless destruction of the natural environment lies an 
anthropological error, which unfortunately is widespread in our day. Humankind, 
which discovers its capacity to transform and in a certain sense create the world 
through its own work, forgets that this is always based on God’s prior and original 
gift of the things that are.176  
He makes it even more clearly in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae “man has a 
specific responsibility towards the environment in which he lives, towards the creation 
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which God has put at the service of his personal dignity.”177 He continues by affirming that 
it is the ecological question “ranging from the preservation of the natural habitats of the 
different species of animals and other forms to ‘human ecology’ properly speaking – which 
one finds in the Bible a clear and strong ethical direction leading to a solution which 
respects every life.”178 In the same way, Pope Benedict in one of his addresses to the Clergy 
urges us to realize that creation is harmed every time that “we ourselves have the final 
word, where everything is simply our property and we use it for ourselves alone. The 
misuse of creation begins when we no longer recognize any higher instance than ourselves, 
when we see nothing else but ourselves.”179   
Conclusion 
In this first chapter, we were asking the question about how to understand the imago 
Dei in its history from our context today. Today, The Catechism of the Catholic Church 
affirms the uniqueness of the human person as the imago Dei, who, both man and woman, 
is a unity of spiritual and corporal, created to be in communion with God and other humans 
and to be a steward of creation. From that official teaching, we moved back to the biblical 
perspective, where in the Old Testament, the imago Dei refers to the whole person, 
undivided and relational, and in the New Testament, the true imago Dei is the imago 
Christi. We also explored Peters’ idea that the human person becomes the imago Dei at the 
end in imago Christi. Next, we reviewed the concept of the imago Dei from the patristic 
and medieval period, where the imago Dei was dissociated from the likeness to God. The 
Eastern Christian tradition, by assuming the distinction between body and soul, made the 
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distinction between being the image and the likeness of God. The Western Christian 
tradition, adopting a structural view, refers the image of God to some human feature given 
by God, especially the intellectual nature of the human being. From there, we analyzed the 
functionality, or stewardship, and the relational, or communal, dimensions of the imago 
Dei. We demonstrated, from the historical analysis of the content attributed to the concept 
imago Dei over the centuries, that different ages in the Church have interpreted the content 
of that expression in different ways. We can conclude from this historical analysis that the 
imago Dei assumes different meanings at different points in history, which is our 
justification for expecting that the term is open to ever new meanings.  From here, we will 
see how the Contemporary Evolution has shaped the new understanding of the emergence 
of the human person. 
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CHAPTER II: THE EVOLUTIONARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN HUMAN.  
One of the most longstanding debates in the field of biological 
anthropology is when members of our lineages became 
“human.” There is a keen interest in knowing when we evolved 
the characteristics seen in our species, and which of these 
features truly makes us distinctive from other primates and 
especially earlier forms of hominins. Language, culture, tool use, 
brain size, and bipedalism have all been cited as traits that 
differentiate modern humans from other primate species. While 
it was once thought that these traits were uniquely human, we 
now understand most of them to be elaborations of similar 
features in other species, although with some specific 
manifestations for modern humans.180 
Introduction  
Human beings have been for a long time, if not all the time, preoccupied by the 
question of who they are, how they came to be, and what can they say about themselves. 
Because by looking at themselves, human beings could see phenotypically that they are 
different from nonhumans, that they communicate in a way of which only they are capable, 
and that they are the only ones who could transform their environment, it happens that 
human beings come to consider themselves as so different and separate from all the other 
nonhuman animals. When that separation of human beings from nonhumans was not 
explained by the choice that God the Creator made for the human race, it is explained by 
some features or characteristics that human beings are the only ones to have. If the scientific 
contributions of the past did not contradict that approach to human uniqueness based on 
the faculty of reason or the capacity for use of tools, language, or culture, it happens that 
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evolutionary science sheds more light on the similarities between human beings and other 
livings beings.  
Without denying the difference between humans and nonhumans, evolutionary 
science has made possible to diminish the massive gap which was thought to separate the 
two. The huge influential impact of Charles Darwin made it possible that, after Darwinism 
and Neo-Darwinism, evolutionary science developed during the contemporary period a 
vast evolutionary contribution, like the Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer; the Eugenics 
Movement of Francis Galton; the Sociobiology of Edward O. Wilson; and the Evolutionary 
psychology of Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, which can be considered 
part of biological evolution. With biological evolution in general, changes or variations are 
understood to occur on the genetic level of a population and to be passed on from one 
generation to the next. In addition to the change on the genetic level of a population, which 
is called microevolution because it is a small-scale change, there is also macroevolution, 
which is explained by the idea that all of life is connected and can be traced back to one 
common ancestor. This idea of a common ancestor is one of the major foundations on 
which the notion of similarities between human species and nonhuman species will be 
elaborated. In addition to biological evolution, another important foundation for our 
argument will be the cultural evolution, where the evolution of cultures of individuals or 
societies helps to recognize some cultural patterns in nonhumans. Also, the analysis of the 
emergence of the anatomical modern humans (AMH) will be another foundation for the 
notion of similarities and divergences. 
In this second chapter, we will begin by emphasizing biological evolution, where 
we will develop the major contributions of Darwin and their implications for Neo-
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Darwinism, social Darwinism, the Eugenics movement, and sociobiology theory before 
getting to evolutionary psychology. We will continue with the concept of the cultural 
evolution, where we will emphasize the integrative evolution, the emergence of the 
anatomical modern human, and the similarities and divergences from nonhuman animals, 
based on some key genetic adaptations. To finish, we will also acknowledge the recent 
contribution of Jurgen Renn on the epistemic evolution which emerges from the cultural 
evolution and makes scientific knowledge a specific characteristic of modern humans. 
2.1. Biological Evolution 
2.1.1.  Darwin and Darwinism 
As is the case in many theories, a new theory very often includes the responses or 
the corrections of the precedent theories. In the case of Darwin also, there were various 
contributions which helped Darwinism to situate in the reality of the 19th century. The vast 
complexity of living species was obvious to any human being. In the Hellenistic period, 
the philosophers were already explaining the biosphere. Aristotle is one of them who 
influenced the medieval Catholic thinkers like Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great who 
expanded on the biological writings of the Greek philosophers. The classification system 
developed by Karl Linnaeus in the 18th century contributed in its own way to the scientific 
dynamism in which Darwinism finds itself. As Ted Peters and Martinez Hewlett 
demonstrated in Evolution from Creation to New Creation, the system of Linnaeus already 
used the nomenclature of genus and species but did not question whether the organisms 
existed as such from the beginning or had developed from earlier, now extinct forms.181 
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During the same 18th century, the idea of the fixity of species was already 
challenged. It was challenged by George Leclerc and even Eramus Darwin, grandfather of 
Charles Darwin. It was challenged also by Jean Baptiste Lamarck in 1809 in Philosophie 
Zoologique, where the controversial approach to evolution of Lamarck was developed. 
Despite the fact that his theory of evolution, in which acquired characteristics were 
inherited by succeeding generations, was thoroughly discredited, Lamarck has the privilege 
to be the first ever to use the term biology as referring to biological science, and the term 
invertebrates as referring to the animals without backbones. The works and critics of 
Lamarck against fixity makes him one of the first evolutionists of modern science. Charles 
Darwin was introduced to the evolutionism of Lamarck through the criticisms of Charles 
Lyell against Lamarck. In The Principles of Geology, Lyell argued that “the earth was very 
old and had been formed by gradual process and was subjected to natural forces that could 
be explained in terms of known scientific mechanisms in operation in the present.”182 Not 
only did Charles Lyell influence Darwin but also William Paley, with his Natural 
Theology: Or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the 
Appearances of Nature of 1802, influenced Darwin.  
Although he studied to become both a physician and a clergyman, Darwin’s 
primary interest was natural history (Biology). Due to his studies of biology, Darwin was 
able to join the naturalist expedition of HMS Beagle for five years. During his five-year 
voyage as naturalist, he observed the variations within individual species in different 
locations. From those observations and the voluminous data and research he had 
collected—including having read a book by Malthus on human populations competing for 
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limited resources—Darwin “had noted the gradual changes in successive generations of 
animals when human breeders select for a particular trait. In every population there are 
small random variations that can be inherited.”183 With the experiences he gained from this 
voyage, Darwin started elaborating the theory of evolutionary change under the force of 
natural selection.184 Because animals need to survive, it became a competition that leads to 
a natural selection. After emphasizing his new theory in a short paper in 1842 and a longer 
one in 1844, Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace presented a similar evolutionary theory 
during a meeting of the Linnean Society in 1858. It was after that meeting, in 1859, that 
Darwin proceeded to publish the first edition of six of On the Origin of Species.  
In his theory of evolution, Darwin not only criticized the idea of fixity, but he 
proposed that all living creatures have a common ancestor, which is the descent with 
modification model. He introduced the force of natural selection, because for him, 
evolution is driven by natural selection. Darwinism is known to have three principles: 
variation, conservative force, and struggle for existence. Natural selection is understood as 
the results from variation within the members of a species. In other words, natural selection 
“operates on heritable differences (variation) among members of a population.”185 In that 
sense, when the genetics of some members are suited better to their environment, they are 
supposed to survive longer, to reproduce themselves and their successors, and to have a 
better life than those whose genes don’t suite the environment. When there is a variation, 
it happens at the genotype (which refers to the genetic makeup of an individual) and the 
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phenotype (which refers to the morphological and behavioral features of an individual). 
The variation may happen “through genetic mutation and, in sexually reproducing 
populations, through genetic mutation recombination during meiosis.” 186   But when the 
variation happens, it happens in the way that the genotypes that are selectively transmitted 
as a result of differential survival and reproduction yield changes in the phenotypes within 
the population over time.  
Another important point of the evolutionary change by natural selection in 
Darwinism is the fact that it is open to the possibility of the formation of new species, and 
not only to the change of traits of a species or subspecies. The possibility of the formation 
of new species, which is qualified as a speciation is part of the theory of extinction, and 
occurs “when variants diverge sufficiently to be no longer capable of interbreeding.”187 
There is also gradualism which is understood as the variation or differences between 
individuals within a population which arise over time by the accumulation of small 
changes.  
 As with any kind of scientific theory, Darwinism has some critics. Among the 
critics, we can identify Thomas Huxley who mentioned that “the natural selection and 
gradualism could not account for speciation-the development of new species from existing 
species. A species is defined as a reproductively isolated group of individuals who can 
interbreed and produce viable and fertile offspring.”188 The second major criticism is the 
fact that the Darwinism model for biology lacks solid mechanisms to explain some of the 
central features, such as the inheritability of traits and the target for the force of natural 
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selection. By the way, the natural selection argument is considered as the tautologic 
argument because the survivors are the fittest, or the fittest could only be the survivors. But 
against those who criticize the natural selection theory, Michael Ruse argues that their 
arguments are not strong enough. For Ruse, the selection depends upon the fact that more 
offspring are produced than could survive, and the difference between the survivors and 
non-survivors is visible. Because of that difference and the systematic feature observed in 
selection, natural selection could not be criticized as tautologic argument.  
Using the same logic, Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin established the 
Panglossian pseudo-scientific picture of a world in which natural selection produces 
everything for the greatest good. And the same Stephen Jay Gould, in collaboration with 
Niels Eldredge in 1970, elaborated the “punctuated equilibrium”189 theory in which they 
challenged gradualism but agreed on evolutionism. This “punctuated equilibrium” is 
defined as “evolution that is characterized by long periods of stability in the 
characteristics of an organism and short periods of rapid change during which new forms 
appear especially from small subpopulations of the ancestral form in restricted parts of 
its geographic range.”190 In other words, punctuated equilibrium is the theory which 
stipulates that there have been long periods of stability interrupted by brief periods of 
rapid changes. And during the long periods of no change, separated by times of very 
rapid change, it seems that nothing proceeds by a smooth, gradual pathway with the 
accumulation of small changes. 
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In “Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary Theory,” Gould explained 
how change is determined by reorganization as well by the selective forces acting on 
adult organisms. It also comes out in “punctuated equilibrium” that the extinction of 
species is sometimes the result of sudden contingent events, such as the impact of comets 
and not only the product of gradual competitive forces.191 Even if these ideas of Gould 
and Eldredge received some critiques, especially from Ledyard Stebbins and Francisco 
Ayala in “The Evolution of Darwinism,”192 it becomes clear for Neo-Darwinism that 
evolutionary changes are viewed as “the product of random variations that were then 
selected by the environment. […] The environment selects individuals, but individuals 
also select environments, and in a new niche a different set of genes may contribute to 
survival.”193 One last important criticism of Darwinism is definitely Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck. Generally, against Darwinism, Lamarck states that the physiological changes 
acquired during an organism’s lifetime can be directly inherited. He believed in direct 
inheritance of characteristics acquired by individuals during their lifetime. That idea, 
however, did not really compete against Darwinism where evolution is explained by the 
natural selection coupled with the diversity. 
Neo-Darwinism194 is frequently defined as the theory of evolution that represents 
a synthesis of Darwin’s theory in terms of natural selection and modern population 
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genetics.195 Neo-Darwinism seems to include the Darwinism model, the Mendelian law 
of inheritance (also qualified as the Mendelian genetics) and molecular biology.196 
Gregory Mendel, in his law of inheritance, provides an explanation about how 
inheritance operates. With Mendel, the inheritance law is no longer the blending of 
parental traits. “Mendel employed the essence of the experimental method to derive a 
series of statements that argued for the quantitative nature of inheritance and, most 
important, for the particulate nature of the heritable principle—what came to be called 
the gene.”197 The work of Mendel has helped to explain the transmission of traits 
intergenerationally.  
With molecular biology, the contribution of Miescher in 1869 on DNA 
(deoxyribonucleic acid) as part of chromosomes with protein became one of the most 
important elements of the evolutionary theory to explain variation as differences in the 
sequences of the four nitrogen-containing bases that make up the molecule of DNA in 
the nucleus of the cell. The contribution of Miescher helps to explain mutation as a result 
of the changes in the physical appearances or performances of the organism.198 In the 
same way, the contribution of the studies of the DNA molecule by James Watson199 in 
1953 and Francis Crick200 helped to establish the model of the DNA structure and to 
indicate the common origin that all living things share. In fact, “in all known organisms, 
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the same genetic code is used to translate from DNA to amino acid.”201 The comparison of 
the molecular structure of similar proteins in different species has shown that “in rhesus 
monkeys, only one of these amino acids is different; horses have twelve that differ and fish 
have twenty-two.”202 The assumption of Neo-Darwinism203 is that “long-term evolutionary 
changes are the result of the gradual accumulation of many small changes.”204  
Molecular biology, especially the DNA discovery, is fundamentally a support to 
the Darwinism theory on two points. “First, a mechanism for the production of variations 
in the population could be imagined. Second, the fact that such variations take place one 
DNA base at a time gives definition to the principle of graduation that is also a critical 
part of the theory.”205 Neo-Darwinism has seen the development within itself of Social 
Darwinism, Sociobiology, and Evolutionary psychology.  
2.1.2. Social Darwinism – Eugenic movement - Sociobiology – Evolutionary 
Psychology 
Social Darwinism 
Social Darwinism begins fundamentally with the work of Herbert Spencer206 
(1820-1903). His idea is that “one could develop an overriding philosophy that 
subsumed all of the sciences, including sociology and psychology, under the aegis of 
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the evolutionary model.”207 For that, he advocated for a societal system which are 
subject to the same Darwinian laws of natural selection as plants and animals. “At the 
heart of his proposal was the idea that the individual has preeminence and that society 
evolves as the sum of the individuals within it.”208 This idea supported “the absence of 
governmental intervention to assist those less able to compete, as well as justification 
for the laissez-faire capitalism of John Stuart Mill.”209 In other words, the greater good 
of the society will be achieved if it is allowed the freedom to act. 
Reflecting on the law of the jungle and what could happen to the unfit, Spencer 
states that “the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such, to clear the world of them and 
to make room for better… It is best that they should die.”210 This idea seems to 
accommodate capitalism’s defenders and the middle and upper class. Against Spencer, 
Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) replied by demonstrating how we can transcend our 
biological roots. For him, “the conscience of man revolts against the moral indifference 
of nature.”211 While “Spencer’s survival of the fittest yielded to nature blood ‘red in 
tooth and claw’ […] Huxley, in contrast to Spencer, envisioned a society governed by 
caring values that mark an evolutionary advancement from beyond where we have 
come.”212 
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Eugenics movement 
The Eugenics movement of Francis Galton213 (1822-1911) is fundamentally the 
belief that influencing the evolutionary trajectory of the individuals will lead to the 
improvement of the society. It is a belief that humanity could be improved through 
selective breeding. In Hereditary Genius214 and his autobiography, Memory of My Life, 
Galton gives more details about eugenics:  
This is precisely the aim of Eugenics. Its first object is to check the birth-rate of 
the Unfit, instead of allowing them to come into being, though doomed in large 
numbers to perish prematurely. The second object is the improvement of the race 
by furthering the productivity of the Fit by early marriages and healthful rearing 
of their children. Natural Selection rests upon excessive production and 
wholesale destruction; Eugenics on bringing no more individuals into the world 
than can be properly cared for, and those only of the best stock.215 
With his eugenic view, Galton considers that the Western European civilization 
is the pinnacle of evolutionary achievement. In Hereditary Genius, Galton compared the 
civilized world of his own culture, the white Anglo-Saxon British Empire, to the negro 
race. As Peter and Hewlett point out, Galton concludes in his comparison that “the 
average intellectual standard of the negro race is some two grades below our own.”216 
The approach of Galton is even called positive eugenics because negative eugenics 
which is found in USA and Germany217 seems to call for the elimination of those who 
are Unfit from the breeding population while positive eugenics called for the racial 
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increasing of the population of the Fit. In the 20th century in America, the sterilization 
laws and marriage laws, which reinforced the prohibition against interracial marriage, 
are all justified somehow by the negative eugenics. In the same way, it reinforces the 
nationalism and anti-Semitism of the Nazism of Germany led by Adolph Hitler, where 
by looking for the purification of the Aryan race, Nazism decided deliberately to 
exterminate people of Jewish heritage as persons with unfit genes.  
Sociobiology 
Neo-Darwinism also provided the foundation for the Sociobiology which was 
developed by Edward O. Wilson (1929…). Sociobiology is traditionally defined by the 
systematic study of the biological basis of social behavior. It is an attempt to understand 
and explain animal and human behavior in the light of natural selection and other 
biological processes. Sociobiology offers a contribution to a better understanding of 
animal social behavior and altruistic behavior in some animal species.218 In his book 
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Wilson, based on the social behavior of animals 
combined with the Neo-Darwinist understanding of population and genes, makes 
conclusions about the social behavior of humans. Human behavior is understood to be 
based on the traits that are genetically subject to natural selection.219  
Among the important themes that assist Sociobiology to explain human behavior 
are the concepts of selfish genes, which was provided by Richard Dawkins, and genetic 
reductionism and genetic determinism. The genes are understood as a driven force which 
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permits the next generation to exist. It is even said that “what we know as human 
consciousness and human culture are the means the genes employ to ensure their 
continuance from one generation to the next.”220 Because of that, Wilson believes that 
“the chicken is only an egg’s way of making another egg,” or in other words, “the 
organism is only DNA’s way of making more DNA.”221  
Believing in genetic selfishness, sociobiologists believe that “culture is reducible 
to a genetic analysis of evolutionary adaptation.”222 Thus everything in culture serves 
reproductive fitness, which in different ways means that values, ethics, and religions 
serve the selfish genes interest. Wilson states that “the genes hold culture on a leash […] 
The leash is very long, but inevitably values will be constrained in accordance with their 
effects on the human gene pool.”223 Sociobiologists believe also that “they can explain 
human xenophobia against strangers and altruism toward relatives, because both are 
expressions of the selfish gene’s desire to replicate.”224  
But “instead of an ethic of individual survival, Wilson says society ought to 
embrace altruism and cooperation.”225 For Wilson, the selfish gene does not mean that 
human beings will be move to tribalism or xenophobia but we are called to support 
modern liberal values and altruism. It can sound contradictory to put selfish genes and 
altruism together, but Wilson and Richard Dawkins did not support the idea of negative 
eugenics. Wilson did not seem to approve the holocaust and we guess in the same way 
that he did not approve slavery and colonization. And Dawkins emphasized how 
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selfishness promotes altruistic social behavior.226 “Dawkins maintains that it is our genes 
that control what we do.”227 In The Selfish Gene, Dawkins states that the argument of 
his book is “that we, and all other animals, are machines created by our genes.” He also 
adds that he “shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene 
is ruthless selfishness.”228  
Sociobiology has been a controversial discipline because of its attempts to 
explain various human social behaviors in terms of their adaptive value for reproduction. 
Sociobiologists are accused of attributing adaptive value to various widespread but 
morally objectionable behaviors by justifying them as natural or inevitable.229 
Sociobiology is criticized because of the lack of empirical studies on the connection 
between human genes and human behavior.  
Evolutionary psychology 
From the debate about sociobiology, a new discipline was constituted called 
evolutionary psychology. The website of the Center for Evolutionary Psychology at the 
University of California Santa Barbara states, 
The goal of research in evolutionary psychology is to discover and understand 
the design of the human mind. Evolutionary psychology is an approach to 
psychology, in which knowledge and principles from evolutionary biology are 
put to use in research on the structure of the human mind. It is not an area of 
study, like vision, reasoning, or social behavior. It is a way of thinking about 
psychology that can be applied to any topic within it. In this view, the mind is a 
set of information-processing machines that were designed by natural selection 
to solve adaptive problems faced by our hunter-gathered ancestors. This way of 
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thinking about the brain, mind, and behavior is changing how scientists approach 
old topics, and opening up new ones230  
This new field was concretized first with The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary 
Psychology and the Generation of Culture231 of Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and 
John Tooby, who are three of the leading scholars in this very active field of evolutionary 
psychology. In recent history, different approaches to the evolutionary psychology, 
which can be defined as the evolution of mind and behavior, have been developed, where 
the relation between the mental qualities and the species is scrutinized. In fact, Darwin 
himself examined in The Descent of Man and in The Expression of the Emotions in Man 
and Animals the “mental faculties and the qualities in human and nonhuman animals, 
and argued for the gradual development of human mentality from ancestral primates.”232 
Under the influence of the intellectual work of Darwin, Hiram Stanley published in 1895 
his Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling, which encouraged various scholars like Francis 
Galton, George Romanes, C. Lloyd Morgan, William James, John Dewey, and James 
Baldwin to deepen the evolution of mind theory and its application within psychology. 
While Romanes and Morgan were developing a comparative psychology for studying 
mental or psychical evolution, James developed functionalism and Dewey held that 
“Darwin’s conception of emotion required adjustment in light of James’s theories.”233 
Among the first prominent figures of evolutionary psychology we could note the 
evolutionary biologists like George Gaylord Simpson, Ernst Mayr, and Julian Huxley; 
the paleontologists Edwin Colbert and Alfred Romer; the comparative psychologists 
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Harry Harlow and Henry Nissen; the psychobiologist and physiological psychologist 
Karl Pribram and Roger Sperry; the physical anthropologist Sherwood Washburn; and 
cultural anthropologists like Margaret Mead.  
The question of how the mind and especially how the human mind evolved has 
continued to be the preoccupation of some scholars through the 20th century. Harry J. 
Jerison in 1973 with his Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence was scrutinizing “the 
fossil evidence for interspecific differences in brain size together with evidence of 
ancient environments and selection pressures in studying the evolution of intelligence 
from an information-processing point of view.”234 In the same way, Philip Lieberman in 
1975 with his On the origins of Language conducted research on the evolution of 
language, and Robert Aubrey Hinde in 1983 with Ethology combined ethology and 
comparative psychology and animal behavior, acknowledging the need for a cognitive 
perspective. It was because of the inspiration by ethology and his interest for social 
organization of insects that Wilson founded the sociobiology which held that “social 
behavior can be explained in terms of inclusive fitness, kin selection, and reciprocal 
altruism-selection pressures operating on closely related individuals or on population 
members that aid one another.”235  
At this point, there are five principles which are recognized to be the principles 
of evolutionary psychology. Peters and Hewlett synthetize these principles beautifully 
in this way,  
Principle 1. The brain is a physical system. It functions as a computer. Its circuits 
are designed to generate behavior that is appropriate to your environmental 
circumstances.  
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Principle 2. Our neural circuits were designed by natural selection to solve 
problems that our ancestors faced during our species’ evolutionary history.  
Principle 3. Consciousness is just the tip of the iceberg; most of what goes on in 
your mind is hidden from you. As a result, your conscious experience can mislead 
you into thinking that our circuitry is simpler than it really is. Most problems that 
you experience as easy to solve are very difficult to solve—they require 
complicated neural circuitry.  
Principle 4. Different neural circuits are specialized for solving different adaptive 
problems.  
Principle 5. Our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind.236  
When evolutionary psychologists are confronted with the question of how human 
behavior is the product of one’s genes, the first thing that they take into consideration is 
the fact that the human brain in the modern period is “the product of selective forces 
exerted on our Stone Age ancestors.”237 The second point is that human beings in the 
modern period are “descendants of those who were subject to the Environment of 
Evolutionary Adaptedness”238 without a clarification on the specific time in which it 
happened. “The idea is that our ancestors were selected for behavior that would have 
survival and reproductive advantage for their genes. As a result, modules of our brain 
contain features that exhibit these behaviors.”239  
While it became obvious that there are some components of human behavior that 
are related to the genes that underlie the structure of our nervous system, it seems evident 
that human behavior is not only determined by the genes, but also by our choice and/or 
our free will. For Peters and Hewlett, “it is clear that the Christian perspective is not 
limited to understanding humans as merely the sum of their genes and the physical 
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structures these genes determine.”240 And they continue by affirming the fact that we 
human beings see ourselves as “so much more than that. Our concept of ourselves as 
created in the image of God, […] imago Dei, means that we have a wider and, […] richer 
view of anthropology and psychology.”241 It is said that “the human soul, whatever we 
think that might be, is not, in the Christian view, only so much neural wiring in the 
brain.”242  
In the same way, Peters and Hewlett state, “if Wilson, Dawkins and the 
evolutionary psychologists are correct, then all human activity is simply a product of 
our evolutionary past and has no real significance beyond the survival value it conferred 
on our ancestors.”243 And it is quite clear that all human activity is not the product of 
past evolution. It goes beyond that and has some significance. However, we can 
recognize that Darwinism, Neo-Darwinism, Social evolution, the Eugenics movement, 
Sociobiology and Evolutionary psychology, as part of the biological evolutionary 
science, were preoccupied by the evolution of human being from the past, if not from 
its origin to the future. Understanding the evolution of human species involves somehow 
redefining the whole different component branches of human realities, like redefining 
the divine action and the cultural evolution of human species and other species. It is in 
that way that some researchers direct their preoccupation for the evolution of human 
being in connection to human mind, brain, and culture.  
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2.2. Cultural evolution 
2.2.1. The recognition of cultural evolution to nonhumans 
The evolutionary science was not only biological. The contemporary 
evolutionary science has seen the development of the cultural evolution.244 In 2007 that 
the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archeology and Anthropology encouraged 
research that led to new understanding about human culture, and to more clarification 
about human societies and their interrelations with the other species. From that 
conference, the participants sought to “understand the origins of the human mind and of 
its biological substrate, the human brain and including the mind’s expression in and 
formation by human culture.”245 In their various contributions, these scholars did not 
share a single theoretical perspective, but they converged on some points. “They 
acknowledge the need to bring all potential sources of evidence and theory to bear on 
the problem of hominin cognitive and cultural evolution, including archeological, 
environmental, cultural anthropological, and comparative perspectives.”246 
Against the traditional belief that the capacity to develop culture is distinctively 
human, because human beings could be the only ones to possess the capacities or 
abilities to pass attitude, skills, belief, or knowledge to other, there is another belief 
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which affirms that other animal species also possess cultural traditions.247 By defining 
culture as something socially transmitted and group-differential traditions within a 
species, it became clear that some nonhuman animals possess culture, even if human 
cultural processes and achievements remain distinctive for the researchers of Evolution 
of Mind, Brain, and Culture. But our point in affirming the culture of nonhuman animals 
is to question with scientific arguments whether we can continue to consider human 
beings as the only ones who have culture. 
The mechanism by which cultural evolution operates is compared to the 
mechanism of natural selection, in the sense that the variation in the case of cultural 
evolution is understood as the social transmission. It is said that the selective retention 
between generations is applied to the retention of the advantageous elements of the 
culture. And the “innovations that are advantageous in a given environment and that are 
socially transmitted because they are advantageous are more heavily represented in the 
next generation.”248 Cultural evolution is not necessarily genetic evolution or biological 
evolution. It is the evolution which can happen in the absence of biological evolution, 
but which brings some changes in human and nonhuman animals’ behaviors. Cultural 
evolution can also be gene-based evolution but not analogous to gene transmission. 
When it is gene-based, evolution uses genes as a model for the cultural evolution. 
Richard Dawkins in 1976 was supportive of cultural evolution based on genetics with 
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his notion of “meme” which is considered as the unit of cultural evolution. However, 
his view did not find many supporters.  
For culture to be transmitted from one generation to another one, there are four 
forms which allow the social transmission or social learning to occur. The first form is 
the location, in the way that the attention of the learner draws on the environment. The 
second is a desire to emulate, as when a chimpanzee sees that another has attained food 
by using a stick and seeks to use the stick to achieve the same outcome. The third is 
imitation, meaning the copying of precise motor procedures. And the fourth is the active 
intervention of the teacher on the learner in order to improve the performance of the 
learner.249  
The recognition of culture in nonhuman animals seems to come from the 
observations that some populations exhibit distinctive behaviors in comparison with 
other populations of the same species. It comes also from their social learning. And the 
“evidence of socially transmitted traditions has been found in birds, dolphins, whales, 
and anthropoid primates, among others.”250 Even if nonhuman animals or our ancestors 
like the Homo heidelbergensis or Homo ergaster could not think, plan, use complex 
languages, and control complex motor skills like in the case of human beings, the 
behavioral difference between different groups of the same species and social learning 
can be taken as a demonstration of the interrelatedness or interconnectedness between 
nonhuman animals and humans.  
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The participants in the research on the evolution of mind, brain, and culture in 
2007 claimed that while animals can change their environments to their benefit, or use 
calls to warn or inform conspecifics, or use tools, human beings “mold their 
environments more profoundly, improve their tools through cultural transmission, 
engage in social cooperation, develop cultural categories, and conceptions of the world, 
and pass on systems of belief and knowledge in unprecedented ways.”251 Because of the 
sharing of not only genetic evolution but also cultural evolution, we can extend the 
interconnectedness or interrelationship between nonhuman animals and human beings.  
2.2.2. Integrative Evolution  
One of the recent approaches to the evolution of mind and culture has been the 
integrative approach to evolution where psychology—meaning the cognitive, 
comparative and developmental view of mind—has been integrated with neuroscience, 
evolutionary biology, archaeology, paleoanthropology, genetics, and geology, which 
leads to the cultural evolution. With his works, Origins of the Modern Mind: Three 
Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition252 and A Mind So Rare: The Evolution 
of Human Consciousness,253 Merlin Donald contributes greatly to the integrative 
evolution by reviewing “evidence from psychology, neuroscience, paleontology, and 
archaeology.”254 His two books are not only a big contribution to the integrative 
evolution but they are also a big contribution to the question of the evolution of hominin 
cognition and the development of the uniqueness (the unique characteristics) of modern 
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humans, which we will develop more when we will explore the emergence of modern 
humans. 
In Origins of the Modern Mind, Donald concludes that “the main biological 
changes in hominin cognition occur in motor skill and memory and that further changes 
are cultural.”255 He came to this conclusion after presenting an impressive collection of 
neurological, anthropological, and psychological information about the human brain and 
cognition and how it differs from those of other primates. Donald conceives four stages 
which explain the evolution of human cognition, the evolution where humans progressed 
from other primates by developing gestural, linguistic, written storage, and thought 
structures. The first stage refers to the cognitive structure of the common ancestor256 
which is episodic, where chimpanzees and other anthropoids perceive and remember but 
have poor autorecall because the only representational form of memory available to 
them is the memory of specific events. The second stage, called the mimetic stage, refers 
to the capacity of representation which is attributed to Homo erectus, who underwent “a 
fundamental cognitive shift that set them apart from all other primates including 
Australopithecus and Homo habilis.”257 According to Donald, Homo erectus developed 
sophisticated tools, spread across vast territory and varied climates, and developed 
“society where cooperation and social coordination of action were central to the species 
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survival strategy.”258 This second, or mimetic, stage259 occurred through changes in the 
ability to plan and execute motor sequences, and ability for imitation, planning, and 
autocuing of motor skills. The mimetic stage is not explained by the increase of brain 
size.  
The third stage is the mythic stage, where the development of complex language 
is possible, even if Donald “contends that the language ability must spring from pre-
linguistic, mimetic representations, which he locates in systems of gesture and the 
perceptual abilities that guide them and read them.”260 According to Donald, the mythic 
culture is symbolic and appears later than speech. He argues that the hunting and fertility 
images found in southern Europe were used “to explore and develop the mythic ideas 
that were already the governing cognitive constructs of human society.”261 “Symbolic 
art, in Donald's view, is handled by the same cognitive system that handles symbolic 
language, although he clearly shows that language and visual processing take place in 
separate places in the brain. Humans would later synthesize symbolic art and symbolic 
language.”262  
 
258 Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind, 163. 
259 The Homo erectus with the mimesis could not speak. They have a generative intentional representational 
form of communication available in gestures and mime. Mimetic culture allowed our ancestors to model 
group structure, moving from relationships between individuals to relationships between social roles; 
establish group norms; voluntarily display emotion; coordinate hunting, allowing some hunters to drive the 
animal to an appropriate spot and others to attack it; and easily teach skills like tool-making. Knowledge was 
no longer passed purely through genes and memory of life events; erectus could pass hard-won knowledge 
like “don’t eat these berries” directly to friends and family. Cf. Trevor Stone, “Review of Merlin Donald’s 
Origins of the Modern Mind and A Mind So Rare,” Issues and Methods in Cognitive Science Spring 2002; 
completed Spring 2003 https://trevorstone.org/school/donaldreview.html (accessed Mar 29 2020). 
260 Hatfield, 36. 
261 Merlin Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind, 282. 
262 Trevor Stone, “Review of Merlin Donald’s Origins of the Modern Mind and A Mind So Rare,” Issues and 
Methods in Cognitive Science Spring 2002; completed Spring 2003 
https://trevorstone.org/school/donaldreview.html (accessed Mar 29 2020). 
72 
The fourth stage refers to the cultural development where writing is the main 
characteristic. After the biological evolution regarding the second and the third stage, 
Donald refers to the final stage of the human cognition as the theoretic culture, where 
visuosymbolic invention is possible.263 By contrast “with the oral-mythic culture of 
earlier H. sapiens, this new stage brings new cognitive manifestations through graphic 
invention (image-making, symbol-making, script-making), the resultant external 
memory […] and theory construction.”264 In his contribution, “Mimesis Theory Re-
Examined, Twenty Years after the Fact,” Donald reexamines the conception of mimesis, 
which is really important in his theory of the hominin development. It is nice to 
recognize that he was also open to the social intelligence theory where “the increasing 
size of the social group requires an increased capacity for representing members of the 
group and their relations, and, ultimately, for sharing knowledge through mimetic 
exchange.”265 In his interest in hominin cognitive evolution, Donald used not only the 
integrative approach but he posits enhanced motor control and memory capacity as the 
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gateway to representational meta-cognition and the ability to teach and learn, which 
yields culture as the engine of cognitive development.266 
In A Mind So Rare, which Donald wrote a decade after the Origins of the Modern 
Mind, he continues to deal with the evolutionary accounts of human cognitive capacity 
with the integrative evolution approach. He argues in this book for the presence of a 
strong consciousness as one of the most important attributes of the human mind. He 
begins this book by clarifying his view of consciousness. He describes consciousness at 
the functional level, rather than providing an evolutionary account or a full description 
of how neurological activity produces consciousness.267 However, as a neuroscientist, 
he builds this functional model upon facts about the brain. He aims for an inclusive view 
of consciousness as “a multilayered, multifocal capacity and a deep, enduring cognitive 
system with roots far back in evolution.”268 For Donald, the words “consciousness” or 
“awareness” encompass many phenomena. The first are mental states such as sleep, 
wakefulness, and alertness. Second, consciousness is a central executive in the mind -- a 
self-regulating high-level processor that receives input from many sources, examines it, 
and directs action based on analysis. This form of consciousness is what is generally called 
thought or understanding. Functionally, such consciousness’ domain is general processing 
power, attention, and general-purpose skill that can be brought to bear on unfamiliar or 
complex tasks. Finally, the third form of consciousness “has more to do with 
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enlightenment, or illumination, than with mere attention,” playing upon human symbolic 
capacity rather than just attention.  
Consciousness is understood as quantitative and not as something that some have 
and some do not have. The nonhumans can be more or less conscious. Their conscious 
capacity can support more or less information. They can handle problems of varying levels 
of complexity. They may have the first form of consciousness but not the other two, and 
so on. With this backdrop, Donald allows many animals into ‘the Consciousness club,’ 
starting with creatures like ants and bees, which can construct a representation of the world 
divorced from their immediate sensory input. At progressively higher levels of 
consciousness are fish and vertebrates, birds, mammals, primates, and humans. Further, 
not all humans share the same level of consciousness, and a child becomes more conscious 
as he or she develops.  
Donald also presents the evolution of human consciousness. He groups the 
constituents of consciousness in three levels of awareness. The first, associated with the 
sensory cortex, is binding or perceptual unity, the ability to combine perceptions to 
perceive complex phenomena like objects and events. This is the domain of raw feeling. 
The second is developed with the secondary cortex. It is the domain of short-term memory 
and control, where the birds and mammals have a sense of time and can focus on both an 
immediate perception and something which is out of sight but no longer out of mind. Such 
animals can also use their conscious power to learn new skills. The third is associated with 
the tertiary cortex, which is typical for humans and other primates. We are able to maintain 
intermediate-term awareness, at the level of minutes or hours. We are able to perceive, 
dissect, and act upon very complex situations and events, and several of them at once. 
75 
However, for Donald, this third level is not enough for symbolic thought and culture. 
Humans departed from their primate cousins by developing a superplastic brain and 
complex webs of culture, neither of which can feasibly exist without the other. Deep or 
cognitive enculturation is thus added to genes and environment as a driving factor of 
development. The two last chapters of A Mind So Rare present a condensed version of the 
four stages of human cognition with an eye toward consciousness. With these two books, 
we could see how greatly Donald has contributed to the integrative evolution and the 
clarification on the uniqueness of modern humans. 
Another integrative work in evolution is the work of Steven Mithen where he 
combined archeological, paleontological, and psychological studies.269 He sought to 
infer the evolution of psychological mechanisms from changes in toolmaking, patterns 
of hunting and gathering, and social structures. Mithen identifies four categories of 
intelligence (social – natural history – technical – linguistic) which are in the hominin 
line. For the evolution of mammalian and primates’ minds, Mithen evokes three forms 
of intelligence. The first is general intelligence for nonprimate mammals. The second is 
central intelligence which fall under the four categories. And the third is cognitive 
fluidity which is specific to modern humans. Mithen argues that modern human 
intelligence is not modularly isolated but creatively combines knowledge and abilities 
across domains. In hominin development, Mithen demonstrates that while Homo habilis 
possesses social intelligence, Homo ergaster has the technical intelligence, and the 
Neanderthals have “increased natural history, technical, and social intelligence, with 
 
269 Steven Mithen, Prehistory of the Mind: A Search for the Origins of Art, Religion, and Science (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1996). 
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language being parasitic on and largely limited to social intelligence.”270 In his 
contribution “The Cathedral Model for the Evolution of Human Cognition,” 271 Mithen 
emphasizes his view of human cognitive fluidity which allows for the beginning of 
history, or the cumulative development of events and knowledge, including cultural 
identities that are expressed in artifact traditions. 
Felix Warneken, professor in the department of Psychology at Harvard 
University, examines the helping behavior in chimpanzees and young children in 
relation to shared intentions.272 He demonstrates that while chimpanzees are capable of 
instrumental helping behavior, only humans can show genuine collaboration in 
coordinated activities to achieve a goal, with differentiated individual roles and a 
realization that both parties are seeking the same outcome. For Warneken, the shared 
goals and shared intentions are unique to humans. He discusses this finding in the 
context of the possibility that group selection has yielded the human ability for shared 
intentions. 
Other evolutionists who have adopted the integrative evolutionist approach are 
Peter Richerson from the Environmental Science and Policy department of UC Davis 
and Robert Boyd of the department of Anthropology of UC Los Angeles. Both are 
concerned with the origins of the capacity for culture. In their contribution “Rethinking 
Paleoanthropology: A world Queerer Than We supposed,” both apply their models to 
 
270 Steven Mithen, Prehistory of the Mind: A Search for the Origins of Art, Religion, and Science (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1996). Cf. Hatfield, 38. 
271 Steven Mithen, “The Cathedral Model for the Evolution of Human Cognition,” in Evolution of Mind, 
Brain, and Culture, ed. Gary Hatfield and Holly Pittman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum 
of Archeology and Anthropology, 2013), 217-33. 
272 Felix Warneken, “The Origins of Human Cooperation from a Developmental and Comparative 
Perspective,” in Evolution of Mind, Brain, and Culture, ed. Gary Hatfield and Holly Pittman (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archeology and Anthropology, 2013), 149-68. 
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the evolution of cognition and culture. They stress the changing character of 
environmental circumstances over the past 14 million years, especially the 2.5 million 
years in which the genus Homo has existed. Both demonstrate that different cognitive 
strategies or different cognitive mechanisms would be favored by different rates of 
environment change in the sense that long periods of environmental stability would 
favor the evolution of innate cognitive mechanisms. But in the case of our hominin 
ancestors, such stability was not possible because of the rapid changes. Both argued then 
that cognitive flexibility would be favored over innate fixity. For them “the mechanisms 
for such flexibility include imitative learning and tribe-oriented values, which might be 
subject to group selection.”273  
The other important contributions to integrative evolution are the work of Kim 
Sterelny from Australian National University in the School of Social Sciences, Peter 
Gärdenfors in Cognitive Science at Lund University, and Philip Chase from the 
Pennsylvania Museum at the University of Pennsylvania. While Sterelny274 emphasizes 
the importance of the evolution of cognitive bases for cooperation in the hominin line, 
Gärdenfors275 focuses on the sensory, motor, and cognitive differences between humans 
 
273 Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd, “Rethinking Paleoanthropology: A world Queerer Than We 
supposed,” in Evolution of Mind, Brain, and Culture, ed. Gary Hatfield and Holly Pittman (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archeology and Anthropology, 2013), 263-302. Cf. Hatfield, 41. 
274 Kim Sterelny, “Human Behavioral Ecology, Optimality, and Human Action,” in Evolution of Mind, 
Brain, and Culture, ed. Gary Hatfield and Holly Pittman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum 
of Archeology and Anthropology, 2013), 303-324.  
275 Peter Gärdenfors, “The Role of Cooperation in the Evolution of Protolanguage and Language,” in 
Evolution of Mind, Brain, and Culture, ed. Gary Hatfield and Holly Pittman (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Museum of Archeology and Anthropology, 2013), 193-216. For Gärdenfors, the key cognitive 
differences are in imagination, planning, mindreading, self-consciousness, and linguistic abilities. Being 
able to plan or to have a mental stimulation, are recognized as the new hominin capacities. The “ability 
for intersubjective cognition underlies hominin symbolic behavior and the evolution of cooperation.”275 
And he makes a clear distinction between the indirect reciprocity (the fact to be helped by someone else) 
and the intersubjectivity needed for shared intentions and future planning which occurs with the 
protolanguage, while the indirect reciprocity requires full predicative language. In Hatfield, 41. 
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and nonhominin anthropoids, and Chase seeks to demonstrate that the social codes 
created by human culture is one of the unique things about human culture. He examines 
the distinctive features of culture as a group and recounts the evidence for the timing of 
its evolution.276 These are some of the integrative evolutionists who have contributed 
not only to the research on evolution of mind, brain, and culture but also to the research 
on the evolution of species and the evolution of modern humans.  
2.3. Emergence of anatomically modern humans (AMH)277 
Focusing on the fundamental question of the unique distinctive characteristic of 
human being, Theodore Schurr from the department of Anthropology of the University 
 
276 One of the unique things that is unique for human culture is the social codes which can exist as a 
possession of groups, such as the codes for driving. And “socially created codes condition the motivation 
of individual behavior, and such codes form an all-encompassing system that assigns meaning and value 
to nearly all aspects of human life. 276 And from his survey of the archeological evidence, Chase concludes 
that “the ability for social coding, including referential language, entered the hominin line no later than 
the late Middle Pleistocene (some 150kya) and that cultural motivation and the formation of complex 
worldviews arose later.” Cf. Hatfield, 43. 
277 According to International Union for Geologic Sciences based on the redating of a geologic, from the 
first unicellular organism (eukaryotes), which is estimated between 4-3.5 billion years ago (bya), the 
evolutionary pathways leads through the first multicellular (the ediacara fauna) which is estimated 
between 800 and 600 million years ago (mya), and to the separation from the other major branch of 
animals, which includes mollusks, arthropods and some worms in 550 mya; all these periods are referred 
to as the “Precambrian” period. The evolutionary pathway leads also to the development of chordates in 
525 mya; and to the constitution of vertebrates with a spinal cord surrounded by segmented vertebrae in 
518 mya; and to development of amphibians in 370 mya; and to the development of mammal which are 
like reptiles in 320 mya; all these periods of the evolutionary development are referred as the “Paleozoic” 
period. 
From there, the evolutionary pathway leads to the “Mesozoic” period which is composed of the 
constitution of true mammals and dinosaurs between 220 and 120 mya; and to constitution of the first 
birds in 160 mya; and to the development of the first placental mammals in 120 mya. After the Mesozoic 
period, there was the “Cenzoic” period which began with the first primates around 65.5 mya; while the 
primates with modern aspects are estimated to occur around 55 mya; and the first anthropoid primates 
are estimated to exist between 50 and 45 mya; and the first Apes which are distinct from the Old World 
Monkeys are estimated around 30-20 mya; and the first hominins are estimated for 7-5 mya. 
To get to the Homo sapiens in Africa, the modern studies to which Hatfield refers show that the 
primary line of descent for Homo sapiens is from the Australopiths around 6 mya which are the first 
bipedalism in the first hominins, to the Homo Habilis between 2.5 and 1.6 mya; to the Homo ergaster 
which is the African form of Homo erectus in 1.8-0.7 mya, from which the Asian form of Homo erectus 
happened to evolve around 500 thousand years ago (kya). The African form of Homo erectus called Homo 
ergaster gave form to the Homo heidelbergensis also identified as Homo rhodesiensis around 600 kya 
which is now considered the common ancestor to Homo neanderthalensis (400-28 kya) in Eurasia and 
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of Pennsylvania began his reflection “When Did We Become Human?” by 
acknowledging the fact that “language, culture, tool use, brain size, and bipedalism have 
been cited as traits that differentiate modern humans from other primate species.”278 If 
it was once thought that these characteristics were the traits of human beings, he states 
that “we now understand most of them to be elaborations of similar features in other 
species, although with some specific manifestations for modern humans.”279 Not only is 
it recognized in chimpanzees and great apes that they have culture and that they have 
some 30 different behaviors like anting, greeting gestures, and reconciliation which are 
part of cultural patterns,280 and that they can make use of tools,281 but it is also recognized 
that they have emerging language abilities282 to comprehend and manipulate symbols 
and communicate emotions,283 even if they cannot make use of complex language. It has 
also been recognized by some scholars that the emergence of human language is 
probably found in the manual gestures, facial expressions, and vocal signals of 
 
Homo sapiens which is also called anatomically modern humans (AMH) around 200 kya in Africa. At 
this point, the Neanderthals are considered as the cousins of the Homo sapiens and no longer as parents 
of them, and both of them shared the same ancestor, Homo ergaster, with Homo erectus of Asia.  
278 Schurr, 45. 
279 Ibid., 45. 
280 The idea of Chimpanzees, Bonobos and great Apes having culture are defended by various scholars. 
Some of them are Andrew Whiten et al., “Cultures in Chimpanzees” Nature 399 (1999); and with Victoria 
Horner and Sarah Marshall-Pescini, “Cultural Panthropology” Evolutionary Anthropology 12 (2003). 
281 The idea of making use of tool is emphasized by Elizabeth A. Fox et al., “Intelligent Tool Use in Wild 
Sumatran Orangutans,” The Mentalities of Gorillas and Orangutans: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Sue 
Taylor Parker, Robert W. Mitchell, and H. Lyn. Miles, 99-116; also, by Gottfried Hohman and Barbara Fruth, 
“Culture in Bonobos? Between-Species and Within-Species Variation in Behavior” Current Anthropology 
44 no4 (Aug 2003): 563-571.  
282 The idea that Chimpanzees and apes have incipient language abilities is mostly developed by Francine 
Patterson and Eugene Linden, The Education of Koko in 1981; and by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Duane M. 
Rumbaugh and Kelly McDonald, “Language Learning in Two Species of Apes,” Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews 9 (1985). 
283 The capacity to communicate emotions or having a rudimentary understanding of grammar is emphasized 
by David Premack, “Is Language the Key to Human Intelligence?” Science 303 (2004): 318-320, and Philip 
Liberman, “The Evolution of Human Speech: Its Anatomical and Neural Bases,” Current Anthropology 48 
no1 (Sep 2007): 39-66. 
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chimpanzees and bonobos or gorillas.284 These various pieces of evidence of sharing of 
culture or cultural patterns “diminish the assertion of modern human uniqueness, despite 
clear quantitative differences between Homo sapiens  and other primate species.”285  
The genetic variation in humans and other primates helps us to see the 
anatomical, behavioral, and cognitive differences and similarities between them. The 
studies or the comparison of the human genome with that of other primates like apes and 
chimpanzees provide serious information about the evolution of modern humans and 
about the phylogenetic relationships among primate species, and reveal the major 
moments of selection which help to explain the anatomical, behavioral, and cognitive 
differences. As Theodore Schurr states in “When Did We Become Human?,” the 
“difficulty in finding a direct line linking earlier hominins with modern humans means 
that we must examine evidence for the emergence of human traits across the entire 
hominin lineage, and within the primate order, as well.”286 Before the polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR)287 method, which was developed in 1983 by Kary Mullis, an American 
biochemist, to analyze genetic variation, there was the chromosomal banding method288 
 
284 The idea that human language from the vocal signals of chimps and bonobos is mostly developed by Amy 
S. Pollick and Frans B. de Waal, “Ape Gestures and Language Evolution,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences USA 104 no19 (Mar 2007): 8184-8189; and Gillian S. Forrester, “A Multidimensional 
Approach to Investigations of Behaviour: Revealing Structure in Animal Communications Signals,” 
Behavior 76 no5 (Nov 2008): 1749-1760. 
285 Schurr, 47. 
286 Ibid., 55. 
287 Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is a technique used to make numerous copies of a specific segment of 
DNA quickly and accurately. The PCR enables investigators to obtain the large quantities of DNA that are 
required for various experiments and procedures in molecular biology, forensic analysis, evolutionary 
biology, and medical diagnostics. Cf. “Polymerase chain reaction” Britannica, 
https://www.britannica.com/science/polymerase-chain-reaction (accessed Mar 11, 2020). 
288 Chromosome banding is the lengthwise variation in staining properties along a chromosome… normally 
independent of any immediately obvious structural variation, and thus excludes patterns such as those seen 
on polytene chromosomes of Drosophila, which have a morphological component. Although the first 
observations of what could be called chromosome banding were made at the end of the nineteenth century, 
modern chromosome banding methods date from 1968 and can be applied to chromosomes of a wide variety 
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where “researchers characterized chromosomal banding patterns and compared 
segmental positions in different primate species to understand phylogenetic and 
functional differences between them.”289 These studies on genetic variation, the 
chromosomal banding method, and the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) did not 
“generate direct genealogical insights into the phylogenetic relationships between 
species as do studies of single copy nuclear genes or uniparentally inherited genetic 
systems, such as the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) or the Y-chromosome.”290 However, 
in large part due to recombination and other rearrangements that have taken place over 
many millions of years, it is recognized that these studies have demonstrated that 
between humans, chimpanzees, and apes, there is a “relative similarity of the genomes 
of these species, and identified sorts of evolutionary processes that they have 
experienced over the past 10-20 million years.”291  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of species with no more than slight modifications. Following the introduction of Q-branding by Casperson 
and his colleagues in 1968, Pardue and Gall inadvertently produced differential staining of heterochromatin, 
leading to C-banding, and in 1971 G-banding was discovered by several authors. In general, there are too 
many branding techniques, to be mentioned individually. Cf. A. T. Sumner,  
 “Chromosome Banding Pattern” ScienceDirect https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/biochemistry-
genetics-and-molecular-biology/chromosome-banding-pattern  2001, (accessed Mar 11, 2020).   
289 Schurr, 56. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid. 
1. Primate cladogram based on chromosomal 
banding patterns.  Cf. Theodore G. Schurr, Fig.2.3. 
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This cladogram based on chromosome banding patterns shows a significant 
change in chromosome structure over the past 14-25 million years, including fusions, 
and inversions. From the Old World Monkeys, which are Macaques and Baboons, 
Vervets and Guenons, and Leaf Monkeys, the “Gibbons have undergone tremendous 
chromosome rearrangements, and they also show a range of karyotypes, while the 
branch leading to the orangutan and African apes has undergone two fissions to produce 
the 48-chromosome karyotype.”292 And “in the human lineage, there has been a fusion 
of two chromosomes present in chimpanzees and other primates to create the human 
chromosome 2, thereby reducing the human karyotype to 2n=46.”293 From the 
perspective of the cytogenetic and molecular data, there have been genomic 
rearrangements more frequently during primate genome evolution. And this genomic 
rearrangement can explain the DNA differences between the human species and the 
ape’s and chimpanzee’s species, because it could have played a role in the gene 
expression of each species.  
To elaborate the exact implications of the chromosomal expansion for selection 
and adaption in the human and chimp lineages, the model of nuclear gene variation has 
been used to reconstruct phylogenetic relationships of humans and hominid ape species.  
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2. A phylogeny showing the evolutionary relationships 
between different hominoid species. The numbers indicate 
estimated millions of years (myr) from the last branch point to 
the present along particular lineages. The time estimates are 
based on both fossil evidence and genetic data from the species 
represented in the tree. Cf. Theodore G. Schurr, Fig.2.5. 
With various nuclear gene sequences, it has been possible to reconstruct a 
phylogenetic relationship of humans and hominoid ape species. In that reconstruction, 
the human-chimpanzees lineage is separated from the Gorillas lineage. The human and 
chimpanzees and Bonobos separation are later than the separation of Humans and 
Gorillas, Orangutans, and Gibbons. In a “study of four genomic regions from human, 
chimp, gorilla, and orangutan comprising ~2 million base pairs, […] estimate the 
human-chimp speciation event at 4.1 ± 0.4 mya and fairly large ancestral effective 
population sizes (65,000 ± 30,000 for the human-chimp ancestor).”294 After the 
speciation between human and gorilla, it is noted in the studies conducted in 2007 by 
Hobolth and Christensen, et al., “Genomic Relationships and Speciation Times of 
Human, Chimpanzees, and Gorilla Inferred from a Coalescent Hidden Markov 
 
294 Schurr, 61. 
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Model,”295 that approximately half of the human genome coalesced with chimpanzee. 
According to Patterson, and Richter et al., in “Genetic Evidence for Complex Speciation 
of Humans and Chimpanzees,”296 the short divergence between humans and 
chimpanzees on the X chromosomes can be explained by an interspecific hybridization 
even in the ancestry of these two species.  
To study the genomic divergences between humans and other hominoids, Feng-
Chi Chen and Wen-Hsiung Li, in “Genomic Divergences between Humans and Other 
Hominoids and the Effective Population Size of the Common Ancestor of Humans and 
Chimpanzees,” selected 53 autosomal intergenic non-repetitive DNA segments from the 
human genome and sequenced them in a human, a chimpanzee, a gorilla, and an 
orangutan. “The average sequence divergence was only 1.24% ± 0.07% for the human-
chimpanzee pair, 1.62% ± 0.08% for the human-gorilla pair, and 1.63% ± 0.08% for the 
chimpanzee-gorilla pair.”297 And “the average sequence divergences between orangutans 
and humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas were 3.08% ± 0.11%, 3.12% ± 0.11%, and 3.09% 
± 0.11%.”298 These estimations, which were confirmed by additional data from GenBank, 
are substantially lower than previous ones, which included repetitive sequences and might 
have been based on less-accurate sequence data.299 When these DNA segments were 
subjected to phylogenetic analysis, they strongly supported the Homo-Pan clade. It states 
that “the neighbor-joining tree derived from the concatenated sequence of the 53 
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segments—24,234 bp in length—supports the Homo-Pan clade with a 100% bootstrap 
value.”300 
Several studies conducted by the Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium 
have noted that “X-linked genes are significantly overrepresented among rapidly evolving 
genes in humans and chimps.”301 In this same study on “Initial Sequence of the 
Chimpanzee Genome and Comparison with the Human Genome,” the authors of the 
Consortium find that “the patterns of evolution in human and chimpanzee protein-coding 
genes are highly correlated and dominated by the fixation of neutral and slightly deleterious 
alleles.”302 They also “use the chimpanzee genome as an outgroup to investigate human 
population genetics and identify signatures of selective sweeps in recent human 
evolution.”303 The comparison of human and chimpanzee genomes have permitted a 
closer examination of regions of the human genome that may reflect adaptive evolution. 
“Within these regions, a number of loci of biological importance were identified, 
including ones involved in pigmentation pathways, components of the dystrophin 
protein complex,”304 and also “clusters of olfactory receptors, genes involved in nervous 
systems development and function, immune system genes, and heat shock genes.”305 
Despite the various biological changes between humans and chimpanzees, Clark et al., 
in ‘‘Inferring Nonneutral Evolution from Human-Chimp-Mouse Orthologous Gene Trios,” 
demonstrate that “based on the comparison of genomic data, human and chimpanzee 
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gene sequences are nearly 96% identical, implying close phylogenetic links between 
them.306 
2.4. The key genetic adaptations for similarities and divergencies 
In his exploration of the relationship of some key genetic adaptations in the 
hominin lineage to anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics, Schurr 
noted that the olfactory, bipedalism, dietary changes, linguistic, encephalization, sexual, 
etc. genes help for the observation of genetic adaptation. About the olfactory genes, he 
notes that those genes have undergone very rapid change in the chimpanzee and human 
lineage.307 Even Chen and Li estimate that there are about 50 genes linked to smell which 
have shown evidence of positive selection.308 The olfactory receptors (OR) as the genes 
with the sense of smell were known to undergo rapid divergence in primates. These 
differences probably reflect the reduced importance of smell in the human lifestyle 
relative to that of chimpanzees. One of the key human adaptations is bipedalism, which 
is a defining feature of the hominin clade. Bipedalism is marked by a series of skeleton-
muscular, neurological, postural, and developmental changes that permit habitual 
movement and balance on two legs. Bipedalism supposes also some anatomical changes 
like pelvic structure, angled knees, curved lumbar region, and reorientation of muscle 
attachments, among others.309 Comparative genomic study has indicated that certain 
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selective changes may have occurred in genes that influenced the evolution of 
bipedalism. And these selective changes include long-bone growth, hair loss, actin 
binding, and cytoskeletal formation.310 
 
 
3.Human bipedality and ape anatomy. A comparison of 
gorilla and human anatomy and stature. (From Bernard G. 
Campbell et al., Humankind Emerging, 9th ed., 2006, Fig. 
13.16.) From Theodore G. Schurr, Fig. 2.7  
The emergence of bipedalism is explained in two different ways. With the fossil 
evidence, it seems that Sahelanthropus could be the first bipedal. Fossil femora discovered 
in the Lukeino Formation of Kenya and attributed to Orrorin tugenensis provides the 
earliest postcranial evidence of hominin bipedalism at 6 mya. But there has been a debate 
about the functional and phylogenetic significance of these femora. There is even an article 
by Brian G. Richmond and William J. Jungers in 2008, “Orrorin tugenensis Femoral 
Morphology and Evolution of Hominin Bipedalism,” which shows that the Orrorin 
tugenensis311 has a different femur from those of apes and Homo, and his femur seems to 
 
310 Clark et al., 1960. 
311 Brian G. Richmond and William J. Jungers, “Orrorin tugenensis Femoral Morphology and Evolution of 
Hominin Bipedalism,” Science 319 (Mar 2008): 1662-65; shows that the Orrorin tugenensis has different 
femur from those of apes and Homo, but his femur seems to resemble to those of Australopithecus and 
Paranthropus. Femoral morphology also indicates that Orrorin tugenensis shared distinctive hip 
biomechanics with australopithecines.  Cf. Schurr, 66-67.  
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resemble those of Australopithecus and Paranthropus. From the comparative 
biomechanical anatomy of Orrorin tugenensis, it seems for some scholars that the Orrorin 
tugenensis was adapted to bipedalism. But there was some evidence that an 
Australopithecus was bipedal. However, truly obligate bipedalism apparently did not arise 
until the emergence of Homo erectus. Bipedalism seems to have “an important influence 
on the development of human cognitive abilities.”312 And the “shift from a quadrupedal 
to a bipedal locomotory adaptation led to a major transformation of hominins at 
anatomical, behavioral, cognitive, and physiological levels.”313 
The comparison of the human and chimp genomes has also shown that almost 80 
genes used to digest proteins differ between these two species.314 “These differences 
likely reflect how the human diet has changed in the 5 million years since hominins split 
from chimpanzees.”315 Like the transformation from quadrupedalism to bipedalism, the 
hominin digestive system underwent major transformation to adapt itself to the new diet. 
According to Leslie Aiello and Peter Wheeler in “The Expensive-Tissue Hypothesis: The 
Brain and the Digestive System in Human and Primate Evolution,” and Katharine Milton 
in “Hypothesis to Explain the Role of Meat-eating in Human Evolution,” Chimps (and 
most probably early hominins) have a longer large intestine and a shorter small intestine, 
as needed by an omnivorous species with a significant intake of vegetative matter and 
fibrous food sources.316 By contrast, humans have the opposite configuration, a shorter 
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large intestine and longer small intestine, allowing them to absorb more nutrients, 
minerals, and fats in the food sources that they consume.317 This remodeling of the body 
had significant bioenergetic implications, as both the brain and the stomach are 
metabolically costly organs. It is said that overall, Homo erectus exhibits features more 
like those of modern humans than those of earlier “and contemporaneous 
australopithecines and paranthropines. The Homo erectus and modern human seem to 
have in common “larger relative brain sizes, larger bodies, higher energetic needs, 
obligate bipedalism, and smaller teeth and jaws.”318 In their divergence and similarity in 
their diet, chimpanzees and humans had different strategies in scavenging or hunting. 
Because these two activities suppose the coordination of group actions to procure food 
sources, some forms of communication were necessary. The comparisons between 
chimp and human scavenging and hunting practices reveal a lack of coordinated group 
actions in chimps, which could be explained by the level of communication.  
Indeed, the ability to communicate is another way to demonstrate the genetic 
adaptation and to explain the genomic divergence and similarity between humans and 
apes and chimpanzees. It has been demonstrated by Premack that “both humans and apes 
are capable of learning and imitation, but only humans can clearly teach others how to 
do tasks, while apes require human training to repeatedly perform imitative behaviors.” 
And, “while great apes can clearly master the use of hundreds of symbols and 
rudimentary grammar, humans are capable of learning a far greater vocabulary and 
symbolic repertoire”319 In addition,  “humans have both recursive and non-recursive 
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theories of mind, and the capacity to understand recursive and non-recursive grammars, 
whereas apes and monkeys are limited to non-recursive grammars.”320And, in “The 
Evolution of Human Speech: Its Anatomical and Neural Bases,” Philip Lieberman notes 
that speech “requires a brain that can ‘reiterate’ or freely reorder a finite set of motor 
gestures to form a potentially infinite number of words and sentences.”321 According to 
him, this appears to be lacking in the chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates. With 
the analysis of brain anatomy and neuronal complexity, it becomes obvious that the 
Broca and Wernicke 322 views of locating the abilities of language to the left hemisphere 
of the brain or in the parietal lobe and temporal lobe is limited, because we “now 
understand that many different parts of the brain are involved in speech production and 
comprehensive and symbolic behavior.”323  
The comparison of the human and chimpanzee genomes “have identified changes 
in 21 human genes that are linked to hearing. Such genes not only enable humans to 
understand speech in the brain, but also are involved in hearing and are likely related to 
the linguistic abilities of modern humans.”324 The language or speech production relies 
 
320 Premack, 318-320. 
321 Philip Lieberman, “The Evolution of Human Speech: Its Anatomical and Neural Bases,” Current 
Anthropology 48 (Feb 2007): 39-66. 
322 Broca’s area was named after Paul Broca, a French doctor of the nineteenth century and Carl Wernicke 
was a German physician who gave his name to Wernicke’s area. The cerebrum is the largest and most obvious 
part of the brain. It consists of two halves which are known as cerebral hemispheres. The hemispheres are 
joined together by a band of tissue called the corpus callosum. Each hemisphere consists of four visible lobes 
known as the frontal, parietal, temporal, and occipital lobes. Broca’s area is a patch of tissue located in one 
of the two frontal lobes. It’s usually found in the left hemisphere, but it is sometimes located in the right one. 
Broca’s area plays an important role in the creation of speech. Ten years after Broca’s discovery, Carl 
Wernicke discovered another area that is often located mostly in the temporal lobe and partially in the parietal 
lobe. It’s involved in understanding the meaning of spoken words. Cf. Linda Crampton, “The Brain: Broca’s 
and Wernicke’s Areas and the Circle of Willis,” Owlcation (Dec 2019) 
https://owlcation.com/stem/Exploring-the-Brain-Three-Regions-Named-after-Scientists (accessed Mar 12, 
2020).   
323 Andrew G. Clark et al., 1960-63. 
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also on having the appropriate anatomical features of vocal apparatus. “Humans and 
apes differ considerably in the size and shape of the vocal tract, the position of the tongue 
in the oral cavity, and the location of the larynx in the throat.”325 While in apes, there is 
the higher position of the larynx, a longer shallower tongue and oral cavity, and the 
inability to use the tongue and oral cavity to produce vowel sounds, in humans, the 
tongue shape and position creates oral-to-pharyngeal proportions of the supralaryngeal 
vocal tract.326  
 
 
4. A comparison of chimpanzee and human vocal anatomy. 
(From Bernard G. Campbell et al., Humankind Emerging, 9th 
ed., 2006, Fig. 13.16.) From Theodore G. Schurr, Fig. 2.10. 
One of the possibilities to explain the ontogenetic aspects of language abilities327 
in humans and apes is that the human vocal ability follows a general ape trajectory until 
the shift to the human track. “In this model, the human child has its larynx situated 
higher in its throat like apes until 2-3 years of age, when it begins producing articulate 
 
325 Schurr, 73. 
326 Ibid. 
327 In 2002, the Specific Language Impairment Consortium, composed by several researchers had 
identified a gene that is central to the human ability to develop language, the forkhead-box P2 gene 
(FOXP2) which is found in many vertebrate, and was initially identified as the genetic cause of a speech 
disorder in a family in which half of the members have severe articulation difficulties accompanied by 
linguistic and grammatical impairment. With the researchers of the Consortium, the FOXP2 is identified 
as the regulate gene expression by binding to DNA, and it is also required for a proper development of 
speech and language in humans. “The predominant features of the FOXP2 phenotype of affected 
individuals were an impairment of both the selection and sequencing of fine orofacial movements 
underlying fluent speech, and the linguistic processing for both spoken and written language. Cf. Schurr, 
76. 
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speech, at which time several developmental changes take place, including the descent 
of the larynx into its adult position in the throat.”328 The emergence of the human ability 
to comprehend and produce semantically meaningful sounds is then marked by both 
anatomical and cognitive changes.329  
Another key genetic adaptation is encephalization,330 since the size of the brain 
is considered one of the primary traits of demarcation between human and apes and 
between the rest of hominins. The human genome for genes related to brain growth 
shows evidence of positive selection in human lineage, in the way that those genes are 
viewed as potentially contributing to the emergence of modern human cognition. There 
are two genes which are associated with primary microcephaly (small cerebral cortex), 
the first being abnormal spindle-like microcephaly (ASPM) and the second being 
microcephalin (MCPH1).331 “Microcephaly reduces the human brain to 50% or less of 
its normal mass, i.e., to about the size of the brain of chimpanzees or early hominin 
ancestors (and the microcephalin gene) is highly polymorphic in human populations, 
 
328 Lieberman, 39-66. 
329 Ibid. 
330 While relative size does have some relationship to certain aspects of language ability, cultural behavior 
and symbolic use, primate species with smaller brains show some abilities to communicate, comprehend 
symbols, express cultural traditions, and recognize members of their social groups. Both relative size and 
the smaller brains of primates, and the neurological organization and the development are really important 
in the emergence of large-brained of hominin and the complex linguistic and cognitive functions that 
humans are to perform. Cf. Schurr, 80. 
331 Yin-Qiu Wang and Bing Su, “Molecular Evolution of Microcephalin, a Gene Determining Human Brain 
Size,” Human Molecular Genetics 13 (Mar 2004): 1131-37; Patrick D. Evans, Sandra L. Gilbert and Nitzan 
Mekel-Bobrov et al., “Microcephalin, a Gene Regulating Brain Size, Continues to Evolve Adaptively in 
Humans,” Science 309 (Sep 2005): 1717-20. 
93 
with most mutations being non-synonymous in nature.”332 The ASPM and MCPH have 
undergone adaptive evolution in the hominin lineage.333  
When it comes to modeling brain evolution in apes and humans, relative size 
does seem to matter. It is traditionally admitted that there is a “relationship between 
brain size and the complexity of hominin behavior as viewed through the lithic 
production, faunal analysis, coordination of group activities, language ability, and 
adaptability to numerous different environments.”334 However, “more recent studies of 
brain anatomy employing modern imaging techniques are showing that expanding brain 
size is only part of the story behind the emergence of modern human cognitive function 
and behavioral capacities.”335 In his analysis of brain structure sizes across the primate 
order, James Rilling, in his MRI results, showed that both human and ape brains 
exhibited specializations with respect to other anthropoid brains. More specifically, “ape 
specializations include elaboration of the cerebellum (all apes) and frontal lobes (great 
apes only), and probably connectivity between them.”336 And human brain 
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333 He gives more details about how these two genes had undergone adaptative evolution. It has been 
identified within the modern humans, a group of closely related haplotypes at MCPH1, called haplogroup D, 
and found that it arose from single copy ~37,000 years ago and subsequently swept to a very high frequency. 
They suggest that this haplogroup originated in a hominin lineage that had diverged from modern humans 
around 1.1 mya and then introgressed into humans by ~37,000 years ago. If true, then this finding would 
imply that admixture occurred between archaic and modern humans. About the ASPM shows evidence of 
accelerated evolution in the African hominoid clade, which preceded hominin brain expression by several 
million years, as well as during the recent human evolution. It has been estimated that, on average, ASPM 
fixed one advantageous amino acid change in every 300.000-400,000 years since the human lineage diverged 
from chimpanzees. The regions of the ASPM gene under positive selection in primates are also the most 
highly diverged regions between primates and non-primate mammals. Therefore, current data indicate that 
the ASPM gene has undergone adaptative evolution in the hominin lineage. Cf. Schurr, 80 
334 Schurr, 81. 
335 Ibid., 81. 
336 James K. Rilling, “Human and Non-human Primate Brains: Are They Allometrically Scaled Versions of 
the Same Design?” Evolutionary Anthropology 15 (Apr 2006): 65. 
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specializations include an overall larger proportion of neocortex, “with disproportionate 
enlargement of prefrontal and temporal association cortices, an apparent increase in 
cerebellar connections with cerebral cortical association areas involved in cognition, a 
probable augmentation of intracortical connectivity in prefrontal cortex.”337  
Until now, most studies of the emergence of language production and 
comprehension have focused on genes influencing brain anatomy338 or the analysis of 
cognitive and neurological phenomena, but there is a study on the masticatory muscles 
in humans and primates, as well as the myosin gene which is one of the genes involved 
in producing them.339 It is noted in “Myosin Gene Mutation Correlates with Anatomical 
Changes in the Human Lineage,” by Hansell Stedman et al., that powerful masticatory 
muscles “are found in most primates, including chimpanzees and gorillas, and were a 
prominent part of the adaptative strategies of Australopithecus and Paranthropus. In 
contrast, these muscles are considerably smaller in both modern and fossil members of 
the genus Homo.”340 For them, according to Stedman et al., the myosin mutation 
“facilitated greater encephalization in the hominin lineage due to removing 
physiological and structural constraints on brain and cranial growth.”341 
 
337 James K. Rilling, “Human and Non-human Primate Brains: Are They Allometrically Scaled Versions of 
the Same Design?” Evolutionary Anthropology 15 (Apr 2006): 65. 
338 The increased of growth of the brain is also explained by the sexual selection. Michael A. Schillaci in 
“Sexual Selection and the Evolution of Brain Size in Primates,” PLoS One 1 (Dec 2006): e62, examined 
the relationship between brain size and sexual selection. While observing no significant relationship 
between relative brain size and sperm competition as measured by testis size in primates, he did find a 
significant negative relationship between them. These results suggested to him that the largest relative 
brain sizes among primate species are associated with monogamous mating systems, suggesting that 
primate monogamy may require greater social acuity and abilities of deception. However, we hope that 
this study of Schillaci et al. is not another way of perpetuation of racism and supremacism on the peoples 
and traditions which continue to find value in polygamy.   
339 Schurr, 84. 
340 Hansell H. Stedman, Benjamin W. Kozyak and Anthony Nelson et al., “Myosin Gene Mutation Correlates 
with Anatomical Changes in the Human Lineage,” Nature 428 (Mar 2004): 415-18. 
341 Ibid. 
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By exploring the emergence of the modern human, which shows the similarities 
and divergences between humans and others species, especially chimpanzees, it is 
realized that “while having roots in primate and hominin prehistory, modern humans 
have undergone significant biological and behavioral changes over the last 2 million 
years.”342 Comparing the human genome to those of the chimpanzees, gorillas, and other 
primate species, it is showed that the human genome has undergone profound changes 
in terms of its size, content, and regulation.  
Despite the close genetic affinity between apes and humans, such that these taxa 
share over 96% of their genomic sequences, it is evident that “there are significant 
differences in the expression and regulation of these genes in the two species, as well as 
specific allelic and chromosomal changes (e.g., segmental duplications) that led to the 
phenotypic, physiological, and behavioral differences seen in them.”343 The differences 
are even observable in the way that each lineage (humans and apes) was affected by 
selection, which had implications for the cultural and even the sexual lives of each of 
these species. Schurr illuminated the cognitive difference between apes and humans, and 
the evolutionary forces that have influenced them. The size of brain is clearly one feature 
that distinguishes humans from apes, but it is, according to Schurr, one dimension of the 
transformation of the hominid brain, because some others dimensions have also been 
observed, like the cortical areas which are related to higher cognitive function, the 
neuronal density and the neuroanatomical architecture.344 And as he states, “it is clear 
that the hominin brain has been transformed in a manner that now allows us to have 
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articulate speech, abstract reasoning, and complex cultural behavior in contrast to other 
hominoid apes.”345  
Until now, it is difficult to determine the exact timing of the emergence of the 
genus Homo in the Pliocene-Pleistocene boundary and the timing of most of the 
transition which remain speculative. And the conditions “under which the 
transformation of the genus Homo took place – which shaped the evolution of the species 
or lineage – are still incompletely understood.”346 The hypothesis is that there could have 
been major climate changes which might have triggered a shift in subsistence towards 
broader spectrum diet and greater consumption of meat, and accompanying behavior 
changes like hunting and scavenging. This dietary shift led to the transformation in gut 
morphology of hominids, “setting the biological foundation for the later encephalization 
of the lineage, and perhaps also the bioenergetic basis for more hominin-like forms of 
bipedalism, which permitted the expansion of the lineage outside of its Africa 
homeland.”347 There are still also questions about the timing of the emergence of modern 
human language,348 the selective forces that promoted rapid brain size growth, and the 
relationship between brain size and complexity and primate and hominin linguistic and 
cultural abilities.  
Terrance Deacon, who could be associated with the integrative evolution, not 
only because of his integrative works of neuroscience with evolutionary biology while 
 
345 Schurr, 88. 
346 Ibid. 
347 Ibid. 
348 When the question of the emergence of language was brought up, it is to the evolution of brain structures 
that some answers were provided, because it is the evolution of brain structures that have facilitated the use 
of language. Considering the fact that human beings are AMH (anatomically modern humans) and 
behaviorally modern as well, which is attributed to the evolution of brain structures, the question of the 
emergence found some solutions there.   
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he was investigating the human cognition, but also because of the close connection of 
his symbolic representation with the inter-relation of the biological and cultural 
evolution of Merlin Donald, makes some important contributions on the development of 
language in human beings. With The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language 
and the Brain, he offers a wealth of insights into the significance of symbolic thinking, 
from the co-evolutionary exchange between language and brains over the two million 
years of hominid evolution to the ethical repercussions that followed man’s newfound 
access to other people’s thoughts and emotions. Like many of those who were interested 
in the question of language, Deacon was intrigued by what makes the human brain 
capable of speech, and by the reasons why animals don’t have such language. The 
exclusivity of the ability for language in the human species is explained ultimately by 
the capacity of symbolization, which is lacking in all the rest of the species. From his 
argumentation, what makes language unique and special for humans is the fact that it 
uses symbols or symbolic reference. While emphasizing the symbolic threshold (icon-
index-symbol),349 Deacon states, 
(The) referential relationship between the words—words systematically 
indicating other words—forms a system of higher-order relationship that allows 
words to be about indexical relationships, and not just indices in themselves. But 
this is also why words need to be in context with other words, in phrases and 
sentences, in order to have any determinate reference. Their indexical power is 
distributed, so to speak, in the relationships between words. Symbolic reference 
derives from combinational possibility and impossibilities, and we therefore 
depend on combinations both to discover it (during learning) and to make use of 
 
349 The use of these three terms (icon-index-symbol) which are important in the argumentation of Deacon, 
come from the impact of Charles Sanders Peirce. But because Deacon is not linguist or philosopher, his 
use of these three seem quite different, even if he makes his point. Some people had made critics against 
his use of these three terms. For example, when he said (this referential relationship between words – 
words systematically indication other words), some people find it difficult to understand because 
reference for a linguist or a philosopher is the action of mentioning or alluding to something or the relation 
between a word and an element of the world.  
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it (during communication). Thus, the imagined version of a nonhuman animal 
language that is made up of isolated words, but lacking regularities that govern 
possible combinations, is ultimately a contradiction in terms.350  
He rejects the traditional approach of complexity, which could make human 
language unique.351 Against the approach of Noam Chomsky of a universal grammar 
encoded in our brains, i.e., an ‘innate grammar’ which could explain why humans could 
learn complex language, Deacon argues that it is language itself which provides the 
facility for the emergence of language. And, the prefrontal cortex, which is more 
developed in humans than in apes and all other species, is the part of the brain which is 
responsible for symbolic reference or symbol formation. In other words, the capacity for 
‘symbolic reference’ is made possible by the fact that humans have the prefrontal cortex 
which is larger than the one of chimpanzees. He argues considerably about the 
localization of the speech function within the brain and has rejected Broca and 
Wernicke’s views of locating the abilities of language in the left hemisphere of the brain 
or in the parietal lobe and temporal lobe. It is clear for Deacon also that the ability to 
use a symbolic reference requires not only the prefrontal cortex, but also the vocal tract 
and the lower position of the larynx in the human throat when compared to the one of 
apes or chimpanzees. Indeed, it is because of that lower position of the human larynx 
that humans can produce sounds and are able to choke when they swallow something.  
Deacon has also argued about the influence of symbolic reference during the 
evolution of the modern human. According to him, the Neanderthals were able to use 
the symbolic reference. Before that, like in the case of the Homo erectus, there is no 
assurance that they used symbolic communication. And without demonstrating it, he 
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believes that the demise of the Neanderthals was not due to a cultural or linguistic 
inferiority, but it was due to disease.352 From Deacon’s contribution, the symbolic 
reference and the prefrontal cortex, but also the vocal tract and the lower position of the 
larynx, are majors elements which explain how human language is unique and special, 
and why animals don’t have language. 
2.5. Epistemic evolution 
Jürgen Renn presents a new way to approach the history of science and 
technology, the history of knowledge. The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science 
for the Anthropocene353 and in the article “The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking 
Science in the Anthropocene,”354 this new approach offers a grand narrative of human 
history where knowledge serves as a critical factor of cultural evolution. He argues that 
humanity has entered into a new stage of evolution,355 the stage of epistemic evolution. 
Just as the cultural evolution emerged from the biological evolution, he believes that 
epistemic evolution emerged as an aspect of cultural evolution and now dominates the 
global fate of humanity. It is characterized by the increasing dependence of global 
society on the achievements and further extension of science and technology in order to 
ensure its sustainability in the age of the Anthropocene.356  
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Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2020). 
354 Jürgen Renn, “The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science in the Anthropocene,” Journal of 
History of Science and Technology 12 (Sep 2018): 1-22.  
355 After talking about the climate changes, Renn notes that the planet is changing with irreversible 
consequences. There is no hope that we might ever be able to return to some “natural state” of affairs. 
Humanity has affected the energy balance at the Earth’s surface, resulting in the transition of our planet into 
a new stage. Cf. Renn, “The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science in the Anthropocene,” 3. 
356 The term Anthropocene was used for the first time by Paul Crutzen (Nobel Prize winner and discoverer 
of the hole in the Ozone layer) during a conference on Earth system science outside Mexico City when he 
was struck by a sudden dislike for the Holocene which seemed to utterly belittle the human impact on the 
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Renn examines the role of knowledge in global transformations going back to 
the dawn of civilization, while providing vital perspectives on the complex challenges 
confronting us today in the Anthropocene – “the new geological epoch of humankind 
[..] (and) the ultimate context for a history of knowledge and the natural vanishing point 
for an investigation of cultural evolution.”357 This book is an examination of the possible 
role of the history of science in understanding the Anthropocene, in the way that it 
reframes the history of science and technology within a much broader history of 
knowledge. He reframes this history by analyzing key episodes such as the evolution of 
writing, the emergence of science in the ancient world, the Scientific Revolution of early 
modernity, the globalization of knowledge, industrialization, and the profound 
transformations wrought by modern science. He investigates the evolution of knowledge 
using an array of disciplines and methods, from cognitive science and experimental 
psychology to earth science and evolutionary biology. With his cultural evolutionary 
approach, he emphasizes the evolution of knowledge and its transformation. The result 
is an entirely new framework for understanding structural changes in systems of 
knowledge and a bold new approach to the history and philosophy of science.  
Renn structures his reflection in five parts. In part 1, he argues about the double 
character of knowledge, the empowerment it provides, and the unintended consequences 
 
Earth system. He told the delegates to stop using the term “Holocene” and, while speaking, searched for a 
better one. “We are not in the Holocene anymore. We are in the…the… the Anthropocene.” The Holocene 
was described as the second period of so-called Quaternary period, after the Pleistocene, which is an Ice Age 
that began 2.6 mya, while the Holocene is interglacial period in which the ice retreats. The Holocene began 
11,700 years before 2,000 CE, and its climatic conditions have been unusually stable ever since. The term 
‘Anthropocene’ has been used by the limnologist Eugene F. Stoermer since the 1980 And as Renn notes in 
his article, the concept of Anthropocene has opened our eyes towards a fundamentally altered global 
environment and the fact that humanity has meanwhile changed the planet to a degree comparable to geologic 
forces. Cf. Renn, The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene, 5. 
357 Renn, The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene, ix.  
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to which it leads. In part 2, he argues about the historical nature of thinking and the 
structural changes of knowledge. He dedicates part 3 to the “economy of knowledge” 
by investigating how knowledge structures affect society and how society affects 
knowledge structures. In part 4, he focuses on the globalization processes of knowledge, 
asking how knowledge spreads. And finally, in part 5, he argues about the kind of 
knowledge our future depends. Recapitulating the role of knowledge in and for 
Anthropocene, Renn states  
Humans have massively intervened in various Earth system cycles, such as the 
carbon cycle, causing climate change, as well as the water, nitrogen, phosphorus 
and sulphur cycles, all of which are fundamental to life on Earth. Humanity has 
affected the energy balance at the Earth’s surface, resulting in the transition of our 
planet into a new stage, the Anthropocene, propelled and empowered by the 
knowledge embodied in our technologies and our material culture. The question of 
whether and when the Anthropocene began is still debated. What is clear is that this 
knowledge has accumulated over generations and ever more quickly since the 
Scientific Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the so-called Great 
Acceleration of the 1950s.358 
 In the 5th part, when he returns to the relation between the Anthropocene and the 
evolution of knowledge, Renn begins by clarifying that cultural evolution is what 
distinguishes humanity from the rest of the biosphere. Cultural evolution is a unique 
layer of metabolism and learning on top of biological evolution. With their rapidly 
evolving culture, humans have introduced an ‘ergosphere’ “(a sphere of work, as well as 
of technological and energetic transformations) as a new global component of the Earth 
system, in addition to the lithosphere, the hydrosphere, the atmosphere, and the biosphere, 
thus changing the overall dynamics of the system.”359 And, “ergosphere may be on its 
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way to becoming a “technosphere” in which technological and other global 
infrastructures created by humans assume a self-organizing, quasi-autonomous 
character.”360 In chapter 15, “Exodus from Holocene,” he argues that the entry into a 
new state of the Earth system is not due to a single cause and cannot be tied to a particular 
event in human history. It can best be described in terms of a cascade of evolutionary 
processes, as a transition from cultural to epistemic evolution.  
In cultural evolution, human societies have entered what Marx refers to as 
“relations of production” dependent on their material culture. In epistemic 
evolution, human societies’ interactions with the Earth system have become 
dependent on science-based technologies, such as the use of fossil fuels, nuclear 
power, artificial fertilizers, and genetic engineering. Without the empowerment 
of the means of production through scientific knowledge, humanity would not 
have entered the Great Acceleration of the 1950s that is now being discussed in 
the geological sense as the beginning of the Anthropocene.361 
What stone tools, hunting, gathering, and later food production, clothing, and the 
building of shelters were for the Holocene, science362 and technology are for the 
Anthropocene. These two are now essential conditions of human life. The transition 
from cultural to epistemic evolution is based on the development of knowledge. 
 
360 Renn, The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene, 31.  
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362 About science, Renn says “the development of science is not a unidirectional or deterministic process. 
Modern science is evidently one outcome of a global history of knowledge that cannot be understood 
without taking into account the interaction of knowledge with a variety of other societal structures, in 
particular the rise of capitalist and later industrial economies.” While he was emphasizing on “The 
Multiple Origins of the Natural Sciences”, he raised the question of the origin of modern science and 
compared it to the question of the origin of the human species. The answer “involved considerations 
about the emergence of a new evolutionary process: cultural evolution. Cultural evolution began as a 
peripheral phenomenon of biological evolution [..] before it eventually became the dominant process of 
human history.” To that same question about the origin of science, it becomes plausible that science could 
emerge and become a dominant factor of our current state without being necessary result of some initial 
conditions. From such a perspective, scientific knowledge is just as unlikely to be an inevitable 
consequence of some given initial conditions, as according to Darwin’s theory of evolution, the 
emergence of human beings is but a contingent result of the processes of evolution. At the same time, 
considering the succession of cultural and biological evolution makes it conceivable that this cascade of 
evolutionary processes might be continued by new forms of evolutionary processes, first emerging as 
marginal effects of the currently dominating evolutionary process and then taking over. Cf. Renn, The 
Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene,323-324 
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“Understanding the dynamics of knowledge is therefore crucial for our survival in the 
Anthropocene. Both knowledge and changes in the environment accumulate across 
generations in long-term processes, and not necessarily in such a way that human 
survival is guaranteed.”363 As Renn developed in chapter 14 on “Epistemic Evolution,”  
In the transition from biological to cultural evolution, the role of ‘niche 
construction’ has been transformed from one among several aspects of biological 
evolution into an essential feature of cultural evolution, as the role of material 
culture and tool use for the very emergence of modern humans illustrates. In the 
transition from cultural to epistemic evolution, the role of scientific knowledge 
has been similarly turned from an aspect into a characteristic feature of novel 
evolutionary dynamics.364 
 “In cultural evolution, the internalization and reproduction of given external 
conditions within societal development was largely a matter of circumstance. In 
epistemic evolution, it will have to become more and more a matter of knowledge.”365 
The awareness that we are living in the Anthropocene does not concern only politics and 
economics but also the quest for more knowledge that may trigger cross-scale effects on 
social behavior. And in chapter 16, “Knowledge for the Anthropocene,” Renn argues 
that the internet offers, at least in principle, a knowledge economy toward a global 
coproduction of knowledge and new forms of organizing, integrating, locally adapting, 
and implementing scientific knowledge. A future Web of Knowledge or an Epistemic 
Web which would help to balance asymmetries in the ownership and control of 
knowledge and allow users to become ‘prosumers,’ for instance by replacing browsers 
with interfaces optimized for interacting with global human knowledge as represented 
on the Web. Not only content but also the network of links would have to become an 
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openly accessible public good. However, before getting to epistemic evolution, human 
species has to evolve to be anatomical modern humans (AMH).  
Conclusion 
In this chapter on the evolutionary contribution to our understanding of the 
emergence of the modern humans, we have developed three stages of evolutionary 
theory: biological, cultural, and epistemic evolution. By evolutionary contribution, we 
mean not only biological evolution or evolutionary science. Rather we have extended 
our analysis to the cultural and epistemic evolution. We have even dealt with the 
emergence of the anatomical modern humans which helps us to address the similarities 
and divergences between humans and nonhumans starting from chimpanzees and great 
apes. From the biological to the cultural and finally to epistemic evolution, there is a 
reciprocity which is demonstrated in the integrative evolution which we have developed 
in the course of this second chapter.  
In general, evolutionary theory challenges the traditional understanding of the 
species as having been created in a fixed way and separate from each other. As part of 
biological evolution, Darwin’s theory, with its descent with modification model,  
challenges the theory of fixity, and with its natural selection in relation to the principles 
of variation, multiplicity, and heredity, opened the window to the new understanding of 
human beings as a species which shares the same common ancestor with other species. 
Human uniqueness could no longer be based on a certain fixity or separation from other 
species. Then, Neo-Darwinism, which synthesized Darwin’s theory in relation with 
molecular biology, natural selection, and modern population genetics, showed that there 
is more evidence of the similarities between human beings and other species. The 
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scientific contribution of the DNA molecules has shown the similarities between the 
molecular structure of similar proteins in different species. 
During the contemporary period, there have been vast contributions to the 
biological evolutionary science which have added to the explanation of the emergence 
of the modern humans. The Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer advocated for a societal 
system which is subject to the Darwinian laws of natural selection; the Eugenics Movement 
of Francis Galton considered that humanity could be improved through selective breeding; 
the Sociobiology of Edward O. Wilson developed a scientific study of the biological 
aspects of social behavior in animals and humans. The Evolutionary psychology of Jerome 
Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby developed an approach to psychology in which 
knowledge and principles from evolutionary biology are put to use in research on the 
structure of the human mind. For the evolutionary psychologists, all human behaviours 
reflect the influence of psychological and physical predispositions that helped human 
ancestors survive and reproduce.  
In addition to the biological evolution, we emphasized the cultural evolution which 
recognizes cultural patterns in great apes and chimpanzees. We emphasized also the 
integrative evolution where an inclusive approach has been used by evolutionists in their 
explanation of human cognitive and cultural evolution. In the integrative evolution, we 
analyzed the evolution of human cognitive capacity where the theoretic culture, the 
superplastic brain, and complex webs of culture, which correspond to the symbolization of 
Deacon, are what distinguish modern humans from nonhumans.  
It was in that context of cultural evolution contributions that we focused on the 
question of the emergence of the modern human, where we, acknowledging the real 
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divergence of human beings from other species, recognized also that we have more in 
common with chimpanzees and bonobos than how we diverge from them. Even if apes 
don’t have complex languages or symbolic language, we recognized in them the use of 
incipient languages, the capacity to comprehend and communicate various emotions. We 
also recognized in most ape species the use of tools, which indicates their use of the brain 
and strategic planning. We also recognized in chimpanzees and orangs the cultural patterns 
in more or less thirty different behaviors, including anting, greeting gestures, and 
reconciliation. 
The use of language, the presence of culture, tool-use, brain size, and even 
bipedalism, which were seen as unique and exclusive traits which differentiate modern 
humans from other primate species, are now understood to be elaborations of similar 
features in other species, although with some specific manifestations for modern humans. 
Keeping in mind that the genomic sequences of humans and chimpanzees, for example, are 
96% identical, modern humans are not then unique or exclusive simply because they have 
language, culture, tool use, and larger brain size. These common features among humans 
and primates diminish the assertion of modern human uniqueness, despite clear 
quantitative differences between Homo sapiens and other primate species.  
At the end of this chapter, we have analyzed the epistemic evolution which, 
according to Jürgen Renn, is based on knowledge. From the cultural evolution, humanity 
has entered into the epistemic evolution stage which is characterized by the increasing 
dependence of global society on the achievements and further extension of science and 
technology in order to ensure its sustainability in the age of the Anthropocene. Just as 
the cultural evolution emerged from the biological evolution, the epistemic evolution 
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emerged from the cultural evolution. This epistemic evolution, like the capacity for 
symbolization according to Deacon, is understood to belong only to modern humans. 
Ultimately, we have demonstrated in this chapter that, in the analysis of the emergence of 
the modern anatomical human, despite the divergencies between species, there are more 
similarities between human species and nonhuman species, starting with the chimpanzees, 
bonobos and great apes than there are difference which would isolate the human species.  
To date, we have demonstrated that the content of the notion of imago Dei has been 
influenced by historical circumstances and changing conceptual frameworks, which is the 
justification for our proposal for further conceptual development. This chapter has 
provided the contemporary scientific date for guiding that further development. The 
following chapter will present our constructive proposal for that development.  
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CHAPTER III: A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL: EXTENSION OF 
IMAGO DEI TO OTHER SPECIES AS A NEW APPROACH TO 
THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY. 
As Israel holds a place of honor among the races, so humans 
occupy a place of honor among the non-human beings 
(including animals and angels). However, as “the election of 
Israel neither signaled YHWH’s renouncement of the other 
nations nor involved their rejection in any way,” so the election 
of humans in no way indicates God’s rejection or lack of concern 
for non-human creatures.366 
Introduction  
Reflecting on the various understandings of the notion of imago Dei in the first 
chapter, it emerged that all the definitions were built on the assertion that human beings 
are unique and exclusive among other species. Because of their belief in being created as 
fully different entities, separated from other species from the beginning, human beings 
identified themselves as the only imago Dei. When this uniqueness or exclusiveness is not 
explained by being the chosen of God, it is explained by having a soul or the intellectual 
ability to reason while other species lack it. With the contributions of Evolutionary science, 
without denying the divergences and similarities between human beings and other species, 
like chimpanzees, it is clear that human beings and other species have the same ancestor, 
because everything began with the eukaryotes, the first unicellular organism, estimated 
between 4 – 3.5 bya. It is also clear that as human beings, we can no longer attribute to 
ourselves alone language, culture, tool use, brain size, and even bipedalism.  
 
366 Joshua Moritz, “One Imago Dei and the Incarnation of the Eschatological Adam,” in Astrotheology: 
Science and Theology Meet Extraterrestrial Life, ed. Ted Peters (Eugene OR: Cascade Books, 2018), chap. 
19, Kindle. 
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With the Big Bang theory and the emerging evolutionary history of life, we 
recognize not only that human beings share a common history of life with all other species, 
but also that new species which existed during the evolutionary pathways depended on 
what went before them, even if they represented something new. As human beings, who 
share a lot with other creatures, can we continue to consider ourselves as the only imago 
Dei? Are we still the masters, those responsible for or the stewards of creation? How can 
we understand our care for the environment? When God allowed the Big Bang and the 
emergence of the life to happen, was it not in His images that He did it? 
In this third and last chapter, we will begin by emphasizing the possibility of 
inclusivity of the imago Dei. We will first focus on Laudato Si: On Care for Our Common 
Home, where Pope Francis challenges the notion of stewardship by encouraging the human 
being as imago Dei to care for and have awareness of the importance of ethics in his/her 
relationship to the environment. From there, we will emphasize the extension of imago Dei 
to other species from the perspective of interrelatedness of Denis Edwards, moral capacity 
of the apes of Oliver Putz, and election of the imago Dei which benefits all creation of 
Joshua Moritz. By agreeing with the argument for inclusivity or openness, we will 
demonstrate our view of the diversity of imago Dei, so that every species can be considered 
as imago Dei in different way. And to conclude, we will affirm that every imago Dei has 
purpose and value, and that, although humans emerge from the evolutionary pathways, this 
does not mean that we are purposeless. Finally, we will develop our idea of the solidarity 
of all creation within the concept of imago Dei.  
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3.1. Imago Dei as person of care  
In his encyclical, Laudato Si: On Care for Our Common Home, Pope Francis raises 
awareness of the importance of ethics in our relationship to the environment. Laudato Si 
also reflects considerably on the sharing of all creation in the next life. Even if the Pope 
provides “an approach to ecology which respects our unique place as human beings in this 
world and our relationship to our surroundings,”367 and even if he never affirms that every 
creature is in the image of God, he strongly raises awareness about the rest of creation 
being part of the next life. For him, it is also clear that our understanding of being stewards 
because we are imago Dei is part of an “integral ecology” and should not have anything to 
do with domination but should make us recognize and respect the value of other species, 
as God does. From simple consumers to decision-makers to scientists, we all have an 
ethical responsibility in our relationship to the environment, our common home, because 
“the destruction of the human environment is extremely serious, not only because God has 
entrusted the world to us men and women, but because human life is itself a gift which 
must be defended from various forms of debasement.”368  
 The pope begins by describing many aspects of the need to take care of our 
environment since its imbalance today is largely due to human abuse, selfishness, and 
 
367 Laudato Si, 15. 
368 Ibid., 5. 
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human violence against it. Pollution,369 waste,370 sea-level rising,371 deficiencies of raw 
materials such as water,372 the consequences of certain technological innovations or 
technocracy, loss of biodiversity,373 and global warming due to the emission of greenhouse 
gases374 such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrogen oxide, etc., are the responsibility of 
humans. Because of that, “Humanity is called to recognize the need for changes of lifestyle, 
production and consumption, in order to combat this warming or at least the human causes 
which produce or aggravate it.”375 It is time to stop considering the rest of creation as 
“potential resources to be exploited, while overlooking the fact that they have value in 
themselves.”376 
 
369 Some forms of pollution are part of people’s daily experience. Exposure to atmospheric pollutants 
produces a broad spectrum of health hazards, especially for the poor, and causes millions of premature deaths. 
People take sick, for example, from breathing high levels of smoke from fuels used in cooking or heating. 
There is also pollution that affects everyone, caused by transport, industrial fumes, substances which 
contribute to the acidification of soil and water, fertilizers, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides and agrotoxins 
in general. In Laudato SI, 20. 
370 Each year hundreds of millions of tons of waste are generated, much of its non-biodegradable, highly 
toxic and radioactive, from homes and businesses, from construction and demolition sites, from clinical, 
electronic and industrial sources. The earth, our home, is beginning to look more and more like an immense 
pile of filth. In many parts of the planet, the elderly lament that once beautiful landscapes are now covered 
with rubbish. Industrial waste and chemical products utilized in cities and agricultural areas can lead to 
bioaccumulation in the organisms of the local population, even when levels of toxins in those places are low. 
In Laudato Si, 21. 
371 A very solid scientific consensus indicates that we are presently witnessing a disturbing warming of the 
climatic system. In recent decades this warming has been accompanied by a constant rise in the sea level and, 
it would appear, by an increase of extreme weather events, even if a scientifically determinable cause cannot 
be assigned to each particular phenomenon. In Laudato Si, 23. 
372 Warming has effects on the carbon cycle. It creates a vicious circle which aggravates the situation even 
more, affecting the availability of essential resources like drinking water, energy and agricultural production 
in warmer regions, and leading to the extinction of part of the planet’s biodiversity. In Laudato Si, 24. 
373 Things are made worse by the loss of tropical forests which would otherwise help to mitigate climate 
change. Carbon dioxide pollution increases the acidification of the oceans and compromises the marine food 
chain. If present trends continue, this century may well witness extraordinary climate change and an 
unprecedented destruction of ecosystems, with serious consequences for all of us. In Laudato Si, 24. The loss 
of forests and woodlands entails the loss of species which may constitute extremely important resources in 
the future, not only for food but also for curing disease and other uses. Different species contain genes which 
could be key resources in years ahead for meeting human needs and regulating environmental problems. In 
Laudato Si, 32. 
374 A number of scientific studies indicate that most global warming in recent decades is due to the great 
concentration of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrogen oxides and others) released mainly as 
a result of human activity. In Laudato Si, 23. 
375 Laudato Si, 23. 
376 Ibid., 33. 
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 To that assessment of the damage done to the environment Francis proposes “A 
Gospel of Creation,” that in Christian morality, taking care of the environment is an 
obligation for every Christian because the environment has been created, and entrusted to 
man to promote his good and not for him to dominate it. We are called to stewardship 
instead of domination. As Francis states, “if the simple fact of being human moves people 
to care for the environment of which they are a part, Christians in their turn realize that 
their responsibility within creation, and their duty towards nature and the Creator, are an 
essential part of their faith.”377 We therefore have a moral obligation according to Christian 
doctrine to cultivate, work, safeguard, preserve, and, above all, care for our environment. 
This is what our Creator prescribes for us. Caring for God’s creation means that “human 
beings, endowed with intelligence, must respect the laws of nature and the delicate 
equilibria existing between the creatures of this world.”378 By caring for the rest of creation, 
Francis is calling us “to recognize that other living beings have a value of their own in 
God’s eyes.”379  
 Pope Francis stresses the human roots of the ecological crisis, “the dominant 
technocratic paradigm and the place of human beings and of human action in the world.”380 
Francis calls for the wise way to use the power that scientific knowledge is giving to human 
beings, so that that scientific power will not be used to kill other human beings. In that use 
of power, it is important to consider the importance of the inalienable value of the human 
being which goes beyond his search for progress.381 Caring for the earth as imago Dei 
 
377 Laudato Si, 64. 
378 Ibid., 68. 
379 Ibid., 69. 
380 Ibid., 101. 
381 Ibid., 136. 
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presupposes that humans should be ethical, demonstrate wisdom in the use of technological 
power, and seek a conversion in our relationship between every imago Dei.   
 Pope Francis proposes a revised way of thinking of our relation to creation, an 
“Integral ecology” which draws attention to the entirety of ecology; Human beings must 
stop thinking of themselves as being separate from the rest of creation because today 
everything is closely interrelated. Our inclusion in nature obliges us to take care of it and 
preserve it for future generations because it is a gift from our God. Integral ecology 
considers the human, family, work, urban contexts and the relationship of each person with 
himself and his relationship with others and the environment. Respect for the environment 
also means accepting oneself as being created. “The acceptance of our bodies as God’s gift 
is vital for welcoming and accepting the entire world as a gift from the Father and our 
common home, whereas thinking that we enjoy absolute power over our own bodies turns, 
often subtly, into thinking that we enjoy absolute power over creation.”382 We necessarily 
need to accept ourselves as created beings, otherwise the tendency will be to dominate the 
environment around us, as if we were the creators. We certainly continue the creation, but 
we are not the creators. 
 As a resolution, Francis proposes some lines of orientation and action in the face of 
the environmental imbalance caused by human action which affect the way we imagine 
ourselves. It is important that as people made in the image of God we engage in a “dialogue 
which can help us to escape the spiral of self-destruction which currently engulfs us.”383 It 
is important to put in place global regulatory norms “to impose obligations and prevent 
unacceptable actions, for example, when powerful companies or countries dump 
 
382 Laudato Si, 155. 
383 Ibid., 163. 
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contaminated waste or offshore polluting industries in other countries.”384 It is urgent to 
make ethical decisions based on solidarity and transparency in decision-making to regulate 
all the causes of this environmental imbalance, but these decisions must be carefully 
studied so as not to cause other international injustices. The solutions advocated by the 
Holy Father call for the solidarity and generosity of decision-makers, and, also for a culture 
of values, so that we can facilitate the continued creation of the Creator and leave future 
generations a more dignified environment, which will restore as much as possible harmony 
between God, man, and the earth.  
 Emphasizing an “ecological education and spirituality” in the six and last chapter, 
Pope Francis insists on the awareness that we must have of our common origin, our mutual 
belonging and the sharing of a common future. Even if Pope Francis did not extend the 
idea of being made in the image of God to the rest of creation, he insists on the idea of our 
communal destiny with all the rest of creation. This commonality is the sign that creation 
has meaning in the eyes of God. We, human beings as imago Dei, are called to “discover 
the action of God in the soul, but also to discover God in all things.”385  
 If God did not make all the creation in his image, in whose image did He make it? 
In whose image does He allow then the first unicellular and the rest of the species during 
the evolutionary pathways to exist? But by making the rest of creation in his image, does 
He remove something from human beings as imago Dei? And if God can express Himself 
 
384 Laudato Si, 173. This idea of Francis happened on the night of 19 to 20 August, 2006, the Pobo Kaola 
ship of Trafigura company discharged 583m3 of toxic product in Abidjan, the Capital city of the Ivory Coast 
which has affected more than fifteen thousand (15,000) people and cost the death of 6 persons in the days 
after. Because it was in the city, people realized what happened, and it became a scandal. If it was not in the 
city, most probably people would not have noticed. Laurent d’Ersu and Marie Jansana, “Le scandale des 
déchets à Abidjan,’’ La Croix (September, 13/2006), https://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/Le-
scandale-des-dechets-a-Abidjan-_NG_-2006-09-13-516442 (accessed December 11, 2019). 
385 Laudato Si, 233. 
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in different ways, can God not create things in His image in different ways? God as the 
Trinity expresses Himself in different ways.  
The Father is the ultimate source of everything, the loving and self-
communicating foundation of all that exists. The Son, his reflection, through 
whom all things were created, united himself to this earth when he was formed 
in the womb of Mary. The Spirit, infinite bond of love, is intimately present at 
the very heart of the universe, inspiring and bringing new pathways.386  
 By creating, God expresses Himself in different ways in creation. In different ways, 
He could make all creation in His image. Francis seems to affirm this when he states that 
“In union with all creatures, we journey through this land seeking God.”387 We are all 
“journeying towards the Sabbath of eternity, the new Jerusalem, towards our common 
home in heaven.”388 The conviction that all the creation is journeying towards the new 
Jerusalem is the reason why we found important the contribution of this encyclical Laudato 
Si of Pope Francis to the idea of applying  imago Dei to other species. By insisting on the 
fact that all the creation is journeying together, Pope Francis helps our understanding of 
similarities between human beings and the rest of the creation.  Additionally, Francis holds 
the conviction that stewardship does not have anything to do with taking advantage of 
creation, instead stewardship is adopting an integral ecology where human beings in their 
care for the rest of creation respect and recognize the value of other species, as God does. 
It is necessary, as Pope Francis proposes, to move toward a reconciliation between 
humanity and the environment.  
 
386 Laudato Si, 238. 
387 Ibid., 244 
388 Ibid., 243. 
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3.2. Extension of imago Dei to other species from the perspectives of Denis 
Edwards, Oliver Putz, and Joshua Moritz 
3.2.1. Imago Dei as interrelated to another imago Dei 
Denis Edwards offers a reflection on ecology from a Christian view.389 From the 
necessity of ecological conversion390 and of a new perspective on Christian ecology,391 
Edwards emphasizes what it means to be human in the midst of creation, and then moves 
to the experience of spirit, before turning explicitly to consider the place of Jesus in 
ecological theology, which opens to the ecological theology of the Trinity, which leads to 
a reflection on the final transformation of all things in Christ, and on worship and 
practice.392 Ecological theology seems to find support from scientific cosmology and 
evolutionary biology, according to Edwards. By assuming the Big Bang theory, the 
stardust393 and the emerging evolutionary history of life, Edwards makes the remark that 
“we human beings share a common history of life with all the other creatures of Earth. We 
carry within us a story of life that goes back to our pre-human ancestors in Africa, back to 
 
389 Ecology at the Heart of Faith: The Change of Heart that leads to a New Way of Living on Earth (New 
York: Orbis Books, 2006). 
390 The ecological conversion is an important theme that Pope John Paul II has proposed because humanity 
has failed God in its abuse of the planet. The ecological conversion goes with the necessity of integrity of 
creation as a moral responsibility. These ideas are well emphasized in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis: On Social 
Concerns, 74; Message for the Celebration of the World Day of Prayer for Peace (January 1, 1990); in the 
encyclical The Gospel of Life: Evangelium Vitae, 80; also Centesimus Annus: On the Hundredth Anniversary 
of Rerum Novarum,  70-78.  
391 Denis Edwards argues that his intention is simply to point to a specific in which he takes a different 
approach. He proposes a theological response to the ecological crisis not in terms of bypassing central 
Christian traditions but in terms of going more deeply into them and seeking to reinterpret them in the light 
of the ecological issues that confront us. He argues that this Christian heritage, above all the living memory 
of Jesus as God-with-us bringing healing and liberation, is deeply connected to creation.  
392 Denis Edwards, 6. 
393 The fact is that it takes more than hydrogen to make a human being. We are a carbon-based life. The 
molecules of our bodies are composed of atoms of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen with small 
amounts of other elements. Collections of atoms make up molecules, which makes up the chromosomes 
which carry the genetic code. While the hydrogen atoms come from the early universe, the carbon, oxygen, 
and nitrogen all come from the stars. And while some organisms are single-celled, a human being is made 
up of about 50 trillion cells specialized to perform an enormous variety of tasks. In Denis Edwards, 10 &79. 
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the trilobites of the Cambrian seas, and ultimately back to the first bacterial forms of life 
3.5 billion years ago.”394  
Edwards addresses the question of the imago Dei, seeing it as the “foundation for a 
Christian view of the radical value of each person before God. It is the basis for the 
Christian commitment to equal and mutual relations between women and men.”395  But the 
imago Dei in reference to human beings can become dangerous. He states, “This concept 
of the human as image of God becomes dangerous when it used to set humans up in 
opposition to other creatures, above all when it is used to suggest that humans have absolute 
and unlimited rights over other species.”396 Against the use of the imago Dei as a 
destructive distortion, Edwards proposes that “it is possible to retrieve this powerful 
biblical idea in an ecological theology that situates human beings in relationship to other 
creatures, and that understands each creature as in its own way reflecting and imaging 
God.”397  
Using the same logic, Edwards remarks that “while the Bible and the Christian 
tradition use the language of image of God specifically of the human, they also see the 
whole of creation, and the diversity of life on Earth, as the self-expression of God and, in 
this sense, as imaging God.”398 In addition, he affirms that “an eagle in flight, a wildflower 
in its delicate beauty, an ecosystem, and the biosphere of Earth can each in its own way be 
seen as a self-expression of the Creator, and thus as an image of God.”399 Here, Edwards 
proposes the extension of the imago Dei to all life, because everything is the self-expression 
 
394 Edwards, 13. 
395 Ibid.,14. 
396 Ibid. 
397 Ibid. 
398 Ibid. 
399 Ibid., 15. 
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of God and, in this sense, is imaging God. It seems like Edwards proposes that humans and 
nonhumans share the same imago Dei. And he believes that even Jesus as the true and 
perfect image of God in his universal meaning is not just image of God “for human beings 
but for all creatures. In him the reconciliation of all things has begun.”400  
Despite this universal role of Christ which is unanimous among Christian 
theologians, “the Christian community has usually used the image language for human 
beings to bring out the uniqueness of humans before God.”401 Instead of defining the imago 
Dei by one aspect of humankind like the capacity for reason, or free will or self-
consciousness,402 Edwards claims that “what makes us unique before God is not any one 
capacity we possess or any partial aspect of the human.”403 For him, “it is the whole human 
being understood as personal and as interpersonal. Being created as the imago Dei means 
that God creates human beings as persons in order to embrace them in interpersonal 
love.”404 It is clear for Edwards that “human beings are made in the image of God in the 
sense that they are made for interpersonal love.”405  
Additionally, the human being as imago Dei is invited to care for and to respect the 
distinctiveness and otherness of the rest of creation. But if the whole creation shares the 
same imago Dei, someone can ask why human beings should care for the rest of creation? 
However, Edwards explains the necessity for human beings to care for the rest of creation 
by the fact that the precise specificity of human beings, which is personal and interpersonal, 
 
400 Edwards, 15. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Friedrich Ernst Schleiermacher is undeniably one of the major theologians of the nineteenth century with 
his contribution of self-consciousness. Even Karl Rahner shares the view of self-consciousness, as a means 
to be able respond to the Creator in freedom and love. 
403 Edwards, 16. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Ibid., 17. 
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makes human beings relate to other creatures as God does. “While all creatures are held in 
the creative love of God at every moment, human beings are embraced by this love in an 
interpersonal way. They are creation come to personhood, and as persons they can thank 
and praise God on behalf of the rest of creation.”406 It is then because of this specificity of 
personal and interpersonal love that human beings are called to love and respect the Earth 
as God loves it.  
Concerning the relationship between human beings and the rest of creation, 
Edwards enumerates five models (kinship with creation;407 domination of nature;408 
ecological egalitarianism;409 kinship within a community;410 and cultivating and caring for 
creation411), and among them, the cultivating and caring model is the one that he supports 
in his ecological theology. Instead of calling this model the functional or stewardship 
model as it could be, Edwards prefers to call it the cultivating and caring for creation model, 
because when the stewardship model is used “to characterize the human stance before 
others creatures, it can run the risk of suggesting an inflated view of the human as a 
necessary intermediary between God and other creatures.”412 It seems that the stewardship 
 
406 Edwards, 17. 
407 The kinship with Creation, God creates each creature, sustains its existence; and human beings as part of 
the Creation are called to act responsibly before God. This model is fundamentally about God-centered 
(theocentric), rather than a human-centered (anthropocentric). It is the biblical interpretation where the 
functionality is put in exergue and God centrality is respected.  
408 Domination is the pretention that the nature is simply for the exploitation for human beings. It was based 
on Genesis 1: 28-30 when God gives to men and women the dominion on fish of the sea, the birds…  
409 Ecological egalitarianism is simply in opposition with the domination of nature, and then in opposition of 
anthropocentrism. With this model, the other creatures have an intrinsic value which the human beings are 
supposed to respect. 
410 The kinship within a community is a model which is based on Genesis 1:31 when God looked at everything 
he had made and found it very good. Also, it is based on Genesis 9: 12-16 when God embraced everything, 
He has created in the covenant love. Francis of Assisi is traditionally associated to this model because of his 
understanding of the variety and diversity of God’s creatures as expressing the beauty and the abundance of 
the Trinitarian life of God.  
411 The five models are from the book Ecology at the Heart of Faith, Denis Edwards presents the five models 
from pages 18 to 26. 
412 Edwards, 25. 
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model suggests that other creatures do not have their own relationship with the living God 
or their own integrity. The cultivating and caring for creation model seems to allow “human 
beings to see themselves as interrelated in a community of life with other creatures, a 
community in which each creature has its own unique value before God.”413 With the 
cultivating and caring model, human creativity stands humbly before other creatures, 
respects their right to exist and to flourish, and commits itself to their conservation and 
flourishing. In this model of caring, wisdom and humility from human beings are crucial, 
because with them, we can recognize our finitude before the mystery of God and we will 
not seek to grasp or control the rest of creation. With this model, human beings “are 
intimately linked to the life-forms of our planet, and to the atmosphere, the soil, and the 
oceans. Our existence is encompassed by the mystery of God revealed in all the variety of 
creatures that surround us. We are part of them and they are of us.”414   
Edwards emphasizes that the diversity of creatures are not only the self-expression 
of God, as imaging God, but they are “part of a wider pattern of relationships in nature and 
that these relationships can be understood as grounded in the Trinitarian relations of mutual 
love.”415 The Trinitarian radical interrelationship is used to explain the interconnectedness 
or interrelatedness of the imago Dei. As at every stage during the evolutionary process, 
something new occurs. At each of these stages, the new species depend on what goes 
before, even if each represents something new, and the “entities emerge in our universe in 
patterns of interrelationship. Things are constituted by relationship.”416 The theological 
insight that the Trinity is relational provides a basis for a relational view of the universe. 
 
413 Edwards, 26. 
414 Ibid., 26. 
415 Ibid., 79. 
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“While science tells us that each creature exists in nested pattern of constitutive relations, 
theology grounds this in the Trinitarian relationships of mutual love. Trinitarian 
theologians argue that if the Creator’s being is radically relational, then this suggests 
something about the nature of created reality itself.”417 The interrelatedness or 
interrelationship of all creatures based on the divine communion in love makes every 
creature important and supports the idea that every creature is the self-expression of God, 
and in this sense has the image of God proper to their species.  
Even with the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the risen Christ and which is 
profoundly Trinitarian, the interrelatedness is defended. “Our Eucharist communion, our 
communion with each other in Christ, is always a sharing in and a tasting of the divine 
communion of the Trinity, in which all things will be transfigured and find their eternal 
meaning and their true home.”418 And, “this Trinitarian communion which we share is the 
source of all life on Earth; it is what enables a community of life to emerge and evolve […] 
it is what will be the fulfillment of all the creatures of our planet.”419  
For Christians, the moment of communion with God in the Eucharist is also the 
moment of communion with all creation. “By being taken up into God, we are caught up 
into God’s love for creatures of our planetary community.”420 With this communion, we 
are all interconnected in the self-expression of God to all the creation. By creating, God 
creates everything as the self-expression of Himself, which means everything is the image 
of God, according to Edwards. But instead of agreeing with him that God creates 
everything in His one own image, we think that God, who allows speciation during the 
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evolutionary pathways, allows every species to have one of His specific images, so that we 
can all share in our common future the fullness of God’s action in us. 
3.2.2.  Humans and Apes as imago Dei 
Oliver Putz by admitting evolutionary biology and ethology’s suggestions that 
humans are not the only species capable of empathy and possibly morality and that 
nonhuman animals are recognized as a free moral agent, argues that “apes and some other 
mammals have moral agency and that a traditional interpretation of the imago Dei is 
incorrectly equating specialness with exclusivity.” 421 He proposes that “the concept of the 
imago Dei could be extended to accommodate moral species other than our own.”422 Putz 
begins by confronting himself with the question of whether morality could have evolved 
by means of natural selection, and whether species other than our own also have moral 
agency. He affirms that the “answer to both questions are of enormous relevance for 
theology, especially for theological anthropology.”423 As he claims, “if animals possess the 
necessary and sufficient mental conditions enabling them to make moral decisions, it 
means not only that they have to be considered “persons” but also that they too are created 
in the image of God.”424 Putz argues that great apes are indeed capable of self-reflection 
and thus of moral decision-making. Therefore, he proposes that the doctrine of imago Dei 
has to be broadened to accommodate moral animals.  
The ethological data relevant to animal morality is based on the phylogenetic 
continuum which is “the fact that evolutionary biology on earth is a continuum extending 
from the earliest organism through diverse phylogenetic branches to the great variety of 
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species alive today.”425 Instead of emphasizing the differences between humans and 
nonhuman animals like gorillas, bonobos and chimpanzees, Putz focus on the similarities, 
like “most biologists [who] agree that humans and great apes share many behaviors.”426 
Regarding animal morality, empirical evidence suggests that apes are capable of cognitive 
achievements which seem to be reserved to humans. Using different intellectual sources, 
Putz remarks that apes make and use tools, have culture, use plants for self-medication, 
have complex emotions, are empathic, show altruistic behavior not only to conspecifics, 
and great apes seem to show signs of self-cognizance and ability to employ symbolic 
processes that operate on the basis of mental images rather than direct sensory-motor 
phenomena.427 
To the question if these capabilities constitute moral agency in non-humans, Putz 
argues that the moral capacities of decision means the free capacities of choice. After 
admitting that “the moral agency presupposes self-consciousness,”428 Putz clarifies that the 
characteristic of self-consciousness is first and foremost “the fissure of self into reflecting 
subject and reflected object.”429 And “this divisions results in an internal self-
symbolization in which the objective self symbolizes to the subjective self the undivided 
self as a whole. This internal self-symbolization is the foundation for all moral judgment 
because it enables free self-reflection.”430 In self-reflection, language, representation and 
intentionality are important. Even if chimpanzees are not capable of symbolic or complex 
language as humans are, they are capable of communication or incipient language. Apes 
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and chimpanzees are involved in some altruistic behavior or empathy which is a crucial 
aspect of morality. The self-recognition in the mirror by adult chimpanzees is, according 
to Putz, a recognition of self and not necessarily self-consciousness. He states that,  
I think the case can be made that the cognitive processes underlying mirror self-
recognition require a notion of self that goes beyond merely perceptual 
consciousness. In es-sence, an animal recognizing itself in the mirror externalizes 
its internal self-symbolization, in which the objective self symbolizes the self to the 
subjective self and transfers it to its mirror image.431  
In summary, the argument of Putz is that “moral agency presupposes self-
consciousness, comprehension, and representation, and that both observational and 
empirical studies suggest strongly that apes possess these mental traits. Consequently, 
empathic and altruistic behavior, but also fairness in games as observed in bonobo play, 
can result from moral decision-making.”432 Every animal capable of recognizing itself in a 
mirror, every animal capable of self-recognition, has, according to Putz, the capacity to 
receive God’s image, because the image of God is the mode or channel of God’s self-
revelation of Godself to us, and thus to every animal capable of self-recognition. With this 
view, the imago Dei, according to Putz, cannot be exclusive or unique or special to human 
beings.  
Against the three traditional interpretations of the imago Dei (functional-
Relational-Structural) which all “insist that human beings are the only species created 
special, […] capable of the divine image,”433 Putz advocates for a more inclusive 
interpretation of the imago Dei because of his interpretation of “ethological data 
concerning mental abilities of great apes.”434 Putz proposes clearly that “it is not humanity 
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alone that is wanted by God for its own sake, but rather the diversity of self-conscious 
expressions that emerge from an evolutionary process and in which the universe, to say it 
with Karl Rahner comes to itself while God’s self-communication be-comes realized.”435 
And sharing with the great apes the notion of imago Dei is not going to remove us human 
beings from our special relationship with God nor release us from our special responsibility 
toward the earth as a highly technological species. In fact, it is only “an expression of the 
abundant presence and richness of God’s self-communication in the world.”436 However, 
it is important to mention that the inclusion of the great apes in the imago Dei by Putz is 
not extended to every living thing that God creates. Not everything in creation, according 
to Putz, is made in the image of God. Also, for Putz, the imago of Dei in human beings and 
in great apes is the same image of God.  
3.2.3. Oneness of imago Dei for all flesh 
Joshua Moritz,437 argues that doctrines of the Incarnation and Christological 
doctrine should be applied to creation beyond the sphere of terrestrial human beings, and 
emphasized that the imago Dei concerned all flesh because “the imago Dei is a 
proclamation of truly cosmic scope declaring God’s radical solidarity with all creatures in 
Christ.”438 Moritz begins his article with the question “Does the Christian message of the 
incarnation—and Logos Christology in particular—rule out God’s loving concern for 
creation beyond the sphere of terrestrial human beings?”439 For some space researchers, 
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such as Paul Davies, “Jesus Christ is called the Savior precisely because he took on human 
flesh to save humankind. He did not come to save the whales or the dolphins or the gorillas 
or the chimpanzees, or even the Neanderthals, however noble or deserving those creatures 
may be (or were). Jesus Christ was the savior of Homo sapiens, specifically; one planet 
and one species.”440 According to Moritz, the reason why scholars like Davies believes this 
is because Davies alleges that Christian theology is exclusively anthropocentric: “he wants 
to show that traditional Christology would require by implication a planet-hopping Christ. 
He believes that Christian theologians, to be consistent with previous commitments, must 
posit the apparently absurd view that God would need to become incarnate multiple 
times.”441  
Moritz assesses the claim “If multiple societies of extraterrestrial intelligent beings 
on exoplanets exist, we can predict that God will or already has provided a species-specific 
incarnation for each planet parallel to God’s incarnation in Jesus Christ on Earth,”442and  
responds that Jesus443 did not come to save only human beings on this one planet. Moritz 
insists on the fact that “the Advent event, when understood within the context of Early 
Jewish conceptions of the Messiah as the renewal and fulfillment of the imago Dei, is a 
proclamation of truly cosmic scope declaring God’s radical solidarity with all creatures in 
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Christ.”444 For him, this applies to all living creatures on Earth and elsewhere, if there be 
there a living creature.  
Also, the incarnation of Jesus is not only for the redemption of humanity, but rather 
the redemption of all biological life, all flesh. For Moritz, “God’s creation subject to God’s 
redemptive action in Jesus Christ is inclusive of all life forms here on Earth; and it includes 
any and all living creatures elsewhere in our expansive universe.”445 Using the same logic, 
he claims that “the one incarnation of God in Christ in Earth’s history is efficacious for all 
sentient creatures wherever and whenever they live.”446  
Beside the many interpretations which have sought to understand the imago Dei in 
light of specific unique qualities or capacities that human beings alone possess and that 
non-humans lack, Moritz emphasizes that “a close examination of the sacred texts 
themselves reveals that the imago Dei is never defined according to one characteristic or a 
specific collection of qualities that set humans apart from other creatures.”447 He also says 
that “in the Bible, the image and likeness of God is never said to be about exceptional 
capacities or traits that humans alone have which qualify them (and disqualify other 
creatures) for inclusion in the imago Dei category.”448 As contemporary theologians agree 
in general, the biblical narrative remains silent about any qualities of human beings which 
might account for their special standing as imago Dei. It is not because of morality, 
rationality, sexuality, language, technology, culture, cognitive fluidity, or possession of 
immortal soul. The evolution of science helps also to realize that we share a lot of the same 
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genes and that there is less than 10 percent of what we can label uniquely humans’ genes. 
As for many contemporary theologians, for Moritz, the imago Dei does not refer to any 
quality or capacity that human beings have and nonhuman animals lack. He disagrees with 
Robert John Russell who “identified the imago Dei with rationality; and with this criterion 
in mind he could attribute the imago Dei to rational creatures on other planets. In contrast 
to Russell, I do not associate the imago Dei with rationality or any other similar creaturely 
capacity or quality.”449  
Contrary to the structural, functional or stewardship, and relational or communal 
understanding of the imago Dei, Moritz views the “image and likeness of God as God’s 
historical choosing or election of human beings from among the animals and setting them 
apart for the sake and fulfillment of the divine purposes.”450 By viewing the imago Dei 
from the early Jewish and early Christian concept of historical or biblical election, Moritz 
insists on the fact that “those who are elected are not chosen because they are ‘the greatest’ 
or inherently more worthy than others, but rather they are elected as a result of mysterious 
acts of divine love and grace.”451 Indeed, “election in the biblical understanding relates to 
a people (and often a lineage) whom God has chosen in the midst of history for a special 
purpose within the wider context of God’s design. This purpose of historical election is 
furthermore defined not in terms of privilege (or even individual salvation), but rather for 
the sake of service.”452 In other words, “within the historical biblical or Hebrew concept of 
election, the choosing of people groups and representative individuals is not for their own 
sake, or for the purpose of individualistic final salvation, but rather for the sake of and in 
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the service of others.”453 And the non-elect are called to be blessed in and through their 
relationship with the elect. In that case, “the concept of election was never assumed to be 
only for the benefit of the elect, but it was always about God’s plan for the whole world, 
the elect and the non-elect alike.”454 
Moritz holds, that rather being a matter of exclusivism, the historical concept of 
election is inclusive and universalistic. And the horizon of the particularism of election is 
universal. In fact, “the particularism of the love of God for the elected one is to be related 
to the more comprehensive horizon of God’s love for all.”455 In this way, the chosen one 
“is assigned a function for that wider context. He is elected in order to serve as God’s agent 
in relation to a more comprehensive object of God’s love.”456 When God elects, it is to 
“proclaim the righteous will of God to the nations. In this view, the election of Israel is not 
an end in itself. It serves the will of God on behalf of the human race as a whole.”457 As the 
election of Israel or of Abraham holds a place of honor among the races, so human beings 
occupy a place of honor among the rest of the creation. However, as “the election of Israel 
neither signaled YHWH’s renouncement of the other nations nor involved their rejection 
in any way, so the election of humans in no way indicates God’s rejection or lack of concern 
for non-human creatures.”458 For Moritz, it is without doubt that the human being, as 
elected as both king and priest, bears God’s image, authority, sacredness, healing, and 
atoning salvation to the whole non-human creation.  
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Using the same logic, the election of Jesus seems for Moritz to bring salvation to 
all those who are flesh. He states, “Jesus came to save the whales, the dolphins, the gorillas, 
the chimpanzees, the Neanderthals, and even extra-terrestrial biological life. As one man 
from one species on one planet is elected as the telos of the imago Dei, so the entire cosmos 
is brought into God’s salvific endeavor.”459 In the same way, he stands with those who 
claim that the “one incarnation of God in Christ is efficacious for all sentient creatures 
wherever and whenever they live.”460 
While Denis Edwards extends the notion of imago Dei to all creation because of 
God’s self-expression in every creature, Oliver Putz extends imago Dei only to great apes 
because of their capacity for self-reflection and moral decision-making, and Joshua Moritz 
extends imago Dei to all flesh based on the election of human beings. Despite their 
differences, Edwards, Putz, and Moritz each argue against the idea of imago Dei as 
exclusively for human beings and against the idea of imago Dei as a proof of human 
superiority over the remaining creatures. They articulated these critiques because of the 
challenging contribution Evolutionary theory posed to traditional biblical literalism. With 
the ecological crisis, the evolutionary establishment of similarities and divergences 
between human species and apes, chimpanzees, and other species, and even because of the 
debate of the possibility of extraterrestrial life, the question of the imago Dei gained some 
new understandings. None of the contemporary intellectuals that we have referred to reject 
the idea of imago Dei for human beings, but they extend it at some point or in some way 
to other living species. For our concern, we agree with them when it is matter of extending 
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the imago Dei to other living species with the idea that the many ways of self-expression 
of God can be the basis for the many ways of the imago Dei in creation.  
In the similarity and divergence of species during the evolutionary pathways may 
reside the extension of the image of God in different ways. Every time there is similarity, 
there is the image of God, and every time there is a divergence, there is an image of God 
in a different way. The similarity shows, then, that both are made in the image of God, 
and the divergence shows that each species is made in the image of God in different 
way. And that does not mean that one species can have many images of God. Every 
species has only one image of God. And that one image of God is the same for every 
entity of the species, and different from every one of other species.  
However, someone can offer the critique that because we are all different among 
the human species, does it mean that we humans are all made in the image of God in 
different ways? No, the divergence is not only being different, it is the difference of 
species. The divergence is the speciation which made one initial species be separated in 
two different species. So, the divergence is not just the difference, but it is the difference 
at speciation level. And it is at that level that human and chimpanzees and gorilla, and 
any kind of living species, is made in the image of God in a different way. The similarity 
of genetic sequences, cultural patterns, use of tools, language, etc., the similarity at all 
these levels makes possible the extension of the image of God to other species, starting 
from Chimpanzees, bonobos and great apes. However, the divergence between the 
species makes possible that each species is then imago Dei in different ways.  
Another way to explain our idea of being created in the image of God in different 
ways can maybe come from some specifics or unique characteristics that some 
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contemporary evolutionists recognize in human beings. For example, the symbolic 
reference of Terrence Deacon, which is unique to human’s language and which is lacking 
in chimpanzees and the rest of creation, can demonstrate that humans and chimpanzees are 
evolved as the image of God in different ways. For instance, the image of God shows up 
in the presence of language in both species, but different images of God show up through 
the different depths of language ability of these two species. The same can even be said 
about the Epistemic evolution of Renn where he emphasizes that during the cultural 
evolution, humans are already distinct from the rest of the biosphere. From that distinction, 
we can see that each species of the biological evolution has evolved as the image of God 
in a different way, while the human species too has evolved in his different way as the 
image of God. When we say evolve, we don’t mean that the different species are not 
created, we want just to insist on the fact that they evolve in the process of evolution.  
Perhaps another example is the difference between knowing and knowing that one 
knows (consciousness, which is the activity of mind). For instance, theology is done with 
the mind, in the way that it takes into consideration the consciousness of the one who is 
doing it. It is only with the mind that we realize that we are not beings unto ourselves. 
In that case, the mind, which made it possible for someone to be conscious about what 
he knows, is also one of the constituent elements which separates the human’s species 
from the other primates’ species, because animals also do have mind but seem not be 
conscious of their knowledge. This ability to know that we know is perhaps what makes 
us aware that we are not our own Creator, but that we are created in the image of the one 
who creates us. Other animals seemingly are conscious but not self-conscious, while the 
human is both conscious and self-conscious. The similarity of having a mind is an 
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indication of being made at the image of God and the difference between being able to 
know and being able to know that one knows is an indication of being made a different 
image of God. At this point, then, what can be said about the value and purpose of the 
imago Dei?  
3.3. The purpose and value of the imago Dei 
When purpose is not defined as the reason for which something is done or created 
or for which something exists, it is defined as the intention or the objective that someone 
has when he or she is doing something. According to Merriam-Webster, purpose means 
“something set up as an object or end to be attained, or a subject under discussion or an 
action in course of execution or an aim to oneself.”461 Examples of purpose as the object 
toward which one strives or for which something exists, an aim or a goal are many and 
obvious. By writing this thesis, my purpose is to deepen my understanding of the mystery 
or doctrine of imago Dei, or by being a student in the Jesuit School of Theology my purpose 
is to learn more about theology. It can also happen that someone is qualified as a man of 
purpose, in the sense that he is determined in his action or he strives for the resolution. 
Purpose can then be a personal goal, a personal achievement which gives a person purpose 
whether it be a good or bad one. However, purpose can also refer to something which goes 
beyond an individual or personal goal; it can be the purpose of the clan, tribe, nation, world, 
human life, or all life. From a Biblical perspective, there is a universal purpose462 of human 
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life, and there is also an individual purpose463 in life. Purpose can then refer to individual 
life or all human life, from the biblical perspective.464 While the individual purpose is the 
purpose that God has individually for our lives, the general purpose is to know and enjoy 
God, who is the terminus and telos of every life.465 Purpose then goes beyond our single 
life.  
From the theistic evolutionism,466 which affirms both “Christian faith and 
evolutionary science as secular scientists present it,”467 the purpose, value, and direction of 
the imago Dei is a divine purpose, which means the value or purpose of the imago Dei is 
not located within itself but is located in God. In fact, it is Peters and Hewlett who, when 
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accepting the Darwinian interpretation of nature in relation to the revelation of God in Jesus 
Christ, affirm as theistic evolutionists that they “will not attempt to locate purpose or 
direction or even value within nature. Instead, as Christians, (they) affirm a divine purpose 
for nature.”468 Recognizing purpose or value as divine means it belongs in God. To have a 
divine purpose means that we are valuable and meaningful in the eyes of the creator who 
opened nonbeing to be and to continue to be.  
Being imago Dei is then not being purposeless, like some evolutionary 
psychologists posit with their atheistic materialism (Richard Dawkins, William Provine, 
Thomas Huxley, or Peter Atkins), but being imago Dei shows us that our purpose and value 
are in our God, and that purpose will be revealed eschatologically.469 It is that our lives 
matter in the eyes of God, and that we are worthy people with dignity. Just because we 
evolved during evolutionary pathways does not mean our lives can be understood as 
purposeless or mechanistic or deterministic. As imago Dei, we have purpose and our 
purpose is universal and divine.  
Considering the example of a long straight stick that has fallen from a tree, Peters 
and Hewlett make the observation that we might not think of it immediately as possessing 
an inherent purpose. But if it happens that a member of the Masai tribe in Kenya or in 
Tanzania were to happen upon this stick, it might be picked up. And later, it might become 
the shaft of a spear. A young Masai warrior might use it to kill his first lion and establish 
his manhood. He might even keep the wooden pole for years as a remembrance. The 
purpose of the fallen stick would not be found in the stick itself; rather, the Masai warrior 
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will have found a purpose for that piece of wood. In the same way, when it comes to 
Christian theology, purpose within the created order comes from God.470 
Like in the case of the example of the stick, where the purpose is revealed at the 
end, in the case of imago Dei, the purpose is fully going to be revealed in God, in whose 
image we are all made in different ways. The purpose is not at the beginning, it is at the 
end. “Purpose comes from what is final looking backward, not from potential lying in wait 
at the beginning.”471 Peters and Hewlett state that “in fact, the Greek word for end, telos, 
means ‘end’ both as final state and as purpose or goal. God has a telos for nature, even if 
we can’t see it within nature. It is the future act of redemption that determines what 
previous creation will have meant, and this can be discerned only eschatologically.” The 
purpose is then at the end.  Since the purpose is at the end, this may be the reason that 
Peters, in “The Imago Dei as the End of Evolution,”472 developed the idea of human beings 
becoming imago Dei at the end (terminus as conclusion and telos as goal or purpose) in 
imago Christi. In that logic, the purpose for the present creation resides then in God’s 
promised new creation.  
In Genesis 1:31, “God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very 
good,” and in Revelation 21:1, “I saw a new heaven and a new earth,” it becomes obvious 
that “we do not have to limit the concept of creation to a single act back at the beginning, 
back at the big bang, or back in Genesis 1. […] (we believe that) God’s creative act of 
imparting an open future is an ongoing one.”473 By giving to nature the possibility for a 
future, God gives it two things: openness and purpose as fulfilment. God gives openness 
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in the way that creation ex nihilo is possible, so that from nonbeing the big bang could 
happen and could continue (creatio continua) by the creative power by which God brought 
being out of nonbeing and continues to sustain the world today. And God gives purpose in 
the way that a new creation will emerge as a whole which is greater than the sum of the 
parts and cannot be reduced to its parts.474 This new whole refers to the new heaven and 
new earth, which will “transform, yet preserve, the entire history of cosmic creation.”475 
“Where we find ourselves today is looking back to alpha, to creatio ex nihilo, and looking 
forwards to omega, the new creation ex vetere, out of what has come before. The new 
creation will emerge from what God’s Spirit does to the present creation.”476 It is in the 
emergence of the new creation that the fulfillment of the act of creation will happen. It is 
there too that resides the purpose of the current continua creatio. Peters and Hewlett 
suggest “the future consummation to be the crowning conclusion of God’s act of creation. 
Creation will then turn out to be a single inclusive divine act whereby what comes into 
existence is perfected in its existence. God will say, as the book of Genesis predicts God 
will say, ‘Behold, it is very good,’ and it will become eternally good.”477  
With the awareness of having purpose and value comes openness to others and the 
improvement of relationships in imago Dei. And in this context, we think that solidarity 
and sincerity are among those things which allow human beings as imago Dei to improve 
their relationship between themselves and with the rest of creation. Solidarity is defined 
traditionally as unity or agreement of feeling or action, especially among individuals with 
 
474 Ibid., 123. 
475 Peters and Hewlett, Can You Believe in God and Evolution? 124. 
476 Ibid. 
477 Ibid., 131. 
138 
a common interest, objectives, and standards.478 However, in Catholic Social Teaching,479, 
solidarity is not a feeling about helping other people. Solidarity is a way of life that 
recognizes that we are all brothers and sisters regardless of race, creed, or ethnic 
background. And with the global crisis of Coronavirus that we are facing in the world right 
now, it is clear that every imago Dei is in this journey of life together. 
When we say that we are in this journey together, we really mean all because a very 
recent article indicated to us that, “Coronavirus could be catastrophic for Great apes, 
experts warn,”480. As Saplakoglu wrote in his article, “Great apes are our closest relatives, 
and the species that make up this group — including bonobos, gorillas, orangutans and 
chimpanzees — are endangered. Though we don't share the same language or society, we 
share about 98% of our DNA with chimpanzees. And, it seems, we have another 
unfortunate similarity: our susceptibility to the same respiratory illnesses.”481 Because of 
the similarities between these unfortunate species and human species, they are also at risk 
 
478 “Solidarity” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/solidarity (Mar 23, 2020).  
479 Catholic social teaching is a central and essential element of our faith. Its roots are in the Hebrew prophets 
who announced God's special love for the poor and called God's people to a covenant of love and justice. It 
is a teaching founded on the life and words of Jesus Christ, who came "to bring glad tidings to the poor . . . 
liberty to captives . . . recovery of sight to the blind"(Lk 4:18-19), and who identified himself with "the least 
of these," the hungry and the stranger (cf. Mt 25:45). Catholic social teaching is built on a commitment to 
the poor. Catholic social teaching emerges from the truth of what God has revealed to us about himself. We 
believe in the triune God whose very nature is communal and social. God the Father sends his only Son Jesus 
Christ and shares the Holy Spirit as his gift of love. God reveals himself to us as one who is not alone, but 
rather as one who is relational, one who is Trinity. Therefore, we who are made in God's image share this 
communal, social nature. We are called to reach out and to build relationships of love and justice. Catholic 
social teaching is based on and inseparable from our understanding of human life and human dignity. Every 
human being is created in the image of God and redeemed by Jesus Christ, and therefore is invaluable and 
worthy of respect as a member of the human family. Every person, from the moment of conception to natural 
death, has inherent dignity and a right to life consistent with that dignity. Human dignity comes from God, 
not from any human quality or accomplishment. Cf. Sharing Catholic social teaching: Challenges and 
Directions: Reflections of the U.S. Catholic bishops (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 
1998) http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-teaching/sharing-
catholic-social-teaching-challenges-and-directions.cfm (accessed Mar 23, 2020). 
480 Yasemin Saplakoglu, “Coronavirus could be catastrophic for Great apes, experts warn,” LiveScience (Mar 
26 2020) https://www.livescience.com/great-apes-coronavirus-risk.html (accessed Mar 27 2020). 
481 Ibid. 
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to be contaminated, and so the expert warns us so that it does not happen. No matter how 
we want to emphasize our differences, we are all together in this life, all together in this 
journey. Living in solidarity and sincerity is definitely the way that we are supposed to 
relate to each other, because every creature is interconnected. And this solidarity does not 
have anything to do with pity or charity. Like in the case of poor people most of the time, 
what they need is not pity or charity but justice, a system which is just and people who live 
in justice. Solidarity and sincerity among imago Dei is not then an act of pity or charity 
that some fortunate ones will do in favor of other unfortunate imago Dei, but solidarity is 
a right that all imago Dei deserve.  
In paragraphs 1939 to 1942, The Catechism of the Catholic Church develops the 
idea of solidarity as part of the Church’s social teaching. Quoting Pope Pius XII, it states 
that “An error, today abundantly widespread, is disregard for the law of human solidarity 
and charity, dictated and imposed both by our common origin and by the equality in rational 
nature of all men, whatever nation they belong to. This law is sealed by the sacrifice of 
redemption offered by Jesus Christ on the altar of the Cross to his heavenly Father, on 
behalf of sinful humanity.”482 There are also other official Catholic documents483 which 
emphasize solidarity, documents like Rerum Novarum484 by Pope Leo XII in 1891, 
 
482 Pius XII, Summi pontificatus, Oct.20, 1939; AAS 31 (1939) 423.  
483 In fact, the Catholic Church’s teachings on social justice have been formed from a rich foundation of 
Scripture, papal writings, and encyclicals as well as episcopal conferences, pastoral letters and documents. 
Taken as a whole, these teachings provide a cohesive body of thought to guide the faithful in addressing 
modern social concerns.  
484 This groundbreaking social encyclical addresses the dehumanizing conditions in which many workers 
labor and affirms workers’ rights to just wages, rest, and fair treatment, to form unions and to strike if 
necessary. Pope Leo upholds the individual’s right to hold private property, but also notes the role of the state 
in facilitating distributive justice so that workers can adequately support their families and someday own 
property of their own. He notes that poor “have a claim to special consideration” Leo XIII criticizes both 
capitalism for its tendency toward greed, concentration of wealth, and mistreatment of workers, as well as 
socialism, for what he understood as a rejection of private property and an under-emphasis on the dignity of 
each individual person. 
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Quadragesimo Anno485 by Pius XI in 1931, Mater et Magistra486 by John XXIII in 1961, 
Populorum Progressio487 by Paul VI in 1967, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis488 by John Paul II in 
1987, Deus Caritas Est489 and Caritatis in Veritate490 by Benedict XVI in 2005 and 2009, 
 
485 Pius XI begins Quadragesimo Anno by honoring and summarizing Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum (1891). 
He writes that Rerum Novarum had encouraged many Christian leaders to reflect on social issues within a 
Christian framework. After summarizing Rerum Novarum, Pius clarifies and updates four issues that Leo had 
addressed: church authority, private property, just wages, and worker associations. Benefiting from the forty 
years of discussion that had followed Rerum Novarum, Pius writes that private property has a twofold 
character: individual and collective. Workers should have a right to attain private property, but the fruits of 
the land ought to be distributed for the benefit of the common good. Pius’s discussion of the just distribution 
of wealth provides a transition to his discussion of just wages. He indicates that many factors ought to be 
considered in determining the appropriate wage for employees. He gives four considerations attention: the 
needs of the worker and his family, the condition of the business, the public economic good, and the relation 
of wages to those of other workers as well as the goods being sold. 
486 The Pope notes the world’s global interdependence and expresses profound concern about the arms race 
and the growing inequalities between rich and poor nations, noting that gains in science and technology 
should not lead to economic disparity, but should instead benefit the common good. He also expresses 
concern about the plight of small farmers and rural areas, calls for greater participation of workers in industry 
and new forms of agricultural support, and notes that respect for culture must be emphasized in the Church’s 
missionary activities. Intervention by governments is needed to address global problems, he says, but should 
also respect the principle of subsidiarity (allowing the people closest to a problem to help resolve it with 
social support as needed). Finally, he proposes that Christians should engage in a process of observing, 
judging, and acting to put the Church’s social doctrine into practice. 
487 In response to the worsening situation of the poor around the world, the Pope criticizes unjust structures 
that have led to inequality and underdevelopment, including the inequalities of the market system, the effects 
of colonialism, economic domination and exploitation of poor countries by rich ones, and the prioritization 
of military spending and the arms race over development. Pope Paul VI challenges the nations of the world 
to focus on the integral human development of the poorest nations. This type of development includes much 
more than economic growth, requiring a true commitment to solidarity (the idea that we are one human 
family) and genuinely human values. 
488 In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, Pope John Paul II celebrates the 20th anniversary of Populorum Progressio by 
updating the Church’s teaching on the “development of peoples” and changes that took place in the preceding 
two decades. The Pope points out that despite some progress in the two decades since Populorum Progressio’s 
publication, the gap between developed and developing countries continued to widened in a variety of areas, 
including the production and distribution of goods, hygiene, health and housing, availability of drinking 
water, and working conditions (especially for women). 
489 The Pope writes that the human person’s ability to love is rooted in the Father’s love for humankind and 
the person’s identity as created in the image of God. Benedict XVI locates love for the poor at the center of 
Catholic life, noting that the ”exercise of charity” is one of the Church’s three “essential activities, along with 
the administration of the sacraments and the proclamation of the word.” 6 He writes that the Church must 
form the consciences of the laity so that they can work for just ordering of society. Their political activity 
should be lived as “social charity” infused with the light of faith and love. 
490 Pope Benedict identifies justice as the primary way of charity and notes the obligation of “every Christian” 
to take a stand for the common good and work for institutional change. The values of love, truth, and 
solidarity, he writes, must inform all aspects of economic life, such as finance, trade, and globalization, which 
must be humanized and re-oriented to the common good. Business owners, investors, and consumers all have 
a role to play in guaranteeing that businesses operate to benefit the common good. Benedict XVI criticizes 
modern society’s appeal to right without acknowledging corresponding duties, and he emphasizes the 
international community’s duty toward solidarity, which should be realized in many ways, such as attention 
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and Lumen Fidei,491 Evangelium Gaudium, and Laudato Si by Francis in 2013, 2013, and 
2015, respectively.  
Solidarity, according to The Catechism of the Catholic Church, “is manifested in 
the first place by the distribution of goods and remuneration for work. It also presupposes 
the effort for a more just social order where tensions are better able to be reduced and 
conflicts more readily settled by negotiation.”492 Solidarity between the poor among 
themselves, between rich and poor, between workers themselves, between employers and 
employees in a business, solidarity among nations and peoples,493 and even solidarity 
between imago Dei seem a solution to so many problems that our society is facing, like the 
socio-economic problems, the systemic injustices of the global geopolitics and geo-
economics, and the exclusion of others because of their differences. “The virtue of 
solidarity goes beyond material goods. In spreading the spiritual goods of the faith, the 
Church has promoted, and often opened new paths for, the development of temporal goods 
as well.”494 Solidarity helps people to see other people as people of dignity, i.e., to see other 
imago Dei as imago Dei, and not just as instruments or objects to be used.495 Solidarity is 
then the sentiment from the soul of the Church which impels human beings as imago Dei 
 
to the needs of workers and immigrants and development assistance to poor countries implemented in a way 
that prioritizes respect for life and the authentic human development of the person. He links concern for life 
with the duty to care for creation, emphasizing environmental concerns more than in any past encyclical. 
491 Pope Francis' first encyclical builds on the work of his predecessor, Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI, 
completing a trilogy of encyclicals on the theological virtues-faith, hope, and love. This encyclical, "written 
by four hands," intends to encourage the People of God to embrace their faith more fully. A continuation of 
Pope Benedict XVI's encyclical letters on charity and hope, Lumen Fidei addresses the gift of faith that God 
has extended to us and how the light of faith needs to be nourished and reinforced so that it can guide us on 
our collective and individual faith journey. 
492 The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1940. 
493 Ibid., 1941. 
494 Ibid., 1942. 
495 In Kantian philosophy, there is a notable distinction between price and dignity. Something has a price 
when it has a relative value. For example, the vehicle is a means of transport, it has a price. But something is 
worthy, when it has value in itself. It cannot therefore be sold in compensation for anything, since it is an 
end. Man being an end, he is worthy. 
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to work for social conditions that are capable of offering to everyone a life worthy of 
someone made in the image of God. And solidarity is not just among human beings as 
imago Dei but solidarity is also between human beings and other species made also in the 
image of God in a different way. At the end, solidarity calls us to be people of sincerity, so 
that we can trust each other in what we think, say and do. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has, first of all, developed our constructive proposal which considers 
the various understandings of the imago Dei in relation to the contribution of Evolutionary 
science about the emergence of the anatomically modern human (AMH). We emphasized 
the possible extension of the imago Dei to other species. In order to do so, we started by 
exploring the care that human beings are supposed to have in regard to the rest of creation. 
It is with the encyclical Laudato Si, by Pope Francis, that we addressed the question of an 
“integral ecology.” Francis draws our attention to the entirety of ecology, insisting that 
humans must stop thinking of themselves as being separate from the rest of creation, 
because today everything is closely interrelated. He argues that our care for the rest of 
nature does not have anything to do with domination. Without extending the idea of the 
image of God to the rest of the creation, Pope Francis strongly raises awareness about the 
rest of creation being part of the next life.  
From there, we emphasized the extension of the imago Dei to other species with 
the contributions of Denis Edwards, Oliver Putz, and Joshua Moritz. These three 
contemporary scholars develop a theology of imago Dei which rejects the exclusivity and 
particularity of imago Dei to human beings. Each one, in his own way, has proposed an 
inclusivist approach of the imago Dei to non-human species. Edwards emphasizes the self-
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expression of God in creating all creation, which therefore images God. He helps to clarify 
the interrelationship between human beings and the rest of creation in a cultivating and 
caring way. Oliver Putz extends the notion of imago Dei to both human beings and apes 
because of the capacity for empathy and morality in both. Joshua Moritz argues from his 
theology of election that the human being as elected shares the grace of that election with 
all nonhuman creatures, in the same way that Jesus as elected saved all flesh on earth and 
outside of earth. While, we agree totally with Laudato Si’ and with the necessity of the 
inclusive approach to the imago Dei, we agree also with Edwards, Putz and Moritz when 
it is matter of extending the imago Dei to other living species. We think that the many ways 
of self-expression of God can be the basis for the many ways of the imago Dei in Creation, 
so that each species is made in the image of God in a different way. And with our 
understanding of the similarities and divergences between modern humans and other 
species, we proposed the idea of the imago Dei in all living species in different ways. 
Because of the similarity between species, each species can be considered as made in the 
image of God, and because of the divergence between species, each species is made in the 
image of God in a different way.  
In the last part of this third chapter, we focused on the purpose and at the very end 
we talk about the sincerity of every imago Dei. We emphasized the purpose of imago Dei 
because even when, with the evolutionary science, we explain how living species evolve, 
that does not mean that they can only be explained scientifically. Beyond atheistic 
materialism, where nature and living species are considered as purposeless, we believe that 
by allowing every species to evolve, God has indicated a purpose for each one of them. 
There is not only an individual and self-centered purpose but, as imago Dei, there is a 
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universal and divine purpose, which is not located within the imago Dei but in the One in 
whose image we are made. The divine purpose is then going to be revealed 
eschatologically. Our lives do not have their entire meaning and goal in this life. Our 
purpose is not yet completely known. All our individual and self-centered purposes must 
not overshadow the divine purpose for which we are made in the image of God. The divine 
purpose does not reside at the beginning or during the creatio continua but it resides in the 
future, when Creation will then turn out to be a single inclusive divine act, and there, what 
God said will then carry all its meaning, that all Creation is effectively good.  
Because we are all made in the image of God and we are journeying together toward 
our divine purpose, we proposed that it is wise for us to live in solidarity and sincerity. 
Solidarity is not a feeling about helping other people but is a way of life that recognizes 
that we are all brothers and sisters regardless of race, creed, or ethnic background. Our 
differences are not bigger than our similarities. Even with other species, which are made 
in the image of God in different ways, we are in this journey together. With the case of 
COVID-19 (or Coronavirus) in this recent time, we all have plenty of examples to see that 
human beings are all treated equally by the virus, regardless of our cultures, religions, 
occupations, or financial situations. Living in solidarity and sincerity with other imago Dei, 
even those which are imago Dei in different ways, seems the wisest thing that we can do 
as people made in the image of God because undeniably, we are interconnected.  
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General Conclusion  
In conclusion, we would like to recapitulate some of the major points of the three 
different chapters. We started with an analysis of the various understandings of the notion 
of imago Dei in the history of Christianity, and demonstrated that the concept has had a 
fluid content that depended on the social, historical, and conceptual frameworks in which 
they were articulated. That provided the justification for exploring further elaboration of 
the concept. We then emphasized the contributions of contemporary evolutionary science 
on the emergence of the modern humans, and argued how the similarity and divergence 
between modern humans and other species helped us to elaborate a proposal of an 
extension of the notion of imago Dei to other species. We concluded that every species 
could be recognized as made in the image of God in a different way.  
We are also aware that the theological anthropological perspective explains the 
human person in consideration of our faith, in light of Revelation and the Christ event. This 
perspective has often been readjusted when a new scientific discovery has been made. 
Because of the knowledge that our ancestors in the faith had about the human species, it 
was obvious for them that the human person was created in his actual form and was very 
separate from the other species. From the understanding of those times, the notion of imago 
Dei could only be applied to the human person.  
Therefore, for much of Christian history, being made at the image of God referred 
uniquely to the human person. This was true from the biblical perspective, where the 
human being as imago Dei was understood as undivided and relational, from the Eastern 
patristic view where the human person could have a likeness or the image of God, from the 
Western patristic and medieval view where the human person was characterized by one of 
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his/her features or capacities like reason or intellectual ability, from the functional or 
stewardship model where the responsibility of the imago Dei was emphasized, and from 
the communal or relational approach where the human person was understood as a person 
of relation. It was clear from all these perspectives that only human beings were the imago 
Dei.  
The knowledge that we have about ourselves can determine considerably what we 
say about our being made in the image of God. The development of the new understandings 
of the human species as an entity which has emerged in the process of evolutionary 
pathways challenges the idea of our uniqueness in the world, which was based on our being 
created separately from other species or on our capacity for having some features which 
belong uniquely to the human race.  
Despite challenging the idea of our uniqueness based on our being created in our 
actual form and separate from other species, the evolutionary contributions, especially 
consideration of the cultural and epistemic evolutions, recognize some distinctive 
characteristics in modern humans, like the theoretic culture of Donald, the symbolic 
reference of Deacon, and the scientific knowledge of Renn.  
These distinctive characteristics or attributes, which are only for modern humans, 
are also the proof of the modern humans as imago Dei in a different way than other species. 
Despite the recognition of our distinction as a species because of our ability for theoretic 
culture, for symbolization, and for scientific knowledge, contemporary evolutionary 
science has proven the abundant similarities between humans and nonhuman species that 
not only do we share a common ancestor with nonhumans animals, but also that there is a 
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similarity between the genetic sequences, brains, language, culture, and tool-use of the 
different species, humans and nonhuman animals. 
As it is now difficult to build the notion of the imago Dei on some unique 
characteristic or on our being created separately from other species, by considering our 
belief in the eschatological gathering where everything will be reunited in God, and by 
using the contributions of some contemporary scholars like Denis Edwards, Oliver Putz, 
and Joshua Moritz, we extended the notion of the imago Dei to other species.  
However, considering the divergences between species, we construed the notion of 
the imago Dei in each species in a different way. Because of our similarity, every species 
is imago Dei and because of our divergence, every species is imago Dei in a different way. 
As we all are all created and evolved as the expression of God, we are not then without 
purpose; instead, our purpose is a divine one. Having divine purpose shows that the fullness 
of who we are will happen eschatologically, and therefore, living in solidarity with other 
imago Dei, even those who are imago Dei in a different way, is no longer an act of pity or 
charity but a right that every imago Dei has because of their inalienable value in the eyes 
of the Creator. 
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